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“Not all CBOs are able to facilitate collective action effectively. 
The extent to which they can do so depends critically on the 
degree to which citizens hold them accountable and legitimate.” 
 
   (Heller 2000; Schönwalder 1997 in Krishna 2004: 9)  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this thesis is to examine the internal dynamics of grassroots level 
organisation in two poor communities in post-apartheid South Africa. Since the end of 
apartheid new social struggles have sprung up all over the country opposing local 
governments and municipalities for failing to provide proper and affordable service delivery. 
According to Ballard et al. (2006: xiii) there has been a polarised response towards what these 
struggles are and who they represent. For some these struggles are the new opposition and the 
true voice of the poor and marginalised, for others aligned to the state they are just 
irresponsible actions of few activists with a limited understanding of the complexities of the 
post-apartheid reconstruction. This thesis seeks to unfold the inner complexities within two 
such social struggles, and attempts to add detail to the understanding of how groups of poor 
and marginalised work and function in their localities, as well as who they are and what they 
represent. In much of the literature on civil society, and especially on social movements, 
emphasis has often been placed on its relation to the state. Although this relationship is 
important to investigate, it is equally pertinent to explore the nature of relationships and the 
tensions that exist within civil society. This thesis will hopefully contribute to a better 
understanding of the inner workings of civil society groups, and the challenges related to the 
plurality of their base. By seeking primarily to get a better understanding of the internal 
dynamics and relationships within civil society organisations (CSOs) this thesis will be a 
contribution to the criticism in the literature of treating civil society as one homogeneous 
agent (Habib & Kotzé 2003) and of romanticising civil society in a way that ignores issues of 
power, politics, and internal conflicts (Mercer 2002, Mohan & Stokke 2000, Purcell 2006).  
The main goal of this thesis is to investigate two CSOs‟ perceived legitimacy through 
presenting utterances and stories of the people living in the communities they are based, as 
well as of the people actively involved in the CSOs. Their perceptions of the CSOs are central 
in the understanding of how the CSOs work in their constituencies and whether they are 
perceived as legitimate representatives of the people.  
Although the relation between the CSOs and the state will be investigated, this 
relationship is primarily intended to offer a better understanding of the relations and dynamics 
within the CSOs and their constituencies. These diverse sets of relationships within and 
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between the CSOs and their constituencies, as well as between the CSOs and the formal 
political system, will be investigated through the concept of legitimacy.  
Legitimacy  
Legitimacy will be scrutinised through four main analytical concepts, namely; framing, 
political strategies, participation, and delivery. By looking deeper into what these concepts 
contain, and how they play out in the two communities - through the workings of the two 
CSOs - the thesis will shed light on how the CSOs frame their issues, construct themselves, 
and motivate mobilisation in their constituencies (through framing), as well as how they relate 
to the formal local political system
1
 (through political strategies), and how they relate to the 
people they are supposed to represent through their organisational structure and ways of 
working within their constituencies (through participation and delivery). These aspects will be 
assessed through three themes within theories on social movements, namely cultural framing, 
political opportunity structures (POS), and mobilising structure.   The centre of attention is, 
then, on the relation between the CSOs and their constituencies, and the relation between the 
CSOs and the local formal political system. These two relations influence on each other and 
together they form a three-divided complex of actors: the CSOs, their constituencies, and the 
local formal political system. A working model with an overview of the four analytical 
concepts and how they influence on these two relationships is presented in the theoretical 
framework (see figure 1).  
 
The topic focus is interesting as it will contribute to the academic literature and research on 
social movements and community struggles in post-apartheid South Africa. It touches some 
very important issues and processes in present South Africa, 14 years after apartheid, where 
the growth in post-apartheid community struggles and their fight for free or affordable access 
to basic services has been an eye-catching reality, especially since the end of the 1990s. South 
Africa‟s liberal democracy has been heavily criticised for its neoliberal approach and for not 
providing basic services to the masses of the poor, such as proper shelter, and free access to 
electricity and water. How CSOs adopt various strategies in getting access to these basic 
                                                 
1
 The thesis uses various names for the formal political system throughout the thesis. These are „eThekwini 
Municipality‟ or just „municipality‟, „state‟, „local state‟, „government‟, „local government‟, „council‟ and „town 
council‟. These names referring to the formal political system - mostly at local, but also at national level - are 
used interchangeably throughout the thesis and reflect the activists and informants‟ interchangeably use of the 
concept.    
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services and what impact these strategies have on the CSOs within their constituencies can 
provide interesting findings on how CSOs work and function in their localities as well as 
whether the people they represent think they do contribute to an improvement of their 
situation. The two CSOs serve as illustrations of how plural civil society groups in the post-
apartheid context are, and contribute in the criticism in the literature against romanticising 
civil society by assuming that it is a homogeneous entity that will lead to true „trickling down‟ 
of resources and deepening democracy through the post-apartheid participatory approaches.      
 
Background for research questions 
This thesis seeks to do a comparative study of two CSOs both located in Chatsworth. 
Chatsworth is a predominantly Indian township on the outskirts of Durban, and is the largest 
city on the east coast of South Africa. The two CSOs, namely the Bayview Flats Residents 
Association (BFRA) and the Westclif Flats Residents Association (W-FRA) are both located 
in the so-called „flatted‟ areas of Chatsworth that consist mainly of the low-income 
government-owned housing, the blocks of flats, that were built in the 1960s under apartheid to 
house those classified as Indians that were forcibly removed from their homes under the 
Group Areas Act (of 1950). The BFRA is located in Bayview community - in unit two, while 
the W-FRA is located in the neighbouring community Westcliff - in unit three. These case 
areas are interesting because it is claimed that they were the sites of the first visible signs of 
social struggle in the post-apartheid era that sparked social resistance in other communities all 
over South Africa. At least that is the view of my informants, although Desai argues that “to 
say that this struggle begins in Chatsworth is a kind of shorthand, which saves the trouble of 
explaining each time that, like all revolts that grow, it has many beginnings” (2002:7). 
However, as movements do ebb and flow, it was interesting to take a deeper look into these 
pockets of resistance in Chatsworth, once so powerful, to see how persistent they still were 
some five years after their peak-period from 1999 to 2002. The fieldwork material used in this 
thesis was collected from late September 2006 till mid-January 2007.  
 
The thesis treats the W-FRA and the BFRA as CSOs namely because they both form part of 
civil society, but their struggle history, and their current workings in their respective 
communities, have rendered them with characteristics similar to both social movements, 
community based organisations (CBOs), and NGOs. Both have not employed all these 
characteristics simultaneously, but as the discussion throughout this thesis will show, their 
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differences today make them look quite similar to CBOs in one case, and NGOs in the other. 
Despite this, the thesis also acknowledges the hybrid nature of these CSOs in that the different 
strategies they utilise in different spaces and for different outcomes show that they employ 
characteristics similar to all these civil society groups, although to different extent, depending 
on the context and the situation.  
 
Research Questions  
To assess the legitimacy of the two CSOs presented above, I will look at various aspects that 
together characterise the CSOs and their relation to their constituents and the political system, 
and what influence these characteristics have on the legitimacy they (the CSOs) attain in their 
constituencies. The thesis‟ main research question is: 
  
 What strategies are utilized by CSOs to present themselves as the legitimate 
representatives of the people, and how are these strategies able to give them 
legitimacy within their constituencies? 
 
To shed light on the various aspects contained in the concept of legitimacy and the strategies 
used by the CSOs in achieving legitimacy, I have used three questions that concretise the 
specific issues and aspects of strategies to gain legitimacy, and have formulated them as: 
 
a) How do the CSOs frame their demands, how do they present themselves as the 
solution to the problems, and how does their choice of motivational framing impact on 
their legitimacy? 
b) What relation do the CSOs have to the formal political system, and how does this 
relation impact on the legitimacy of the CSOs? 
c) How do the CSOs organise community participation (and distribute resources) and 
how does this impact on the legitimacy of the CSOs?  
The first question (a) will shed light on the CSOs‟ use of framing strategies by looking at their 
ability to diagnose problems, create a collective identity with their constituents, frame a 
solution to their problems, and motivating people to participate in the proposed strategies and 
ways forward. The second question (b) looks at the CSOs‟ relation to the formal political 
system and what significance this relation has on the relation between the CSO and its 
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constituency, implied in this is that the legitimacy the CSOs obtain in their constituency is 
based on their choices of political strategies. The constituents‟ perceptions of the state are 
important for whether they perceive their CSO as legitimate or not, and will be discussed in 
the analysis. The third question (c) assumes that there is a link between the CSOs‟ legitimacy 
and the constituents‟ level of participation in CSO activities and their access to resources 
(delivery) from the CSO. The assessment of participation and delivery will elucidate 
important aspects of the CSOs‟ organisational structure.  
 
The structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into eight chapters and provides an analysis of the legitimacy attained by 
the W-FRA and the BFRA in their constituencies in two neighbouring communities in 
Chatsworth, South Africa. The aim is to see how two relatively identical CSOs use different 
means in striving to achieve identical goals, and how their choices of strategies to reach their 
goals render them different in the eyes of their constituents.  
Chapter 2 offers a historical and current contextualisation of the two CSOs that 
provide an important background in which they developed and came into being. The 
socioeconomic challenges facing the two CSOs today portrays the current climate they are 
facing in their work and forms part of their social basis.  
Chapter 3 is a presentation of the theoretical framework that frames the discussion in 
the analytical chapters five, six and seven. Here the concept of legitimacy is defined mainly 
through four analytical concepts that will be analysed through three themes in theories on 
social movements.  
Chapter 4 is a presentation of my methodological approach where the discussion of 
strengths and weaknesses in my data-collection and the processing of the data will form an 
important basis to assess the quality of my research.  
Chapter 5 gives the reader a look into the discourses (framing strategies) used by the 
two CSOs, and how they try to convince their constituents that the issues they fight for are 
unjust and need to be acted upon to be changed. How the CSOs attract participants and 
supporters through diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing is at the heart of the 
discussion.  
Chapter 6 analyses the relation between the CSOs and the political system. How the 
political opportunities and constraints facing them are utilised impact on the relation they 
develop to the political system, and ultimately to their own constituents.  
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Chapter 7 assesses the organisational structure of the CSOs. Their organisational form 
influences on the CSOs‟ relation to their constituents and ultimately on their attained 
legitimacy within their constituencies.  
The last chapter summarises the findings of the thesis and explicitly answers the 
research questions guiding the discussion. The main aspects of the two CSOs‟ framing 
strategies, use of political strategies, and organisational structure, will be discussed against 
what implications these characteristics can have for their future role in their constituencies. 
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2. CHATSWORTH: HISTORY AND 
SOCIOECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
 
Description of the area 
Chatsworth was laid out on either side of a ridge many kilometres long. From this 
ridge, countless roads lead down in steep slopes, and are intersected by streets that run 
parallel to the Highway. There are rows of semi-detached, two-story flats painted in 
faded pastel shades of blue, orange, lilac, pink, turquoise and lavender. At the bottom 
of the ridge, where a valley is formed, the semi-detached flats mutate into huge, bulky 
tenement blocks containing six families a piece. Here, the poorest of the poor have 
been put to live and die, cramped, ugly, unsafe and hidden from view.  
 
            (Desai 2000:4)  
 
The huge, bulky tenement blocks are the government-owned flats located in both Bayview 
and Westcliff. Today they are more than 40 years old and are not as colourful and bright as 
the rest of the houses and buildings around. In this sea of pastel shaded colours the blocks lie 
bleak, tired and exhausted from years in the sun and the rain. The blocks have a bleak 
yellowish colour, with a bleak wine-coloured foundation wall, and are ridden with profound 
cracks and tagging, looking as if they desperately need a stroke of paint to fresh them up and 
cement to patch the profound cracks. These washed-out colours and deep-ridden cracks are 
clear signs of poverty and destitution, and prove the age of these flats like wrinkles on an old 
face show how long a person has withstood time.  
The flats come in three different sizes; a one-bedroom and a kitchen, a two-bedroom 
and a kitchen, and a three-bedroom and a kitchen. For many, the flats do not house a family of 
few members, but often families with many children, extended families, or even families of 
three or four generations. This results in crammed spaces with no privacy.  
In between the blocks are washing stones of cement placed in groups of four, and two 
taps next to these. Some taps are frequently in use, others are dried up with no sign of running 
water, or closed with a type of box and a padlock. Judging from these observations, these taps 
are not communal, and the water running through is not free. 
Around and between each block of flats are narrow pathways of cement which one can 
use when moving from one place to another. These pathways are often wet and slippery as a 
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result of spring water coming up from the ground, and have resulted in people falling and 
injuring themselves
2
. On rainy days many flats get flooded, and many have experienced all 
their furniture and things being destroyed. 
 When ignoring the details of the tenement blocks, the overall area looks beautiful. The 
blocks are surrounded by a very green and lavish landscape, and mango trees are a common 
view.  The bushes around some of the flats grow wild and look as if they are going to drown 
and encapsulate the flats with their branches and leaves. On the flatland between the blocks 
the grass grows high. If one stands by one of the flats on top of one of the highest hills, one 
can, beyond the sea of pastel-shaded buildings and dark grey asbestos roofs, catch a glimpse 
of the real sea: the Indian Ocean.  
Despite these green and beautiful surroundings, the high grass and the wild-growing 
bushes have their own dark story. Accounts and stories from the people living here illuminate 
the hidden dangers in these, superficially, beautiful spaces. Snakes are common, and the tall, 
thick bushes provide a perfect hiding spot for robbers and murderers. In this context, mothers 
are scared of their children playing around in the tall grass in danger of getting bitten, or of 
snakes sneaking into the flats. One informant told me she has had snakes coming into her flat, 
one even in her bed. During my stay in the area I also saw snakes; one had been smashed with 
stones by one of the neighbours. Despite the fears of snakes among the residents in these 
communities, the fear of humans utilising these perfect hiding spots is greater. One Bayview 
resident said in an interview: 
 
The bushes are growing. Here the workers are going to work, they get robbed in the 
morning, there‟s murders because of bushes. When you walk down to forty [40] you‟ll 
see what I mean. There is so many bushes, and the road from Umlazi, KwaMashu is a 
pathway. Now we don‟t know who is doing the murders, or who‟s robbing the people 
because we have no electricity. 
                  (Bayview resident 4) 
 
In addition to the natural surroundings, the lack of proper streetlights (as mentioned by this 
informant) is a problem.  
 
                                                 
2
 I was told by one neighbour that her daughter fell and broke her leg because of the slippery pathway. She sued 
the Municipality for not doing a proper upgrading to improve the conditions (informal conversation, Westcliff 
resident).  
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Through observations, informal conversations and interviews, I got familiar with the 
problems with the flats themselves: Unstable buildings create cracks in the walls; some blocks 
looking as if they are going to collapse any time
3
. The hollow and porous brick-walls and 
cracks makes it easier for water to seep through, resulting in flooded flats, and a discolouring 
of inside walls due to a sort of mould that sticks to them creating a dirty look. This requires 
people that can afford it to re-paint the inside walls every-two years
4
. Asbestos roofs and no 
ceilings often result in high temperatures inside the flats, in the top-floor especially. High 
levels of dampness and heat have resulted in high levels of wheezing, asthma, and respiratory 
problems among the people there.  
 
All places, no matter how dilapidated they might be, do have their own story. The following 
section brings us back to the beginning of Chatsworth‟s existence and its history up to now. 
Historical background 
Chatsworth was built in the 1960s, early 1970s. Under apartheid it acted as a buffer zone 
between the Black townships KwaMashu and Umlazi, and the White suburbs of Durban 
(Freund 2001). Today it houses around 350.000 people. Although most were Indian due to 
apartheid segregation laws, today around 30 percent of the population are Africans (Desai 
2002). The notorious Group Areas Act (GAA) of 1950 (Act No. 41 of 1950) uprooted people 
from their homes, and for the Indians living in central areas and „Homelands‟ around Durban, 
their forced relocation put them in homes in the newly built township. Tightly knit social 
networks were dissolved, and extended families were broken up into nuclear families. This 
made life tough as strangers became neighbours and additional financial burdens were placed 
on them. The relocations resulted in a downward spiralling development for the people forced 
to live in Chatsworth.  
 Despite the breaking down of the once-so-strong civic life present among the Indians 
before being relocated, new community structures sprung up in Chatsworth in the late 1960s. 
People divided themselves in wards, elected committees, mobilized and put up a „shadow 
town council (Desai 2002). As this was seen as a danger, Council resisted the mobilization by 
criticizing leaders of being revolutionaries that were inciting the poor, and continued apace 
with forced evictions of the residents to created fear and division in the communities. Anti-
                                                 
3
 See front page photo/illustration. 
4
 Informal conversations, Westcliff residents. 
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poverty protests were also opposed by further rent increases and a „no nonsense approach‟ 
(Desai 2002:26).   
Local leaders from the wealthier middle class opposed the call by the Indian Welfare 
Society to mix people from the low and high-income groups so lower-class people could be 
lifted by the upper-class people (Natal Mercury, April 9, 1969 in Desai 2002). And they also 
supported further rent-increases despite resistance from the Chatsworth Civic Association. 
This led to an uneven development of the areas within Chatsworth and put a spoke in the 
wheels of a unified response “in a manner typical of Indian and generally anti-apartheid 
politics” (Desai 2002:27). The affluent framed the issues and had access to the media and 
existing political organizations, so issues of poverty and lack of housing was sidelined, even 
by progressive organizations in the area (Desai 2002).  
 
The downfall of Chatsworth, and the build up to the 90s 
Together with an oppressive apartheid system that restrained the mobility of people, making it 
even more difficult to travel back and forth from work, alcoholism, suicide, child abuse, and 
divorces escalated. From the mid 1970s to the early 1980s gangsterism thrived, and with it 
violence, corrupted polices and a whole lot of drug-dealing escalated (Desai 2002). In 1980, 
an investigation by the Chatsworth Indian Child and Welfare Society found that mass 
unemployment and increased divorce rates accelerated the number of Chatsworth residents 
relying on state grants (Desai 2002).  
Amidst this socioeconomic breakdown the newly inaugurated Chatsworth Housing 
Action Committee (CHAC) began to stir up large protests against rent increases and the 
Council‟s attempts to sell the flats to the residents. Despite their opposition, evictions 
continued. In 1983, however, after the increased anti-apartheid mobilization in the 1980 
school boycotts, the state instituted a host of reforms. Indians and Coloureds were offered 
representation in the tricameral parliamentary system, and in Chatsworth it was a noticeable 
cut-back in evictions. The tricameral parliament attracted wealthy middle class individuals 
from Chatsworth, but few people voted for them. On the other side of the divide Indian 
politicians and professional middle-class people that were in the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) 
played a major role in the United Democratic Front (UDF) and in the Durban Housing Action 
Committee (DHAC), but the NIC was never able to build a mass base in Chatsworth (Desai 
2002).  
11 
 
 Instead, local civic organizations started to assert themselves in Chatsworth, and as 
protests became more recurrent, a clear set of demands emerged. In July 1989, 300 protesters 
came together on the Regional Offices of the House of Delegates. Many were tear-gassed and 
arrested. They demanded more affordable rents. During this period of marches, boycotts, and 
rallies, all kinds of groups from all over (students, workers, churches and civic associations) 
supported each other‟s demands, and the DHAC grew in strength. This was a year before the 
revolt in South African cities intensified so much that the National Party was forced to 
abandon apartheid (Desai 2002).  
 From 1990 liberation movements were unbanned, the GAA was repealed, and with 
that the apartheid regime was dismantled (Desai 2000, 2002, Smith 2001). In 1994 the ANC 
came to power, and a new era of history began.  
 
The post-apartheid era 
In 1994, the ANC won the government seat and a transition to a multi-party, no-racial 
democracy commenced (Edigheji 2003). South Africa‟s transition to liberal democracy 
happened in a peaceful manner and is seen as a social revolution where the real beneficiaries 
were the popular masses. With this transition civil society was transformed as the previous 
networks of civil society were absorbed in part into the state apparatus. The United 
Democratic Front, ANC, civics and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) where either 
now part of the government or operating in close collaboration with it. This period changed 
the relations between state and civil society from being adversarial to being more 
collaborative and development oriented (Ballard et al. 2005), and so the political opportunities 
changed.  
The new government‟s promises of „a better life for all‟ and their party programme, 
namely the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) represented a radical 
constitutional reform that granted extensive formal rights to all citizens (Stokke & Oldfield 
2004), and is seen one of the most progressive constitutions in the World. Together with the 
absorption of many civil society groups into the state apparatus, these promises lead to a 
decline in the civil society activity in the early 1990s as the citizens of South Africa patiently 
waited for the seed of democracy (newly-planted) to grow and surround them with a net of 
security and improved socioeconomic conditions. 
When changes did not occur, and the government, with President Thabo Mbeki in the 
lead, changed the RDP into the neoliberal structural adjustment programme: the Growth 
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Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) in 1996, people started waking up from their doze of 
hope and realised that the promised improvements were not coming anytime soon.  
Privatisation distanced the government from being a „provider‟ to a mere „ensurer‟ of 
service delivery (Bond 2004, Stokke and Oldfield 2004)  using NGOs as their contractors. 
This was followed by cost-recovery policies and changed the political and economic 
discourse on water and electricity from being a natural right, to a „scarce‟ economic good 
(Ruiters 2004). While new infrastructure was rolled out, the high price of services and high 
levels of non-payment led to a low-level war between local authorities and working class 
consumers (Ruiters 2004). Massive service cut-offs in water and electricity services, and 
litigation against the poor, spurred resistance in townships all over South Africa. Demanding 
affordable access to basic services and proper housing, people began engaging in meetings, 
discussing strategies and ways to claim back their rights and dignity (Desai 2002). In light of 
these circumstances, CSOs such as the BFRA and the W-FRA in Chatsworth came into being. 
 
The birth of the post-apartheid resistance  
"The struggle in Chatsworth helped to ignite rebellions in other areas, and to illuminate 
struggles already happening elsewhere” 
           (Desai 2002:7) 
The Bayview Flats Residents Association (BFRA) in Chatsworth‟s unit two - Bayview, and 
the Westcliff Flats Residents Association (W-FRA) in unit three - Westcliff - or „Bangladesh‟ 
as most people call it - are both formally constituted organizations comprised of people living 
in the government-owned flats described above. They both emerged out of this post-apartheid 
environment. In pace with rising unemployment rates as a result of the shedding of thousands 
of jobs in the clothing sector, poverty levels, services-cut offs and forced evictions increased, 
inciting anger and frustration among the people in Chatsworth. According to the W-FRA 
leader:  
What actually motivated us to start organising was when the government they decided 
to chop off the child support grant by one third. And whilst they did that they said it 
was for the purpose of redistribution to Black people. It was a fair decision, but while 
they decreased the child support grant by one third they increased the rent the same 
month. And that was the difficult part. 
 
Tenants in the four government-owned flatted communities in Chatsworth (Bayview, 
Westcliff, Woodhurst and Crossmoor) were facing the same problems, and started organizing 
together as the Flatdwellers Action Committee (FAC). They held meetings, elected 
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representatives from the each community, and for about one year they jointly mobilized in 
protest marches, served memorandums, had discussions with the municipality around their 
problems, and managed to prevent evictions through the court-system with the help of 
wealthy individuals and low-priced attorneys. The Municipality eventually refused any direct 
communication with the Chatsworth activists and created instead a working group to act as a 
communicator between it (municipality) and the activists. According to the W-FRA leader, 
this working group turned out unable to speak the poor people‟s case “So, we that were truly 
representing the poor could not (…) put ourselves into this group because they didn‟t make 
decisions on how people were people.” It was close to the national elections in 1999 and a 
temporary moratorium on evictions gave the Chatsworth activists time to rethink their 
position and strategies.  
Just before the national elections in 1999, the activists in the FAC then decided to 
invite all the political parties to a meeting in Westcliff together with people from all the 
communities of Chatsworth. That turned out to be a turning-point in their struggle. Attending 
the meeting was a pre-apartheid freedom fighter, Professor Fatima Meer, representing a group 
called the Concerned Citizens Group (CCG) made mostly of Indian ANC members and pre-
apartheid freedom fighters. They were going to Indian communities to promote people to vote 
for the ANC in the upcoming national elections, but especially to convince Indians not to vote 
for the „white parties‟ (the New National Party and the Democratic Party) in the upcoming 
general elections in June 1999 (Desai 2000, 2002, Dwyer 2006). Instead, they were met with 
anger and stories of the poverty in the flatted areas of Chatsworth. “At that meeting they were 
attacked very badly, and it was at that meeting that the Concerned Citizens Group and Fatima 
Meer decided what their position (…) in our communities were. When they truly listened to 
the plights of the poor people” (interview,W-FRA leader).  
At this moment things started to change. Professor Meer and the CCG members 
realised that the situation in these communities was far more complex than what they first 
thought was the lack of a revolutionary, non-racial consciousness (Desai 2000, 2002). After 
spending some time in the communities, and being exposed to the poor and appalling 
conditions people were living under, with no fault of their own, Professor Meer and the CCG 
members realised that the reason for non-payment of rent and services in these communities 
was an „economics of non-payment‟, and not a „culture of non-payment‟5 as proposed by the 
                                                 
5
 There has been a debate about the government‟s view/discourse on the „culture of non-payment‟. For a 
discussion challenging this view see McDonald and Pape (2002). 
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government. Instead of canvassing for votes for the ANC, Professor Meer and the CCG got 
together with the residents of Bayview and Westcliff and made a survey of the socioeconomic 
conditions in the communities.  
The results were appalling: of 504 families in the Bayview and Westcliff areas, 75% 
lived below the poverty line, 58% were unemployed and 42% were dependent on welfare 
grants (Fatima Meer in Natal Mercury 17 February 1999 in Dwyer 2006). In addition to this, 
children where not in schools for lack of fees, and diseases of poverty raged unchecked (Desai 
2000). The results were piled in a report to present to the ANC government to convince them 
that evictions and services cut-offs should not be visited on these poor. Thinking this report 
would be the first snowball in building up for positive changes in the communities, it was 
instead a proof of disbelief and disappointment in the ANC seeing that they totally ignored 
the terrible conditions it had exposed. The CCG then abandoned its quest for votes for the 
ANC, and turned itself into a human rights pressure group. It acted as a catalyst revitalizing 
flatdwellers‟ associations in Units 2, 3 and 10 of Chatsworth, and a powerful leadership 
started to emerge in these areas (Desai 2000). In meetings with CCG, Chatsworth flats 
residents, community groups from around Durban, students, academics and others, actions 
were discussed, banners made, political videos showed, and so the crafting of a powerful 
resistance was born (Dwyer 2006). The CCG changed its name into the Concerned Citizens 
Forum (CCF) to disassociate itself from its previous connections to the ANC, and in line with 
its new identity as the co-ordinating body linking groups in Durban and South Africa. It was 
at this time the two CSOs were formally constituted, in June 1999, just after the national 
elections. Coming from neighbouring communities, living under the same socioeconomic 
conditions in government-owned flats, and having an identical history and grievances, it is 
almost impossible to differentiate one from the other.  
 
The Bayview Flats Residents Association (BFRA) in Bayview has an executive of 18 
members, of which 17 are women (Benjamin 2007). The current leader is a young male of 25
6
 
years that has been the chairperson of the BFRA since six months after its birth. The leader‟s 
involvement in community activism started early with being the Secretary of the FAC at an 
age of 18. When the BFRA was constituted he was elected Secretary, and was later on (when 
the initial chairperson resigned) nominated and elected by the community to be the leader 
                                                 
6
 That was in 2006 during my fieldwork, this year he will be 27.  
15 
 
(Interview, BFRA leader). The committee has not changed much over the years where 
“almost 90% of the people that are still in the current committee have been there [in] the last 
4-5 years” (Interview,BFRA leader).  
The Westcliff Flats Residents Association (W-FRA) is located in the neighbouring 
community, Westcliff. The W-FRA also has a committee dominated by women. Although it 
has gone through changes over the years, many of today‟s committee members have been 
there for many years. The biggest difference between the two CSOs is the leadership: whilst 
the BFRA is lead by a young man, the W-FRA has had a 40 something year-old female leader 
since its birth.   
Both CSOs have democratically elected leaders and committee members, but are 
dependent on committed people, as all work is unpaid and voluntary. This entails a certain 
flexibility in the roles given each elected committee member and leader, where their roles can 
be overlapping, or even be „taken over‟ by „volunteers‟7. The CSOs do not have the resources 
for a formal office, so the leaders‟ homes often function as provisory offices from which they 
organize the activities necessary for the running of the organization, such as writing, printing 
and scanning documents/letters. Despite having relatively identical historical beginnings, 
sharing the same grievances and goals, and having a more or less informal organizational 
structure, the CSOs do, as will transpire throughout the discussion in the analytical chapters, 
have many important differences.  
 
The period (1999-2002) in which the CCF was most active in the communities was also the 
period of most action. Both activists and people from both communities speak warmly of this 
particular time in the history of their struggle, and many see themselves as igniters of the 
post-apartheid struggles in South Africa. One W-FRA committee member, the first to be 
forcibly evicted in Chatsworth, proudly said: “In fact I started the struggle” (Interview,W-
FRA member 1). The BFRA leader, talking of Chatsworth as a whole, said:   
From the eviction and the resistance that occurred in Bayview and Westcliff here in 
Chatsworth in the year 2000, the Anti Eviction Campaign started in the Western Cape, 
the Anti-Privatisation Forum started in Johannesburg, so Chatsworth, in a sense, gave 
rise and birth to social movements in South Africa. 
 
                                                 
7
 Volunteers are here defined as people actively involved in CSO activities, but who do not have any formal 
position in the CSO as they have never been formally elected into the committee. 
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Today, the CCF does not have such an active presence in Chatsworth as during the three first 
years (1999-2002) of its existence. While some argue it has demised, others argue that the 
CCF, just like other movements, have quiet periods and that these kind of inactive periods can 
be used to rethink new strategies in relation to the state (Dwyer 2004, Desai 2002). In an 
interview with the front leader of the CCF, Professor Fatima Meer, she argued that the CCF 
gradually abated. She claims that due to lack of funding it was difficult to sustain the 
organisation and uphold momentum. Nonetheless, she argues that as an organisation it made a 
difference and that the people in it are still active today.  
 
Whether or not the CCF is inactive today has certainly not affected the level of activity in the 
two communities, especially not in Westcliff. The following part presents today‟s continued 
socioeconomic challenges in the two communities, and forms an important backdrop in 
understanding the issues facing the W-FRA and the BFRA in their daily workings. 
 
Continued socioeconomic challenges  
The awakening of civil society, and especially of the W-FRA and the BFRA, must be seen in 
light of neoliberalism and globalisation. The effects this has had on the South African 
economy and society as a whole is the cutting back on free or heavily subsidised essential 
services that meet basic needs, undermining of the progressive labour legislation, the 
reduction of progressive taxation and the free flow of money between countries (Egan and 
Wafer 2004). 
 
Today‟s socioeconomic problems have worsened since the ANC came to power and represent 
great challenges for the people in Bayview and Westcliff. According to statistics based on the 
2001 census around 40% of the population in both Bayview and Westcliff are not 
economically active and more than half of the people in both communities have no income 
(58% in Bayview, 55% in Westcliff) (Ward profiles 2003, StatsSA). Other surveys done in 
the communities by the IBR and CCG together with the BFRA “showed about 76% living 
below poverty (…) living below R1200,-. There was 46% unemployment rate and 16% no 
income. The recent [survey] was done when the Council was doing the upgrade (…) and that 
showed 86-87% living below the poverty line” (Interview,BFRA leader). The BFRA leader 
continued to say: “If you look at the expenses and the income then [people] are generally 
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living in poverty”. Judging by these poor economic conditions the non-payment of rent and 
services seems to be rather unavoidable.  
 
Non-payment of rent and services is rife in both Bayview and Westcliff. Although most paid 
during apartheid, many have accumulated huge arrears due to a combination of raised 
unemployment rates, the reduction of social grants (due to the replacement of the State 
Maintenance Grant during apartheid with the Child Support Grant in April 1998), and 
increased prices for rent and services.  
Non-payment is, in the gust of the market-oriented GEAR and its push for cost-
recovery, punished with cut-offs, and most controversially in the case of South Africa, 
evictions (McDonald & Pape 2002). These methods of counteraction towards non-payment 
have been met with anger and resistance among the people in both communities till this day, 
and have raised questions among people unable to understand the government‟s behaviour: 
“If the government raises and increase of rental and not increase our salary, how are we gonna 
cope?”  (Interview,Bayview resident 4).  
 
Drug-abuse in both Bayview and Westcliff is soaring and represents a huge challenge 
especially among the youth
8
. „Sugars‟, a highly addictive drug consisting of a mix of cocaine, 
heroin, rat poison, and, some say, house detergents, is rife in both communities. According to 
the founder and chairperson of the Chatsworth Anti-Drug Forum the drug is most widespread 
in the Indian communities in Durban (Chatsworth and Phoenix) and has resulted in: 
 
...untold damage to the individual users and their families; the abuse has changed these 
neighbourhoods. Crime is going through the roof because abusers steal anything they can 
to pay for their next hit [dose]. Gang wars have taken off - there have been four gang-
related killings in the last few months - and there appears to be no end in sight.  
    (IRIN 2007)
9
 
 
In addition to this, alcohol abuse and domestic violence is rife. In most cases of domestic 
violence the men beat their wife and children, and some incidents have even resulted in 
death
10
.  
                                                 
8
 www.iol.za 
9
 „South Africa: The drug trade‟s bitter taste‟ at www.alertnet.org, 17 May 2007. 
10
 The W-FRA leader told me about a six-year old girl by the name Nikita who was killed by her father in 
Westcliff. The Nikita-case is well-known in the community. During my fieldwork period the CPF were 
arranging ‟16 Days of Activism‟ against violence against women and children, and in several community 
meetings in Westcliff the W-FRA leader tried to urge people in the community, especially the men, to participate 
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 The drug-trafficking in the area has enriched those living of this business, the drug-
lords. Although immensely disliked in both Bayview and Westcliff, some people have ended 
up being small-scale drug-dealers themselves due to the difficultness of getting a job with 
enough pay to remain safe in their home, and be able to feed their children
11
.  
Accusations against community leaders in being involved in drug-business happens, 
and are in some cases used to undermine a leader‟s reputation and legitimacy. During my 
fieldwork that kind of accusations against the leaders did happen, and were used more vividly 
were constituents regarded their leader as being illegitimate. Even the leaders themselves 
acknowledged the fact that some community leaders are involved in this life-destroying 
business. One of the leaders said in an interview: “Most community leaders benefit from drug 
lords, some of them may be involved in it, you know, one way or the other. That have family 
members involved in it, you know”.  
Despite knowing who the drug-dealers are, and despite their aversion towards them, 
people seem to be helpless in their quest to get rid of them. According to residents in both 
areas, the difficulty in combating the drug-circulation is mainly due to a corrupted police 
force that in many cases benefit from the drug business itself. One informant told me: “I feel 
the polices are corrupted. They are not strong, they are not there for the community, they are 
only there for the drug-people” (Interview,BFRA member 1), another had no hope in it being 
changed, lamenting: “The thing is you can‟t really count on it being changed, you know, the 
local police involvement, because they are very corrupt (…)” (Interview,BFRA leader). This 
lack of trust in the police is a huge challenge and makes it almost an impossibility to do 
anything about the social problems in the communities.  
 
As many are unemployed and struggle to get an income, many become small-scale 
shopkeepers and transform their private home into a type of „tuck-shop‟ from where they sell 
all kinds of snacks and sweets, some even cigarettes and alcohol. Others go from door to door 
in the community selling clothes, underwear, make-up and other petty things. This is a 
survival strategy used by many people in the communities as it is difficult to accumulate 
money by other means. Some sell things at the weekly „Bangladesh Market‟ in Westcliff on 
Fridays and Saturdays. Those who cannot get adequate money, due to the desperateness of 
their situation, are often pushed into lending money from local loan-sharks, also called 
                                                                                                                                                        
in the making of a human chain arranged by the CPF to mark aversion against women and child abuse. In one 
community meeting she said: „Let‟s never forget Nikita‟ (community meeting, Westcliff, 08.11.06). 
11
 Informal conversations, Westlciff.  
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„interest-people‟. Although they provide an immediate relief, they are, in many ways, a long-
term pain. From what I observed and heard, there was about a handful of them in Westcliff, 
and about the same in Bayview. Being the last resort for people in desperate situations, and 
knowing they utilise the poor, they are generally not liked in the communities. One lady 
angrily lamented: 
 
(...) there are people that collect interest in the area. Speaking of those people that are 
eating poor people‟s money that don‟t have food on their table, don‟t have the next 
meal on their tables, people are so desperate, they go to the interest-people and ask 
them for help, (…) those are the people I don‟t think should be living here in this place, 
in this area like this. 
                                                                                 (Interview,Westcliff resident 8) 
 
According to Benjamin people also borrow money from drug-dealers, or buy on credit from 
tuck shops in the area. “The interest rates are often so high that some end up paying solely the 
interest. Some people (mostly women) are forced to go begging on street corners and 
shopping malls, or are forced into prostitution to pay off their debts or to buy food” 
(2007:193).  
 
This socioeconomic context forms a backdrop to the analysis of the two CSOs‟ cultural 
framing strategies, their choice of political strategies and their mobilising structure. These 
themes are presented in the theoretical framework in the following chapter. What will be 
evident is that the two CSOs generally share identical framing strategies, but have significant 
differences in their political strategies and mobilising structure.   
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3.    THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
This chapter provides a general overview of the theoretical framework used in this thesis to 
assess the legitimacy of the Westcliff Flats Residents Association (W-FRA) and the Bayview 
Flats Residents Association (BFRA). The theoretical framework is based on McAdam et al.‟s 
(2004) synthesizing, comparative perspective on social movements based on themes that have 
been emphasized in recent social movement theory, namely; cultural framing, political 
opportunity structures (POS), and mobilizing structures.  
Although the thesis uses themes from social movement theories, it does not 
necessarily mean that the W-FRA and BFRA (here referred to as CSOs) are defined as social 
movements, but rather that these social movement themes can illuminate important aspects of 
the CSOs by virtue of their explanatory power and because they are prevailing themes within 
the literature on civil society. The CSOs are, after all, conceptualised as the smallest building 
blocks of social movements due to their history as being part of a social movement (Desai 
2002, Dwyer 2004; 2006). And although a single organisation is not a social movement in 
itself, it can, despite organisational differences, be involved in a social movement process 
(Tilly 1988, Oliver 1989 in della Porta & Diani 2006). The three different social movement 
themes are seen as complementary and will help to shed light on both internal and external 
aspects that are important to know in order to assess the CSOs‟ legitimacy among their 
constituents.  
Before discussing each of these social movement themes, a presentation and 
explanation of the main concepts used in the thesis will provide a better understanding of their 
use and their substance.  
 
Civil society 
It is a need to recognize that there exist a myriad of definitions on civil society.  The term has 
generally been used vaguely, although presented as if it carries a clear and universal meaning 
(Tvedt 1998), but the definition proposed by the London School of Economics Centre for 
Civil Society is illustrative: 
 
“Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced collective action around shared interests, 
purposes and values. In theory, its institutional forms are distinct from those of the 
state, family and market though in practice, the boundaries between state, civil society, 
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family and market are often complex, blurred and negotiated. Civil society commonly 
embraces a diversity of spaces, actors and institutional forms, varying in their degree of 
formality, autonomy and power. Civil societies are often populated by organisations 
such as registered charities, development non-governmental organisations, community 
groups, women‟s organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, 
trade unions, self-help groups, social movements, business associations, coalitions and 
advocacy groups” (LSE 2005:2).  
 
This definition captures the multi-faceted nature of the concept, as well as rendering it 
analytically and empirical useful, and at the same time grasping neatly the South African case.  
Civil society is seen as a carrier of positive values such as trust, tolerance and co-
operation and has therefore become synonymous with „good‟ society (Van Rooy 1998:12). 
Although it might be „good‟, warnings are posed against treating civil society as a 
homogenous entity as it then will become overly romanticized. Oversimplifying the concept 
civil society is seen as a malady due to its location in a complex reality of conflicting interests 
and opposing agendas. The treatment of South African civil society as a homogenous entity 
has rendered it academically and politically unsustainable (Habib & Kotzé 2003). Civil 
society has been made “synonymous with the voluntary sector (Third sector), and particularly 
with (…) groups (…) and other actors explicitly involved in „change work‟ (Van Rooy 
1998:15), and is defined as all “organised expressions of various interests and values 
operating in the triangular space between the family, the state and the market” (Habib & 
Kotzé 2003:249). 
 
The concept of legitimacy 
The concept of legitimacy has been debated for decades in the disciplines of sociology and 
political science, and even for centuries in social and political philosophy (Jost & Major 
2001). It is argued that Max Weber is the single most important theorist on the subject 
(Zelditch 2001). Weber meant that the legitimacy has a decisive meaning for the stability and 
exercise of authority in social organisations, and that all social systems try to create a 
legitimacy foundation through, for example, socialisation. In that sense, “although political 
legitimacy dominates, legitimacy is a phenomenon of “the social order”” (Zelditch 2001:39). 
Although being important in understanding political life, the concept of legitimacy is fruitful 
in understanding everyday social interactions (Ridgeway 2001). This argument is based on 
the belief that people value many characteristics that are strongly associated with perceptions 
of legitimacy, such as fairness, truthfulness, and rationality (Jost & Major 2001).  
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A large part of the literature on legitimacy is normative; focusing on what people ought to 
think is legitimate (Zelditch 2001). This thesis will focus on describing the empirical 
behaviour of actors, hence arguing that a subjective definition of the term is sufficient for the 
purpose of the thesis. The definition of legitimacy here, then, is that: a CSO is seen as 
legitimate if it works in accordance with the interests of the people, and adopt (political) 
strategies, organizational procedures, and distribute resources in a way that is acceptable 
among its constituents.  
The thesis looks at four analytical concepts (framing, political strategies, delivery, and 
participation) that will be analyzed and discussed through three social movement themes, 
namely cultural framing, political opportunity structure (POS), and mobilizing structure. The 
four analytical concepts are operationalised in the presentation of each social movement 
theme which will be presented later in this chapter.  
The discussion of the four analytical concepts is intended to illuminate the content of 
the relationship between the CSOs and their constituencies (micro-level), as well as the 
content of the relationship between the CSOs and the state (meso-level). Altogether, they 
constitute a complex picture of the various relationships that co-exist and influence each other 
in the space(s) between the grassroots and the state. Figure 1 presents a working-model 
illustrating the various linkages between the four analytical concepts, and how they interact in 
the spaces between the CSOs and their constituencies, as well as between the CSOs and the 
formal local political system, and how these relations impact on each other.  
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Figure 1: Working model.  
An overview of the relation between the CSO and the community and the CSO and the formal political 
system, respectively, and how the four analytical concepts (framing, political strategies, participation and 
delivery) impact on these relationships. The two relationships illustrated here also influence each other.   
Source: Fieldwork.  
  
How these four aspects (framing, political strategies, delivery and participation) are 
interlinked with the CSOs‟ legitimacy will be discussed in the following analytical chapters. 
Before going into the discussion of the three social movement themes the thesis will first 
define and discuss three „blocks‟ of civil society groups: civil society organisations (CSOs), 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and community based organisations (CBOs).  The 
reason behind this choice is that the thesis is referring to the W-FRA and the BFRA as CSOs 
since they both are part of civil society, but as will transpire in the discussion in the analytical 
chapters, their differences make them look like different types of CSOs, one employing 
characteristics similar to a „typical‟ CBO, and the other characteristics rendering it similar to 
an NGO.  
 
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
When referring to both the W-FRA and the BFRA simultaneously, the thesis uses the term 
civil society organizations (CSOs). Although there are differences between different types of 
civil society organizations, such as CBOs and NGOs, the term civil society organisations 
(CSOs) is a more all-encompassing term and refers to the broad range of associations and 
groupings that fall under the term civil society (Habib & Kotzé 2003). The choice of calling 
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them CSOs from the outset of the thesis also facilitates a more nuanced description of them 
later on in the analysis when their differences appear more clearly.  
 
Like social movements, CSOs are part of a heterogeneous society. Thus, in order to avoid 
homogenizing it, and rather comply with the request of Habib & Kotzé (2003) to consider 
civil society as a heterogeneous space, this thesis assumes a description of CSOs identical to 
Jelin‟s description of social movements, namely as:  “objects constructed by the researcher, 
which do not necessarily coincide with the empirical form of collective action. Seen from the 
outside they may present a certain degree of unity, but internally, they are always 
heterogeneous, diverse” (quoted in Egan & Wafer 2004:2). The W-FRA and the BFRA‟s 
seemingly identical form should, therefore, not trick researchers into thinking they are 
altogether identical.  As will be discussed in the analysis, they do have important 
organisational and „political‟ differences.  
It is also argued that accountability and transparency are central elements in the 
strength of CSOs (Habib & Kotzé 2003). Therefore, it is interesting to see how two CSOs, 
that at first glance seem to be very similar, are perceived differently among their constituents 
precisely due to their different ways of being accountable and transparent.   
 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
Although NGOs are seen as part of civil society, Van Rooy makes a distinction between 
NGOs and CSOs arguing “NGOs are often described in service delivery roles, whereas CSOs 
are depicted as political agents” (Van Rooy 1998:35). In practice, NGOs are bigger, more 
formalised organizations (Habib & Kotzé 2003). They are not necessarily driven by internal 
democracy, and might, under the authority of a strong leader, not constitute a space for wider 
participation in decision-making processes (Mercer 2002). They are also said to be 
distinguished from community-based organisations (Habib & Kotzé 2003). NGOs are largely 
defined by their sub-contractual role to the state (Habib 2005). To say that an organisation is 
an NGO Tvedt (1998:15) has listed five criteria: 1) it has to be formally constituted, but not 
necessarily registered legally, 2) it has to be non-governmental in its basic structure, and 
organisationally separate from the government, 3) it has to be self-governed with elected 
representatives that should be responsible to their constituency, 4) it can not generate profit, 
and, 5) has to be based on voluntary work to a high extent. In many cases the NGOs do not 
have formal members, but rather „supporters‟, because their loyalty to the organisation is 
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measured through their participation in it (Tvedt 1998). Some of these criteria are criticized 
for not being applicable to African civil society. In the Third World, NGO leaders can often 
be self-elected, and the internal organisational procedures can be unclear. This can render the 
organisation unreliable and illegitimate due to its lack of transparency (Tostensen et al. 2001).  
The literature argues that civil society organisations that derive more than a certain 
percentage of their income from domestic public sources or foreign donors cannot be said to 
be part of civil society. The reason is that such an organisation can be too dependent on the 
state to actually represent a genuine expression of civil society (Tostensen et al. 2001).  
 
Community Based Organisations (CBOs) 
CBOs are usually smaller, less formalized groupings or associations operating at community 
level (Habib & Kotzé 2003). Since they are based on voluntary work, and most people that 
join these organizations often are resource-poor and unemployed, commitment and 
perseverance is usually lacking and constitute a great challenge. Continued participation by 
people in these types of organizations is then most often motivated by religion or personal 
identification with the problem at hand (Habib & Kotzé 2003). It is argued that CBOs in 
developing countries are organising around “the human fall-out” of neoliberal programmes. 
These smaller CBOs are situated closer to ordinary people‟s lives and tend to organise around 
quite specific issues and identities which are broadly related to social exclusion and 
exploitation (Habib & Kotzé 2003).  
 In the post-apartheid context CBOs emerged from within marginalised communities to 
enable the residents to survive the ravages of poverty in a neoliberal climate (Habib & Kotzé 
2003).  
The CSOs in this thesis share similar characteristics to social movements, as defined 
by Habib & Kotze (2003). Social movements are seen as largely preoccupied with protesting 
against the impact of neo-liberal, social and economic policies and preventing their further 
implementation in South Africa. In the same manner, the CSOs in Chatsworth are challenging 
the local state in preventing it from evicting poor residents who are unable to pay their rents 
(Desai 2000, 2002, Dwyer 2004, 2006, Habib & Kotzé 2003).  
According to Miraftab & Wills (2005) the South African civil society is by the media 
presented as a division between „authentic‟ NGOs and community-based organisations that 
are portrayed as „rightful‟ and „authentic‟ voices of the poor, against the grassroots 
movements whom are presented as „inauthentic‟ and who‟s agency often is criminalized 
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(Miraftab & Wills 2005:209). Anyhow, some analyses of civil society in South Africa argue 
that although CBOs and social movements are seen as two different analytical constructs, they 
are seen as fluid and non-static entities (Habib & Kotzé 2003).  
 
Key themes in social movement theories  
Cultural Framing 
“The conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings 
of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action” 
          (McAdam et al. 2004:6) 
 
Studies of cultural framing focus on how cultural processes create a basis for, and are a 
product of, collective action (Stokke 1999). Framing-based studies of movement culture have 
a more-or-less agency-oriented theoretical perspective and are all concerned with meaning. 
Since their beginning, and up to now, their main interest has been to see how internal 
dynamics start and maintain collective action efforts.  Studies on framing have contributed to 
an “increased understanding of the emergence and articulation of grievances, the dynamics of 
recruitment and mobilisation, and the maintenance of solidarity and collective identity” 
(Williams 2004:94). Snow and Benford (1988) have looked at three types of framing all 
necessary in moving people to actually partake in collective actions. These three framing-
types are diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing.  Analogically, Gamson (1992) 
argues that three types of frames, namely „injustice‟, „agency‟, and „identity‟ frames are all 
necessary for a frame to go from understanding to motivating action.  
 Diagnostic frames entail problem-identification and attribution of blame. This means 
that what the people or the organisation see as a problematic aspect of their social life is 
diagnosed as such, as well as whom or what is to blame for the problems are explicitly 
voiced. Prognostic framing involves an articulation of a proposed solution, suggesting 
specific strategies or a plan to solve the problem at hand. Although finding people who agree 
with the framed problems and the proposed solutions, this alone is not necessarily enough to 
attract supporters‟ participation. In order to motivate people to take part in ameliorative 
collective action motivational framing is necessary. Motivational framing provides a rationale 
for action, a “calls to arms” and includes the construction of appropriate vocabularies of 
motive (Benford & Snow 2000). This refers to what Gamson (1992) calls the “agency” 
component of collective action frames. In addition to these framing tasks, the creation of a 
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collective „we‟ and a „them‟ identity (also done in the CSOs‟ diagnostic framing) is necessary 
to create a collective sense of togetherness and „being in the same boat‟. The common identity 
built in the CSOs framing-work can play a very important part in building unity. This happens 
when people define themselves within the same frames (by belonging to the same community, 
by being unemployed, by being poor, and so on). Furthermore, this can facilitate the 
engagement of people in „contentious politics‟ through collective mobilisation (Stokke 1999). 
 
These three framing components are all necessary in the mobilisation in Westcliff and 
Bayview. Cultural framing is then defined based on the CSOs‟ diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational framing. In order to assess their legitimacy in relation to their use of framing, the 
thesis will look at how people in Bayview and Westcliff identify themselves with the BFRA 
and the W-FRA, their strategies, aims, and ways of communicating with them, and whether 
they believe the CSOs are working in line with their ideas and perceptions. Although framing 
is almost exclusively restricted to discourse, this thesis will look at the implementation of 
actions as necessary to convince the people that the CSOs‟ discourse is resonant and 
believable. This is, as my findings show, necessary for the CSOs to be able to motivate people 
to participate in mobilisation, but also important for the CSOs to have a continued 
significance in their constituency. Thus, for framing work to be successful, it depends on the 
organisational structure (the mobilising structure) of the organisation. A similar argument is 
posed by Dwyer (2006:103) when he argues that: “What form an organization takes is crucial, 
for while a particular framing process may encourage mobilization (…) the potential for 
framing is conditional upon participants‟ access to mobilizing structures”.  
 
Framing political opportunity 
Political discourses are very important in most political struggles and give marginalized 
groups the possibility to take advantage of such discourses as one of their few assets (Webster 
& Engberg-Pedersen 2002). Political discourses exist within and between the political sphere 
and civil society, and can have positive outcomes for a social movement when used 
strategically for the benefit of the movement. Such discourses are interesting to take into 
consideration when scrutinizing the movements (Millstein et al. 2003). A key feature of the 
1994 transition to democracy was the strong commitment to human rights on the part of all 
parties, and in particular the ANC (Egan and Wafer 2004). This transition proved to be a 
process of legitimization (Kelman 2001) as the progressive constitution legitimized all South 
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African‟s claims to their rights, as contradictory to the apartheid past. Ballard (2005) argues 
that the uncritical celebration of rights is problematic in that it tends to result in the 
assumption that because one has the right to education, adequate housing and services, that it 
must somehow be so. Yet, it is important to note the creative ways in which social movements 
have adopted the notion of rights. Claims to rights help even legitimize illegal activities such 
as reconnections and occupations of property (Greenberg 2004). How the W-FRA and the 
BFRA has adopted a language of rights in their framing work will be discussed more in depth 
in the following chapter. 
The political discourses present in South African context are a mixture of the 
neoliberal globalisation discourse lead by dominant global institutions like the World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation (Bond 2004, Egan and 
Wafer 2004), a powerful global development discourse that favours institutional reforms in 
favour of democratisation, human rights (Jones 2005), decentralisation, good governance and 
strengthening of civil society. Such discourses and their institutional manifestations define 
political spaces for various individual and collective actors who claim to be the legitimate 
expressions of these good causes and the people (Millstein et al. 2003). The next part 
discusses how political spaces are utilized by collective actors.  
 
Political Opportunity Structure (POS) 
In recent years, the relationship between social movements and the state has gained more 
attention. In scrutinizing this relationship, the study of political opportunity structures (POS) 
is of great relevance. The POS can briefly be described as political opportunities that can 
trigger collective mobilisation (Stokke 1999). The notion of political opportunity structures 
moves the analytical attention away from the movements themselves “and on to the contours 
and dynamics of the wider society in which the movements operate” (Williams 2004:95). 
Tarrow (2004) claims that the POS addresses the structures (both formal and informal) of the 
political system that creates opportunities or constraints for collective mobilisation.  
McAdam (2004:27) integrates four studies (done by Brockett 1991, Duyvendak & 
Giugni 1992, Kriesi, Koopmans, Rucht 1996, and Tarrow 1994) on these contours and 
dynamics, and has presented the similarities in their views on the political opportunities and 
constraints facing social movements as;  
1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system;   
2) the stability or instability of that set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity;  
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3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and,  
4) the state‟s capacity and propensity for repression.  
 
The first dimension highlights the formal legal and institutional structure of a given polity. 
The second and third dimensions are more directed towards the significance of the informal 
structure of power relations. The fourth dimension concerns repression in form of police 
violence, especially under protests. I also choose to include in this concept state efforts to co-
opt or demobilise oppositional movements. This can happen through offering well-paid jobs 
to the leaders of these movements thus attacking the core of a movement’s strength.  
 
The openness or closure of the institutionalized political system 
The post-apartheid period has witnessed a relative opening up of the institutionalised political 
system, giving people more opportunities to participate in, and influence, policy processes. 
The instruments and spaces that have become available make interaction between the state 
and civil society possible, and have indeed paved the way for a dual relationship where also 
civil society actors can challenge the state. The instruments available are the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), the media, the courts, the 
constitution, and formalised attempts to have public input into most policies, local 
governments‟ Integrated Development Plans (IDPs), and even rhetorical support for mass 
demonstrations (Ballard 2005). Despite the opening up of these spaces, some analysts of the 
South African political economy have questioned the participation of CSOs in public policy 
processes (Edigheji 2003). Meer (1999, in Edigheji 2003) argues that participation of CSOs in 
policy processes has rather demobilised and delegitimized organs of civil society. The reason 
is that those who participate in the policy process have little time to consult with their 
constituencies on all issues, and as accountability and transparency is important for CSOs, 
they are being undermined as a result. Despite these negative aspects, one has to recognise the 
positive aspects of this civil society participation because they have made the process of 
governance more transparent, and elected officials to be more accountable (Edigheji 
2003:105).  
How the instruments and spaces that have been made available, such as IDPs and 
election of ward-committees, have been received and utilised by the two CSOs, and how their 
choices have influenced their legitimacy within their constituencies will be discussed later in 
the thesis. 
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Political opportunities can stimulate people to participate in contentious politics, while 
political constraints can be understood as the government‟s propensity to contain conflict 
between the state and the social movement through the use of different means. These can be 
seen as different forms of repression (Tarrow 1998), and will also be discussed later in the 
chapter.  
 
Accessible „spaces‟ for movement participation 
Invited spaces of citizenship are created from above by local and international donors and 
governmental interventions (Miraftab & Wills 2005:209). In the case of the activists in 
Chatsworth, the creation of ward-committees through supposedly democratic elections serves 
as an example of an invited space they have made use of.   
Invented spaces of citizenship are spaces that are chosen, demanded, and seized 
through collective action from below (Miraftab & Wills 2005), one such space is the Social 
Movements Indaba (SMI). Invented spaces have, by the South African media and 
government, been termed „inauthentic‟ because they have been created as a result of the 
“practicing agency of the citizens struggling to expand the public sphere” (Miraftab & Wills 
2005:210).  
Insurgent spaces of citizenship are spaces that are grounded in civil society and are 
actions that are “exercised in the streets of a city, in the squatter camps and in the everyday 
life spaces of those excluded from the state‟s citizenship project” (Miraftab & Wills 
2005:201).  
 
Political strategies and contentious politics 
Political strategies are, within the context of the two communities, strategies that have been 
used to communicate to the formal local political system the needs of the people in their quest 
for improving the socioeconomic situation they find themselves in.  
„Political strategies‟ are the actions taken by movements and are, in this thesis, defined 
in light of Tarrow‟s (1998) concept of „contentious politics‟. Tarrow argues “contentious 
politics occurs when ordinary people, often in league with more influential citizens, join 
forces in confrontations with elites, authorities, and opponents” and it is “triggered when 
changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives for social actors who lack 
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resources on their own” (1998:2). This definition characterises social movements as acting in 
opposition to the state, immediately thinking that their relationship to the state is overtly 
conflictual. But Tarrow argues strategies can vary from outright resistance to cooperation. 
This flexibility, Tarrow argues, is characteristic of the modern social movement which is seen 
as a “multiform phenomenon ranging from protests that physically and symbolically attack 
the dominant system to those that bring movements within the range of conventional politics” 
(1998:104). This view is applicable to the findings in this thesis.  
 
Repression versus state control 
The state’s efforts in containing protest actions, or people’s resistance against forced evictions 
in Bayview and Westcliff, can be perceived differently depending on whether it is through the 
state or the people’s eyes they are seen. della Porta and Diani (1999) argue that the state, 
when using police to control protests or resistance against evictions, see their actions as their 
legitimate right to exert power. For the state it will be a necessary political means to restore 
peace and order, whilst for the people that experiences the police violence, will see it as a 
form of state repression. Repressive means can have an impact on the action repertoire. It can 
lead to the employment of more radical methods of protest, and can create bigger conflicts 
between social movements and the political system. della Porta (2004) argues that in general, 
a tolerant and soft style of policing favours the diffusion of protest, while a repressive and 
hard policing of protest results in a shrinking of mass movements but a radicalization of 
smaller protest groups. What is evident in the analysis is that resistance against forced 
evictions have been met with violent responses.  
”Contentious collective action is the basis of social movements, not because 
movements are always violent or extreme, but because it is the main and often the only 
recourse that ordinary people possess against better-equipped opponents or powerful states” 
(Tarrow 1998:3). Organisers use contention to exploit political opportunities, create collective 
identities, bring people together in organisations, and mobilise them against more powerful 
opponents. “Much of the history of movement-state interaction can be read as a duet of 
strategy and counterstrategy between movement activist and power holders” (Tarrow 1998:3).  
Martin and Miller (2003) argue that a relational and contextual approach to the study 
of contentious politics can provide nuanced and rigorous explanations of the processes and 
mechanisms driving contention, and a spatial  perspective can produce more illuminative 
understandings of how people perceive, shape and act upon grievances and opportunities. 
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Creswell (1996) in Martin and Miller (2003) talk about „in-place‟ and „out-of-place‟ 
behaviour, where the former shapes everyday social behaviour, the latter calls attention to the 
unspoken social order or disruption of everyday social activity for example in the form of 
social protest. The places where grievances are identified and aired are not necessarily the 
same places where contentious politics eventually play out. Depending upon the geography of 
political opportunity, the contestants may attempt to shift conflict to different „spaces of 
engagement‟ (Cox 1998 in Martin & Miller 2003:148) – either different places or different 
scales. It is exactly the contextual conditions in local places (socioeconomic differences 
between people living, for example, in the same area) that have triggered social unrest, shaped 
as social movements or protest actions, in South Africa. 
Habib and Kotzé (2003) argue the CBOs experience increased marginalisation within the 
communities they organize in and represent. This marginalisation has put them in an 
adversarial relation to the government.  
 
Mobilising Structure  
Inspired by the abundant empirical work done by proponents of resource mobilisation theory 
and the political process model, the interest in studying the organisational dynamics of social 
movements has grown among movement scholars (McAdam et al. 2004). The study of 
mobilizing structures is in this respect essential. Mobilizing structures are defined as “those 
collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilize and engage in 
collective action” (McAdam et al. 2004: 3). One important strategy used by social movements 
in line with this is building social networks (Stokke 1999). By doing this, social movements 
can gain wide support which can form a basis for their establishment as a social movement. 
McCarthy (2004:141) argues that:  
 
The choices that activists make about how to more or less formally pursue change have 
consequences for their ability to raise material resources and mobilize dissident efforts, 
as well as for society-wide legitimacy - all of which can directly affect the chances that 
their common efforts will succeed. (Emphasis added) 
 
A CSO‟s mobilizing structure is, then, interlinked with its ability to access resources, to 
mobilize people, and to gain legitimacy among its constituents which will finally affect their 
ability to reach their goals. Participation and delivery are two important issues that will be 
discussed in the analysis and constitute an important part of the W-FRA and the BFRA‟s 
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mobilising structure. Mobilising structure is in this thesis not only concerned with the social 
networks the CSOs are made of, but their organisational structure and day-to-day operations 
and activities that facilitate a continued interaction between the CSOs and their constituents. 
This is also emphasized by Krishna (2004) who argues that CBOs need to have repeated and 
continuous interactions with their constituents not only to gain legitimacy, but to be able to 
build legitimacy.  
 
The thesis distinguishes between three forms of participation, namely participation, non-
participation and non-inclusion or exclusion. The three forms of participation are defined as 
follows: a) Participation: People‟s active or passive presence in community meetings and/or 
other arrangements organised by the CSO, b) non-participation: People‟s lack of participation 
due to personal choice, and, c) non-inclusion/exclusion: People‟s lack of participation due to 
factors outside their personal control such as the CSO‟s way of including or excluding them 
in various ways.  
 
Social movements are usually embedded in dense relational settings and the creation of social 
networks facilitates participation. Social structure affects individual and collective behaviour, 
and is generated and reproduced through action (Diani 2004). 
 Studies of diverse organisations have suggested that embeddedness in social networks 
not only matters for recruitment, but also discourages leaving the organisation, and maintains 
continued participation. Despite the arguments suggesting social networks are important, 
empirical evidence from other studies suggest that mobilization can arise outside social 
networks, or not at all despite the presence of social networks (Diani 2004). Another line of 
criticism against the importance of social networks argues that “focusing on networks diverts 
attention away from the really crucial process for mobilization, namely, the transmission of 
cognitive cultural messages. Although it can happen trough networks, it may also take place 
through other channels, such as the media” (Diani 2004:343). In this thesis, the physical 
presence and visibility of the CSOs in their constituencies is crucial for their ability to gather 
people and convey such “cultural messages” Diani (2004) is referring to.  
 
CSO-structure 
This thesis argues that a CSO is made up of a web of networks and relations that exist within 
the CSO and between the CSO and its community (its constituents) and other organizations 
35 
 
and groups (on a local and national level). These networks and relations, in sum, is the 
structure of the organization. As already mentioned, Diani argues that social structure affects 
individual and collective behaviour, and that structure, in exchange, is generated and 
reproduced through action (Diani 2004:339). Although he might refer to structure as the local 
and national context a CSO finds itself in, this thesis delimits social structure to a CSO‟s 
internal organizational structure. How this maintains, and is maintained by, the networks the 
CSO has with its immediate environment, its constituency, and other organizations and 
groups, as well as the formal local political system, is decisive for what legitimacy it receives 
in its constituency. Where the constituents have a direct influence on the organization through 
their direct participation in it, the structure of the organization is in line with what they 
perceive as legitimate. Where the opposite is the case, the organization will most probably be 
perceived as illegitimate.  
For a CSO to maintain itself, then, is dependent on how this structure is maintained. 
But what is more important here is how the CSO maintain its legitimacy, and especially, its 
structural legitimacy (i.e. its legitimacy within its constituency based on how the CSO is 
structured and include its constituency in its daily workings as well as happenings).    
Movement scholars concerned with the organizational dynamics of social movements have 
turned their attention to looking at, amongst other things, the “specification of the relationship 
between organizational form and type of movement” (McAdam et al. 2004:4). It will be 
argued in this thesis that the organizational form employed by the CSOs will impact on their 
relation with their constituents, and will as a result influence the constituents‟ perceptions of 
the CSOs.  
 
The three social movement themes discussed here are seen as resources (organisational, 
political and cultural) which are important for a social movement (Stokke 1999).  
 
Delivery and clientelism  
Delivery is the distribution of goods, both tangible (such as groceries, clothes, school-
stationary, funding) and non-tangible (entertainment, transport, information and so on) by the 
CSOs to their constituents. The concept of delivery (and access to resources) is discussed 
parallel to the discussion of the CSO – NGO divide, and is closely interrelated with the CSOs‟ 
use of political strategies (and relation to the state), and how open they (the CSOs) are in 
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regards to their constituents‟ participation in CSO-related activities (their mobilising 
structure).   
 Delivery can, depending on how an organisation chooses to deliver (distribute 
resources), foster clientelistic relations between the organisation and its constituents. 
Clientelistic relations are “based on the award of personal favours, and at times coercion, by 
the ruler - the patron - to the citizens, who are the clients” (Edigheji 2003:74). This creates a 
type of interdependent relationship between the CSO (the rulers) and its constituents (the 
ruled) where both, more or less, will benefit from each other‟s relationship. The reality is, 
however, that the patron manages to uphold this system due to the clients‟ deprived situation. 
Whether there are any signs of this type of relationship in any of the two communities the 
CSOs here are based will become evident in the analysis.  
 
Summary 
The theoretical framework presented here will be used to assess both the internal and external 
aspects of the W-FRA and the BFRA. Knowing that each dimension has both strengths and 
weaknesses, this theoretical framework offers complementary perspectives on CSOs. The 
political opportunity approach gives valuable insights into the structural opportunities and 
constraints facing the CSOs, but has limited understanding of context-specific processes and 
actors, whilst the actor-oriented approaches of cultural framing and mobilising structure do 
account for internal processes and the context within which the CSOs have developed and 
base their work, but lacks the structural dynamics in which these are embedded. 
 This thesis aims therefore at analysing the two CSOs‟ legitimacy by looking at how 
the CSOs frame (and politicize) their demands, their solutions and their „enemies‟, where in 
the political terrain they choose to work, and how these choices are received by their 
constituents, and how people are mobilised into the activities of the CSOs. These issues are 
closely interlinked with the issue of legitimacy, and as will be discussed, legitimacy plays a 
major role in facilitating support to the CSOs by their constituents. 
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3.    METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
 
This chapter will present the research strategy employed in this thesis. How the data has been 
gathered and processed throughout the fieldwork period, as well as throughout the writing of 
this thesis, will be accounted for, as well as the weaknesses and the strengths of these choices. 
This discussion will create a basis for an assessment of the credibility, the confirmability, and 
the transferability of my findings.   
 
Community mobilization in Chatsworth 
Studying community mobilization has been an interest of mine since the beginning of my 
academic journey. After spending a year as an exchange student at the University of 
KwaZulu-Natal, studying civil society and gaining knowledge on community mobilization in 
the areas around Durban, the motivation in studying community mobilization within civil 
society in South Africa, was even more intrigued. 
 The idea to choose Chatsworth as a research location for my studies was proposed by 
Dr. Richard Ballard, a professor at the School of Development Studies. Dr. Ballard has a great 
knowledge of civil society in South Africa. After reading about the Chatsworth-struggle
12
 I 
was curious to see what was currently going on there and what changes had been made as a 
result of the struggle. To get more information about the current situation, Dr. Ballard, 
advised me to contact the leader of the Westcliff Flats Residents Association (W-FRA) whom 
he knew was currently very active in the struggles in Westcliff.  A few days after talking with 
the W-FRA leader over the phone, I found myself in the midst of a rally in Crossmoor, one of 
the communities in Chatsworth. The rally consisted of several hundred people and activists 
from Chatsworth and surrounding areas. From that day on I had almost daily contact with the 
activists until I moved into Westcliff a community in Chatsworth one month later.  
 
Fieldwork in Westcliff  
The fieldwork was conducted in Westcliff from September 2006 to Mid-January 2007. I was 
living there from 25
th
 October till 14
th
 January. By literary being side by side to my key-
                                                 
12
 Desai 2000, 2002, Dwyer 2004 
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informant throughout big parts of my fieldwork, I gained valuable knowledge and 
understanding of the history of the area and the organisations. I also got insight into the 
current processes there, the W-FRA‟s daily activities and the various spaces and relations the 
W-FRA leader had to involve in as part of the W-FRA‟s activities and mobilisation.  
 By living in the area I got a great opportunity to see for myself who was the most 
active in the local organization, what kind and extent of knowledge people in the area had 
about their community, I also had access to people‟s life stories that gave me a deeper 
understanding and insight into the topic I was investigating as well as the background so 
important for understanding the current situation in the area, as well as the everyday 
happenings in the community, both in the private and the semi-public sphere.   
 
Fieldwork in Bayview  
Throughout the months living there and participating in W-FRA activities, I also gained 
valuable knowledge of the local dynamics at play in the neighbouring community Bayview, 
and the organisation situated there, the BFRA. It was interesting to include BFRA in my 
research as I became aware that although the BFRA was quite similar to the W-FRA and had 
the same struggle history, it had developed in a quite different direction. The interest to 
compare these two organizations was then intrigued.  
 I also participated in educational workshops at the CCS at the UKZN with students 
and civil society leaders, and was in the organizational group arranging the SMI 2006 in 
Durban. Being part of such events I got access to the spheres outside the immediate 
community and got a better understanding of how the W-FRA and the BFRA network with 
other groups facing similar challenges.  
 
The development of research questions 
Throughout the weeks and months I spent both living in Westcliff and participating in all the 
activities the W-FRA was involved in, I gained valuable knowledge of the local dynamics at 
play in the neighbouring community Bayview, and the BFRA‟s activity.  
Before going into the field I had a general assumption of what I wanted to look at, but 
due to the limited knowledge I had about what was going on there, the research question was 
not ultimately set. I choose to say research question instead of research problem to avoid 
giving the impression that the issues studied are inherently problematic, which is not the case. 
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Johannesen & Tufte (2002) also share this view. The first phase doing „explorative fieldwork‟ 
gave me a notion of what was going on, but still I was not sure what was of specific interest 
for my research. The development of my research question concur with ethnographic research 
where: “the development of research problems are rarely completed before fieldwork begins 
(...) the collection of primary data often plays a key role in that process of development” 
(Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:37). In line with this approach, my initial research question 
changed after having spent a considerable amount of time in the field, and having seen what 
issues transpired throughout my interactions with people there. From being concerned with 
finding out as much as possible about the local struggles and seeking to grasp every aspect of 
what they contained, my research focus was eventually narrowed down. According to 
Thagaard (2006) the formulation of research questions should not be fixed, but open to 
changes both through the research process and the writing process. From focusing on the 
strategies employed by the activists in Westcliff in their struggle for housing and access to 
service delivery, I got familiar with a similar organisation; the BFRA in the neighbouring 
community. Getting familiar with two such similar organisations, and seeing how different 
they worked, I was intrigued to do a comparative study of them. From studying their 
similarities and their differences, I discovered that their different level of activity in their 
constituencies had an impact on the constituents‟ perception of them. From hearing people‟s 
stories and opinions, the research focus was narrowed down to look at the legitimacy the two 
CSOs attain in their constituencies.  Focusing on legitimacy, and how I chose to define it, 
demanded an analysis of several aspects that together could shed light on the issue, and the 
nuances within the concept.    
 
Methodological approach 
This thesis is a study of civil society organisations‟ (CSOs) attained legitimacy in their 
constituencies, and is a comparative study of two CSOs situated in the same context. The 
methodology used in my thesis is based on an intensive ethnographic study of the W-FRA 
and the BFRA, and it was not always done in a systematic and formalised way. The main 
strategy was to be as close to the people as possible, and participate in all the happenings 
where activists from the organisations were present. Being an observer, a participant, 
engaging in informal conversations, writing field-notes, and doing semi-structured interviews, 
as well as reading literature done on the struggle in the area, I got very familiar with the 
various issues at hand in the communities, and their struggle. 
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Doing ethnography 
Ethnography is a method or a set of methods. In its most characteristic form it involves 
the ethnographer participating, overtly or covertly, in people‟s daily lives for an 
extended period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking 
questions - in fact, collecting whatever data is available to throw light on the issues that 
are at the focus of the research.  
       (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:1) 
 
This accurately describes the method I applied when approaching the field. When initially 
going into the area I choose to approach the field with an „open-mind‟ and choose to do a 
several weeks long explorative fieldwork to gather as much information as I could to broaden 
my understanding of the mobilisation in the area. 
 
Entry in the field 
Thagaard (2006) argues that to get an entrance in the field the most important strategy is to 
get to know a central person, a gatekeeper, from that environment. A „gatekeeper‟ has the 
authority to give the researcher restricted or unrestricted access to an environment or an 
organisation (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995). The person I first made contact with did 
function as a gatekeeper that gave me access into the field, and put me in contact with other 
informants and persons both from the local communities in the area (Chatsworth) as well as 
with activists from around Durban. Altogether, they gave me a broader view on the nature of 
the activism in the Durban areas. Almost on a daily basis I attended different happenings (see 
appendix 2: List of events), and throughout my fieldwork I was exposed to the daily running 
of the W-FRA, as well as its networks and associations with other organisations and 
movements. Through those intensive experiences I developed a more profound understanding 
of what the struggles were all about, especially in the eyes of those that were deeply involved 
in them.  
 In addition to the important role the gatekeeper played in granting me access into the 
field, the „nature‟ of the field was to my advantage. Thagaard (2006) argues that in 
environments where people are not concerned with concealing their activities, they are usually 
more open to researchers coming in. In those cases getting access to the field is 
unproblematic. Chatsworth has, since the struggle escalated in the late 1990s and was exposed 
both in the media and thoroughly portrayed in Desai‟s books (see Desai 2000 and 2002), been 
a site exposed to researchers ranging from established academics to undergraduate university 
students from near and far. This was obviously to my advantage as people were used to 
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researchers coming into the area. In most cases my informants seemed to share their stories 
willingly, but in one case one informant expressed scepticism towards using her time on 
interviews stating researchers come and go but never do anything good for the community: 
Our voices, you can never hear our voices. People just come and interview, like eh… 
I‟m not, I‟m not saying…we see you one day, after that we don‟t see you… There‟s no 
agreement, there‟s no…you know. If you come to hear our stories, then after our 
stories go we don‟t hear a peep of you to say maybe, you know what, certain thing… 
                           (Interview, BFRA member 1) 
 
This experience made me think about what positive impact my research could have on these 
people‟s situation. After having thought about it I realise that indirectly, somehow, the 
research done in these areas is one in a number of contributions to studies on civil society in 
South Africa. This can be of valuable importance for example for the South African 
government‟s current implementation of „state-civil society partnerships‟ where the local 
state, for example in Durban, are inducing participation by the communities in decision-
making processes around development planning
13
. Providing information on the nature of the 
dynamics happening in these communities can make decision-makers taking into account the 
local power-structures present in such settings to be able to target the needs of the true 
impoverished. Another issue is that by exemplifying and showing how the economic policies 
of the South African government impacts negatively on the poor, this thesis can be a 
contribution in the information of local communities in Chatsworth that the South African 
government can take into account when making decisions that have a direct impact on the 
people on the ground. By publishing the thesis in Norway, Norwegian institutions working 
with development projects in South Africa can be made aware of the various aspects of civil 
society groups in South Africa when implementing development projects or in interacting 
with the South African government. It must be noted, thus, that this thesis is only a limited 
contribution, but hopefully a valuable one.  
 
Interacting with people in organisations made up of the urban poor, the unequal power-
relations between the researcher and the researched are also obviously going to impact on the 
knowledge-production. Being literally the only white-coloured person in the community did 
not exactly render me unnoticeable, however, my long stay in one of the communities, and the 
contacts I made there, gave me an advantage in getting the trust of my informants in my role 
and my intentions with doing research there.  
                                                 
13
 See Ballard et al. (2007) for more on these partnerships in Durban (eThekwini). 
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Data Collection 
The data collected for this thesis has been done through qualitative interviews, direct and 
participant observation, informal conversations and secondary sources such as books, articles, 
films, and news articles and web pages from the internet. Before doing my fieldwork I read 
about the services and housing struggles in the area thus giving me an insight into the 
relatively contemporary history of the area. Informal conversations with key informants gave 
me a further insight in other perspectives of the history of the struggle in the area and of the 
present situation and issues. Yin (2003) argues that when you really have performed data 
triangulation, the events or facts of the case-study have been supported by more than a single 
sort of evidence (Yin 2003). Data triangulation is the collection of information from multiple 
sources. This thesis has used data triangulation. Participant observation has been the main 
method employed in gathering data-material, followed by semi-structured interviews. I will 
discuss each in turn. 
 
Participant observation 
The overall objective with participant observation is to be able to describe what people say 
and do in settings that are not structured or controlled by the researcher (Fangen 2004), and is 
normally done in fieldworks that last for an extended amount of time. Becker (1970 in Fangen 
2004) argues that a long fieldwork increases the confirmability of the data-material as your 
conclusion is based on several hundreds of tests; not only have you seen many actions and 
heard many utterances that support your conclusion, but you have also seen so many actions 
and utterances that serve as evidence to disprove alternative conclusions. According to 
Hammersleay & Atkinson all social research takes the form of participant observation in that 
“it involves participating in the social world, in whatever role, and reflecting on the products 
of that participation” (1995:17). Becker (1970 in Fangen 2004) argues that data-material from 
doing fieldwork is „rich‟ because the researcher will have a complex picture of the people 
he/she studies over time. Participant observation facilitates a closer relation between the 
researcher and the researched than any other qualitative method, and gives the researcher the 
opportunity to compare what the informants say with what they do.  
 
Doing an intensive fieldwork over several months with daily interaction with the field 
facilitated a huge amount of participant observation. At times, the information I was exposed 
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to was so massive and intensive that I would not to be able to reconstruct all the information 
in my field notes. Spending most of the days with the activists from early morning to late 
night made it difficult to write down thorough field notes at the end of the day. Although 
wishing to do so, I was too tired to write down all the interesting observations I had made 
after having spent several intensive hours in the field. Despite this, all the continuous 
observations I did, the repeated happenings in the field, as well as the recurrent character of 
the stories told, made it easier to map out the recurrent and central issues concerning the 
people in the community. Fangen (2004) argues that when living in the field, being a fulltime 
participant observer, one cannot, and should not, note down everything that happens. It is 
important to be selective, if not, analysing the material will be too time-consuming to process.  
I lived in one of the flats in Westcliff community for almost three months, and 
participated in a lot of the activities the W-FRA was a part of almost on a daily basis already 
one month before I moved into Westcliff. Hesselberg (1998) argues that being a participant 
observer is especially suitable when studying complex social contexts, such as interconnected 
networks and the role local leaders play in their constituencies. Spending much time with a 
local leader in the field gave me an insight into the daily activities managed by the leader, and 
all the interactions she was involved in throughout the course of a day.  
 
The impact of the researcher‟s presence 
The role as a white researcher from Europe is contested when having to deal with different 
actors in a community of urban poor enmeshed with people of conflicting interests and 
unequal power relations. No matter the level of participation by the researcher, her presence 
has an impact on the people she studies.  It is important that the researcher reflects over how 
the informants perceive her and how the researcher‟s presence influences the informants. 
Where the fieldwork has a long duration the informants can „forget‟ that the researcher is 
there and they behave as they normally would. How aware the informants are about the 
researcher‟s presence is also dependent on how busy they are with their own activities, and to 
which extent the researcher participates in the activities (Thagaard 2006). Where the 
researcher participates to the same extent as the researched, her presence will be less 
disturbing. Thus, the less one stands out, the less influence one will have on the people that 
are studied.   
When I was in the field I tried to participate as much as I could in all the activities that 
happened. Although I always presented myself as a master‟s degree student from Norway 
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doing research on the struggle and the organisations in the area, my role was not only that of a 
researcher. Throughout my stay there I developed friendship bonds to certain individuals, and 
spent some of my time visiting people and chatting about issues not necessarily connected to 
what I essentially was suppose to study. Being frequently seen with the local leader (W-FRA 
leader) in the community, though, could have had an impact on how the people in the 
community related to me, and what they told me in the interviews. Being aware of this, I 
believe that by the character of the interviews and the conversations I engaged in, people 
seemed in general to be very honest in their answers. 
 
Participant observation has played an important role in the development of my knowledge of 
the struggles in Chatsworth. It has provided me with a nuanced picture of existing power 
structures in the community (Westcliff), and how these play out in people‟s daily interactions. 
Without the information gathered and accumulated throughout this time I would not have had 
the same prerequisites I had to do a study of the CSOs‟ attained legitimacy in their 
constituencies. These observations also made it easier for me to get a better understanding of 
the informants‟ experiences with what they said in the interviews.  
 
Interviews  
The choice to do interviews was done to hear the nuances in people‟s own experiences and 
opinions, to substantiate the knowledge I already had, and to produce explicit material, with 
the informant‟s own words, that later could be used in the thesis as quotes. I choose to use a 
digital recorder for all the interviews for various reasons. The main reason was to facilitate 
my attention on the stories of the informants, keep an eye contact, and do the interview as 
similar to a normal conversation as possible without frantically taking notes. This was an 
intentional choice to make the informant comfortable and relaxed, at the same time I could 
think about probing questions to get more information on an issue, or clarify unclear answers. 
By recording everything no information will be subjected to interpretation by the researcher 
in the first phase of gathering data. This will increase the reliability of the data, and the quotes 
used in the thesis will be literally the informants‟ own expressions.  
Using a recorder also has its negative sides. Hesselberg (1998) argues that the 
informant may be reluctant to speak openly about sensitive issues as he/she may be scared 
that the answers might be used against him/her. In other cases the informant can be scared of 
giving the „wrong‟ answers. I experienced both. In one interview I had to assure the informant 
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that his answers would be treated with confidentiality as he said some things he was scared 
would be known to others. In another interview one informant felt uncomfortable with being 
recorded in fear of saying something wrong. The situation might have had the character of 
being formal and „controlled‟ by the researcher so as to giving the informant associations of it 
being an oral exam. In these cases I had to assure that the information would be treated 
confidentially, and letting the informant know that there were no right or wrong answers. To 
make the informant comfortable about recording the interview I told her some of the 
questions and topics I was going to ask about so she felt more control over the situation. 
Despite these limitations, the interviews conducted gave me much information.  
 
In many interviews the informants became emotionally involved in the issues they spoke 
about. Some got agitated about certain issues that concerned them a lot in their daily lives and 
that seemed to disturb them. At the same time they could laugh, or shake their head in 
resignation. These emotional expressions transpiring throughout an interview was for me 
signs that gave a strong impression of the answers being trustworthy.  
In one occasion, one informant spoke about five to ten minutes before I could ask her 
the first question. She also avoided any eye-contact with me throughout the interview. This 
body language appeared for me as if the informant was reluctant to do the interview, and did 
not want me to ask questions she maybe did not feel comfortable of answering. During the 
interview she also literally expressed her concern about researchers coming into the 
community without contributing in changing things for the better for the community (see 
above). Because of this obvious reluctance towards me as a researcher I choose to ask her 
relative „innocent‟ questions that provided me with background information I could use in the 
thesis. Later on in the interview she did change her attitude towards me slightly and seemed to 
express more vividly feelings around her opinions on various issues. The information 
provided in this interview was valuable for my thesis, and has been used explicitly in the text.  
 
It was necessary for me to conduct interviews in Bayview, as most of the information I heard 
of what was going on there in most cases came from people not residing in the community. 
Doing interviews there proved valuable in testing what I had heard up against people‟s own 
experiences there. This way I could easier confirm or refute the information I already had.  
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Selection and access 
The selection of informants to interview was done based on the networks I had developed in 
the field. Most of the people I had contact with, and whom I first interviewed, were all related 
to the W-FRA either as committee members (in this thesis simply referred to as „W-FRA 
members‟) or „volunteers‟ and participants in the W-FRA activities. I realized that the results 
would be biased when only relating to people that obviously would have mostly positive 
things to say about the organisation. Therefore, I choose to go around in the community 
(Westcliff) and actively seek people that were not affiliated to the CSO or any other 
organisation, or that did support other groups
14
 in the communities. I did this to have access to 
other viewpoints on the W-FRA.  One strategy was to go around in the community and ask 
random people whether I could interview them, or actively seek people I had heard of that 
were part of „opposition‟ groups in the communities. Other times I met people by coincidence 
and that were neighbors of people I knew. Often people‟s doors were open and gave me 
access to sit in their homes and conduct the interview. In Westcliff most of the people in the 
flats knew I was there as a reseacher, and as I was the only white-colored in the community I 
was easy to spot. Being a white person in this township made up of most Indians and about 
30% Africans was not problematic at all. I was generally welcomed in most people‟s homes 
and was always invited to a soft-drink or some food.  
 When interviewing people that were seen as the W-FRA‟s opposition I was met with 
suspicion and anger among some W-FRA members as they thought I had taken sides with 
their „enemy‟. They quickly accepted it when I explained to them thoroughly the purpose of 
my research and the importance of not being biased. I had to say that to get a „real‟ picture of 
the W-FRA I had to include other views as well. Although it ended well, I still felt bad about 
the whole experience. As seen here, getting a too close relation with certain informants can 
create conflicts when the researcher does something the informants perceive as working 
against them and their integrity. What I learnt from this experience is the importance of being 
honest about one‟s intentions so that one will not get misunderstood along the way. I thought 
I had been clear on my role, but having spent a considerable amount of time with the W-FRA 
                                                 
14
 I choose to use „groups‟ here as people claiming to represent other organisations in Westcliff and Bayview 
often consisted of few individuals. According to both W-FRA and BFRA no other groups in any of the two 
communities are formally constituted.  
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activists clearly impacted on their expectations from me. For many I became a friend more 
than I was a researcher. What I can say now, after having been in the field, and experiencing 
such an intensive fieldwork, is that without my intensive interaction with the W-FRA activists 
and becoming „one of them‟ I would not have had access to the information that led me to 
seek other informants that could shed light on alternative aspects of the W-FRA, or even 
choosing to compare the W-FRA to the BFRA. 
Informants selected in Bayview where suggested by W-FRA activists in Westcliff. 
Although most of the interviews were done with people suggested by W-FRA activists, and 
thus would to a higher extent produce biased results, I did use the „snowball method‟ there 
asking the informants I first interviewed if they could put me in contact with other informants 
in the community (Bayview) that would be interesting to speak to. In Bayview I spoke with 
people that had been actively involved in the BFRA, but not part of the committee, as well as 
committee members and the BFRA leader.  
 
Ethical concerns 
Staying as long as I did in the field gave me information on things that, if used, could 
potentially harm my informants. Although presenting myself as being a researcher, the 
informal character of most of my interactions could have led people to forgetting what I was 
actually there to do. At times informants shared sensitive personal information with me, and I 
was witness to activities that according to South African law and regulations are illegal.  
Although some of these activities could provide some nuances in the material when assessing 
the legitimacy of the organisations, I have chosen to exclude this information to protect my 
informants.  
Being so close to people for such a long time may lead to a less distanced relation 
between the researcher and the researched, and instead of regarding me as being a researcher, 
for some I was perceived as a friend. The information disclosed in settings where my 
informants regarded me as a friend raised ethical concerns about using the information. When 
sensitive information has been disclosed it has been done in such a way that the informant 
cannot be recognised.   
I believe that although my integrity as a researcher might be harmed because I choose 
not to disclose sensitive information, trying to avoid any harm on the informants outweigh the 
choice of including such sensitive information. As such I did not find it ethical justifiable to 
use such information in the publication of this thesis.  
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Analysing the data 
The analysis of data is not a distinct stage of ethnographic research (Hammerlsey & Atkinson 
1995), it is something that is done in a continuous process since the beginning of a study 
(Fangen 2004). Thagaard argues that analysis and interpretation are two activities that happen 
parallel to each other throughout the research process, and that they are difficult to 
differentiate because the researcher continuously reflects over how the material gathered can 
be interpreted while still in the field. However, despite being closely interconnected, the 
processing of data material in an early stage is seen as different from the later stages where 
development of concepts and reflections over how the material should be understood is done. 
The researcher‟s independent analysis of the data after fieldwork distances herself from the 
subjects under study (informants) and the relation changes to that between the researcher and 
the text developed from the field (Thagaard 2006). The arguments posed throughout this 
thesis should therefore not be considered to be an objective truth.  
While it is rare for ethnographic analysis to begin from a well-defined theory, the 
process of analysis cannot but rely on the existing ideas of the ethnographer and those that she 
can get access to in the literature. The theoretical knowledge one has, and develops through 
the analysis of the data, should be used as resources to make sense of the data (Hammersley & 
Atkinson 1995). When looking for patterns or anything that stands out, what one is looking 
for depends on one‟s research focus and theoretical orientation. At times analytical concepts 
may arise „spontaneously‟ being used by the participants themselves, and may be worth 
following up as they may mark theoretically important or interesting phenomena 
(Hammersley & Atkinson 1995). The analysis of the data has been done in different ways. As 
discussed under I used analytical concepts from the theory. But other aspects of my findings 
are shed light on through concepts developed from the data-material. This analytical method 
is inspired by grounded theory. Grounded theory is an inductive method where the 
informants‟ stories and the data-material gathered is guiding the analysis. Although traditional 
grounded theory was exclusively inductive, Strauss & Corbin (1990) are open for a more 
flexible relation between the categories developed from the empirical material and the use of 
relevant literature that can shed light on the empirical material (Strauss & Corbin 1990). This 
can give the researcher an effective tool in interpreting the material and understanding 
connections in the material better. This has especially been done in chapter 7 where I have 
tried to find different dimensions within the empirical data and added theoretical concepts 
(such as the „free-rider‟ challenge) to better discuss and understand the issue of participation. 
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22 of 25 interviews were transcribed and provided a massive material constituting more than 
300 typed and some hand-written pages. The last three interviews were not transcribed as the 
information was not very different from the other interviews, however, it does not mean that 
all the interviews transcribed were dramatically different from each other. 
 In assessing the informants‟ perceptions of the CSOs‟ legitimacy I tried to find 
recurrent themes in the material that said something about their views on the CSOs and the 
leadership. The material was coded in topics, and quotes from informants regarding each of 
these topics were placed in separate word-documents. This was very time-consuming, and I 
eventually changed strategy as I found four main analytical concepts that could be used in 
guiding the analysis of the material. The four analytical concepts are related to, and inspired 
by, three key themes in theories on social movements, namely: cultural framing, political 
opportunity structure, and mobilizing structure. Using these theories as a point of departure 
interesting themes and issues transpired within each of them. Using analytical concepts 
related to the theory proved valuable in making sense of the massive material gathered in the 
field. Most of the material in the analysis stems from interviews, informal conversations and 
participant observation. Much of the background information in chapter 2 stems from 
secondary sources, and from both interviews and informal conversations in the field.  
 
The quotes I have used throughout the thesis are the informants‟ utterances on a material level 
and have been presented literally as they were expressed in the interviews. Still, the selection 
of quotes and how they have been presented and used in the text is an analytical expression of 
what I perceive as important to understand people‟s feelings about their CSO. The selection 
of quotes is done to exemplify and substantiate central aspects of the material, as well as 
nuances in people‟s views. Some informants were more vivid and thorough in their 
descriptions, thus, quotes from these individuals are more recurrent in the text.  
 
Assessing the quality of the research 
In social sciences, it has traditionally been proposed some standard criteria to determine the 
quality of the research. These criteria have been called reliability, validity and generalisation 
(Kvale 1996). Their usefulness has been fruitful in quantitative studies where knowledge has 
been seen as something measureable. These criteria have been replaced by some concepts that 
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better grasp and reflect the underlying assumptions in much qualitative research, namely 
credibility, confirmability, and transferability (Thagaard 2006).  
 
One way of demonstrating the credibility of the research is to discuss how the researcher uses 
and develops information from the field (Thagaard 2006) so that the reader can assess the 
choices made by the researcher. I have tried the outmost to make the research as transparent 
as possible, and have done so mainly through explaining my positionality in the field, the 
context in which I gathered the data, as well as the theories and analytical strategies applied in 
the knowledge production and understanding of the topic and the informants‟ stories. 
Triangulation of data-gathering methods, yielding information from various sources, has 
contributed to overlapping findings thereby increasing the credibility of my interpretation and 
analysis of the data. Despite my efforts in accounting for my choices along the way, the 
uneven selection of data may render the analysis more familiar to some than others. This is 
not uncommon.  
Whether the results can be confirmed or corroborated by others relates to the criteria 
of confirmability. Most of the aspects discussed within the concept of legitimacy are present 
within the theories framing this research. How I have applied the theory in the analysis of the 
findings appear clearly in the text. Other aspects of my findings are shed light on through 
concepts developed from the data-material. Thus, the concepts used in assessing legitimacy 
have been accounted for and have together produced a relatively credible understanding of 
legitimacy. As said earlier, the confirmability of the data collected increases when doing long 
fieldworks. The initial data gathered, and the assumptions made by the researcher about this 
data, can be strengthened or weakened based on continuous observations and data-collection 
in the field.  See attached a list of all the events I participated in during my fieldwork period 
(Appendix 2). Although the findings presented in the analysis of the thesis can be said to be 
„constructed‟ by the researcher it “does not automatically imply that they do not or cannot 
represent social phenomena” (Hammersley & Atkinson 1995:18).  
 
My findings cannot be generalized as the material was gathered in a specific place at a 
specific time. Richard Pithouse argues that when an academic article gets published it can do 
damage because the timeframe is so slow that when it finally gets published the situation is 
different on the ground. However, academic writing is valuable in that it records “what 
happens as it happens” although it can never be comprehensive as a phenomenon do have 
“layers of meaning”. Anyhow, “lessons can be learnt from different times and different 
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moments” (Interview, 15.11.06). Having this in mind, I believe that although the findings in 
my thesis cannot be generalized, they are one contribution among many towards the 
understanding of civil society in South Africa. The fieldwork was done within groups of 
people, mostly, but not exclusively, made up of Indians, living in the flatted area in two 
neighbouring communities in Chatsworth, Durban. Thus, civil society groups that operate in 
other contexts will be influenced by other circumstances and other mechanisms that work 
differently and can create different outcomes. However, the researcher‟s understanding that 
develops throughout and within the frame of a study can be relevant in other similar studies. 
 
Summary  
This chapter has presented the methodological choices done in collecting and analyzing the 
data. Most of the data-collection was done through participant observation by living in one of 
the communities and by participating in all the spheres used by the activists. To substantiate 
my observations I chose to do interviews. Most of the information I have from the BFRA was 
collected through informal conversations with W-FRA activists and others, and mainly 
through interviews in Bayview. The massive data-material gathered through four months with 
intensive participation and being exposed to stories and happenings almost on a daily basis 
have increased the credibility and the confirmability of my findings. Despite having been so 
fortunate of having such close interaction with the field, the findings must not be interpreted 
as objective truth as the data gathered has been subjected to interpretation and analysis solely 
by the researcher.  
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4.    FRAMING 
 
This chapter will use the cultural framing approach to assess the W-FRA and the BFRA‟s use 
of framing strategies to diagnose problems, to distinguish between a „we‟ (the activists) and a 
„them‟ (usually the state), propose solutions and motivate people to partake in their actions. 
The issues framed as problematic, how these issues are justified by blaming the government‟s 
broken promises and unfulfilled constitutional rights, as well as the creation of a collective 
identity as „poor‟, is identical for the two CSOs. The main differences between the CSOs are, 
however, on the frequency of their framing (W-FRA having more meetings and other 
activities in its community that facilitates communication with its constituents than the 
BFRA), and their different ways of motivating their constituents to participate in the CSO 
work and actions. The findings show that the W-FRA‟s uses a more altruistic motivational 
framing, whilst the BFRA uses a frame of duress. These differences will form a basis from 
which one of the CSOs (W-FRA) attains a more legitimate role in its constituency than the 
other (BFRA). 
 
Diagnosing the problems and politicizing issues 
The W-FRA and the BFRA have throughout the years of their existence had similar 
grievances and have diagnosed the same issues as problematic. Today, although the W-FRA 
is more active than the BFRA in its community through regular community meetings and 
frequent communication with its constituents, the same issues are still equally pertinent for 
the CSO activists and the constituents in both communities. The reason both communities 
share the same grievances is that they are both situated in the same socioeconomic context, 
and are facing similar challenges in regards to local social problems and economic 
deprivation mainly due to the government‟s socioeconomic policies. The following is a 
presentation of the issues diagnosed as problematic and which the W-FRA, especially, tries to 
combat through motivating its constituents on the need to act collectively in order to change 
them. The current issues have been seen as problematic for many years as the socioeconomic 
situation these people live under has not been improved since the birth of the CSOs.  
 
The following is a presentation of the issues diagnosed as problematic. Although the 
presentation here can be apprehended as mere „facts‟, it has to be noted that the information is 
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based on the informants‟ stories and the CSOs‟ use of framing. The information presented 
here was used by the CSOs in informing their constituents on why they are facing these 
problems and how they can combat them collectively. Most of the information transpired 
through weekly community meetings in Westcliff, other public gatherings, and one meeting in 
Bayview, as well as through many informal conversations with the W-FRA leader done 
frequently throughout the fieldwork period.   
 
Ownership 
The struggle against the government‟s attempt to sell the flats to the people is ongoing, and 
seems to represent a battle over meaning between the local government and the Chatsworth 
activists. Sale of government-owned property is part of the ANC‟s neoliberal strategy to 
transfer the administrative responsibility of the flats from Council to a locally elected body 
corporate in the communities.From the government‟s side it has been promoted with beautiful 
rhetoric: „bringing housing to previously disadvantaged communities is the basis of our 
democracy, and owning one‟s own home is a form of empowerment for the people of 
Durban‟15. To counteract it, and convince people that home-ownership will worsen their 
situation, the W-FRA conducts frequent meetings to discuss this issue. At one occasion they 
invited people already familiar with the problems with home-ownership. In one extraordinary 
meeting held especially to inform people from both Bayview and Westcliff about the 
problems, some activists from Wentworth (neighbouring township) argued that the body 
corporate system is detrimental to the relations between neighbours and families because of 
money (Wentworth activist leader speaking at meeting in Westcliff 05.11.06). Increased rates 
and interests have put people that were previously in good financial standing in huge arrears, 
and the body corporates are bankrupted. Another argument against ownership says the costs 
of living in a privately owned flat will be the same as when being a tenant. One W-FRA 
member, replicating what was said on the various meetings, said in an interview:  
The Body Corporate, the levies, the rates…It doesn‟t make sense. If you pay rent, 
lights, and water then suddenly Council want to get you and say „now you don‟t pay 
rent, you pay RATE, lights, and water‟, but if you have to judge your rent-money and 
your rate-money it‟s almost the same thing! (...) So why is Council bluffing the 
people? 
                                       (Interview,W-FRA member 4) 
 
                                                 
15
 eThekwini Municipality Mayor Obed Mlaba quoted in Govender 2006:„Home ownership for tenants‟, 
February 2, 2006 (www.durban.gov.za), published at the official website of eThekwini Municipality.   
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A Bayview resident feared the Body Corporate system would result in corruption, saying:  
The only problem is that among the people: who can you trust to be a body corporate? 
(...) Because they might elect a rog [thug]! And if you give money and they cheat your 
money, what are you going to do? 
                                      (Interview,Bayview resident 3) 
 
Another strategy to prevent people from accepting transfer of ownership is to tell them that 
the organization can no longer help them once the transfer-papers are signed. In the same 
extraordinary meeting the W-FRA leader said “Don‟t go to Rent Office. Then you work 
against us and our integrity” (Extraordinary meeting, Westcliff 05.11.06). In the one and only 
community meeting held in Bayview the BFRA leader used the same argument in another 
manner saying: All people that signed for ownership can not be helped.  Do not sign whether 
you are threatened or not!” These arguments are used in the CSOs‟ relentless fight against the 
ownership because they know that shifting state-owned property into the hands of the people 
themselves will remove an important mobilizing subject. Desai has grasped this point as well 
arguing that “by privatizing living arrangements, collective memories of struggle would be 
replaced by the immediacy of dealing with banks and other lending institutions as 
individuals” (2000:48). To avoid a splitting up of people in matters like this the W-FRA 
leader continuously says “together we stand, divided we fall”. This phrase has become her 
mantra and is used in all occasions possible to educate people on the importance of fighting 
this issue jointly.   
However, it is important to notice that both CSOs relentlessly try to convince their 
constituents not to sign ownership-papers because many people do not have specific 
objections against ownership. Many think the idea of owning one‟s own home sounds nice. 
This has resulted in the CSOs changing their tactic in battling this issue because it seems that 
people eventually will accept it anyway. Now they are setting some terms; demanding a 
proper upgrade of the flats, and an arrears wipe-off before transferring of ownership can be 
done.  The reason is that although the National Housing Subsidy Discount Benefit Scheme 
offers a subsidy of R7.500 to tenants who want to buy their flats, making it sound like the 
flats are free (see Appendix 4), people with arrears have to sign mortgage statements and pay 
their arrears in full before taking ownership (Narsiah 2002). As said in the Westcliff meetings, 
when people sign ownership they will thus automatically acknowledge their arrears. 
The ownership issue is, as seen here, fused with confusing and conflicting mindsets, 
and has pushed the CSOs to change their strategies from rejecting the transfer of ownership to 
being open for a trade-off.  
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Prepaid meters 
Both CSOs diagnose the installation of prepaid meters as a problem they need to combat, and 
argue mainly that the „prepaids‟ will reduce people‟s access to electricity or water as their 
access depends on how much money they can pay. When not able to pay for water “the 
maximum access is 200 litres a day” (W-FRA leader speaking in community meeting 
29.10.06) and a water-flow restrictor (by informants called a „trickler‟) will dramatically 
reduce the water flow so it will take several hours to fill up a bucket of water.  When able to 
pay, 20% of the paid amount will go towards the down-payment of people‟s arrears. In that 
way the prepaid system is forcing people to pay back their arrears. It is also reducing the 
amount of electricity available at once: “With prepaid meters you can not use all appliances in 
the house at the same time. The geezer
16
 takes most electricity” (BFRA leader speaking at 
meeting in Bayview 26.11.06). The other argument posed by the BFRA leader is: “(...) we 
face problems if we destroy meters; they [Municipality] will say we tampered; now WE have 
problems!” The reason this is a problem is that for each time someone has illegally 
reconnected themselves to the water or the electricity grid they will be disconnected and fined 
with R820,-
17
. This is the main reason people have accumulated so many arrears over the 
years. According to the W-FRA leader, around 84% of the people living in Westcliff and 
Bayview have arrears (community meeting, 27.10.06). When someone asked the W-FRA 
leader why the CSOs in Westcliff and Bayview do not want to accept the prepaid system she 
firmly replied that they want a full write-off of arrears before implementing the „prepaids‟ 
(Community meeting, Westcliff, 29.11.06).  
For poor people with little or no income the prepaid system can end up forcing people 
to use other methods, such as drinking from polluted water streams, in order to get water. One 
of my informants in Westcliff told me that she and the many children she was the caretaker of 
were forced to drink water from a still-standing stream nearby due to being disconnected from 
the water grid. They became sick, and later it was revealed that the water turned out to contain 
dangerously high levels of Coliforms and E-coli which made it unhealthy and unfit for human 
consumption (Desai 2002). The same year, in 2000, KwaZulu-Natal experienced the worst 
cholera outbreak in the history of South Africa. 
The arguments used by the BFRA in pleading its constituents not to accept the prepaid 
meters seemed to be an attempt in making them feel they were going against the others in the 
                                                 
16
 Hot water container. 
17
 At the time of my fieldwork 1ZAR (South African Rand) equalized 1NOK (Norwegian Crone). 
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community and contributing to the BFRA losing its battle against the prepaid system: “Few 
rotten potatoes went there to sign [accept prepaid water/electricity meters], so now we others 
also get rotten. If we don‟t do things together we‟re gonna loose” (Community meeting, 
Bayview, 16.11.06).  
Although the W-FRA and the BFRA fight the same issue, they use different strategies 
in convincing people to fight it jointly. The W-FRA leader educates people on the 
consequences of signing and the costs involved, whilst the BFRA leader, although mentioning 
certain negative aspects, rather speak badly of the people that have already accepted the 
prepaid system.  
 
Demand for arrear wipe-off 
The accumulation of arrears is a huge problem in both communities and is a daily topic and 
major concern among the residents. Many are thousands of rands in arrears, some up to 
R80.000. The CSOs‟ aim to delete people‟s arrears is interconnected with their resistance 
against the prepaid system and the transferring of ownership as in both cases people have to 
account for their accumulated arrears and are forced to pay them back. In an extraordinary 
meeting arranged in Westcliff for residents from both communities a joint resolution letter 
was drafted. It ended with the words: “We will only talk to you if you write off all arrears!” 
(Public meeting, Westcliff, 05.11.06). At the moment the Council is only „parking off‟ the 
arrears (see Appendix 4).  
 
Upgrading 
They know we gonna fight tooth and nail for good homes! We don‟t want to accept it 
like it is now. 
       (W-FRA leader speaking in community meeting 22.11.06) 
 
As illustrated in chapter two, the flats are in a very bad condition. The CSOs complain about a 
previous attempt by council to renovate and upgrade the flats that ended up in a total failure 
putting the flats in a worse condition than they already were in. The W-FRA leader complains 
about the waste of money: “R10.5 million was invested in Chatsworth for the upgrading; we 
have not seen any benefit of the upgradings!” (W-FRA leader in meeting 29.10.06). This 
problem is recognised by all residents in the two communities, making the issue of upgrading 
imperative for both paying and non-paying tenants.  
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Broken promises and a language of rights 
The W-FRA and the BFRA have, as seen above, identical demands, additionally, they also 
frame their demands remarkably similarly. Two frames were outstanding and repeatedly used 
by all informants when framing issues as problematic. The first frame stresses the 
government‟s failure to deliver and claims that the government (more specifically local 
councillors) has broken the promises it has given the people. A sense of being betrayed and 
ignored by the government characterizes this frame, which here is referred to as „the broken 
promises‟ frame. The second frame emphasizes people‟s rights to their claims, both as 
citizens and as human beings, and is here called „the language of rights‟ frame. The common 
use of these two frames is identical for the two CSOs, and forms part of their view on whom 
and what is to be blamed for their problems. With these frames they manage to justify their 
continued activity and efforts in trying to mobilize their constituents. These frames were also 
found to be resonant in the constituents‟ own presentation and stories of what they themselves 
perceived as the root to their problems. The broken promises frame will be discussed first, 
followed by the language of rights frame. 
 
Broken promises 
Part of the diagnostic framing is to attribute blame on somebody for the problems identified 
by the CSOs. The South African government, and more explicitly the local government and 
the eThekwini Municipality, is generally blamed for people‟s problems and miseries in the 
communities. On a general basis the government is accused of giving promises it still has not 
been able to meet, promises such as those in their election manifesto “a better life for all” 
used to canvass votes among the poorer sections of the population. One BFRA member 
pointed at the local councillors as failures angrily saying: “(…) you [local councillors] 
promised us so much of things (…), you have failed to give us your promises (..), now is a 
time that we need you and you can‟t do what you all [promised] (Interview,BFRA member 1). 
Many claim that the councillors and representatives of the various political parties at local 
level coming into the communities during elections are only hunting for the poor people‟s 
votes for themselves to be elected as political leaders rather than actually helping the poor:   
When the councillor comes in he only goes to the poors and he ask for.., he gives them 
opportunities  but the opportunities he gives is false opportunities.  He promises things 
and after (...) he can never offer it. After he gets his votes he gets his things he know 
now he‟s the government itself, he can never be with us, he‟s always against us. You 
see?  
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                                     (Interview,BFRA member 1) 
 
This view is widespread amongst the informants of both communities and forms the basis of 
people‟s scepticism towards political councillors and representatives of various political 
parties, especially during election time. People do not know who or which political party to 
vote for as they do not know who can replace the current ANC government (especially at 
local level) and improve the conditions in the communities. One W-FRA member confirms 
this view saying that “All political parties make false promises” (Interview, W-FRA member 
2). The lack of a political party to the left of the ANC is also a main reason for people‟s 
disbelief that the other political parties can make changes.   
AW-FRA member calls the ANC liars saying: “ANC won, ANC didn‟t give us 
nothing! Nothing! (…) is like you‟re living with promises and lies at the same time!” 
(Interview, W-FRA member 4). Another W-FRA member believes the ANC councillors lead 
to division in the communities saying: “I‟m a registered voter and a member of the ANC. I‟m 
ashamed because they promised a better life for all. Councillors bring division instead of 
unity” (Interview, W-FRA member 2). People‟s view is also that “Council” is not only 
breaking their promises, but also breaking people‟s homes. A W-FRA member angrily said: 
“But Council, YOU should put shame in your face to say “we promised these people to give 
them homes” but you go and destroy people‟s homes” (Interview,W-FRA member 4).  
Whilst most people are tired of waiting for the long-promised delivery and see the 
promises given by the government as broken promises, one Bayview resident saw it, still, as a 
delayed delivery of the promised services: “people are confused and every party say they will 
deliver, same that the ANC said they promise, but I think they are a bit slow with delivery” 
(Interview, Bayview resident 3).  
Many people question the discrepancy between the government‟s promises of service 
delivery and their implementation of cost-recovery measures that forces relatively poor people 
to pay for their services, but also to pay back the arrears they have accumulated due to their 
unaffordability to pay their services.  One Bayview resident question this discrepancy, saying: 
“And why now you promised us all that, and now you are coming to a time when you put in 
this prepaid meters, and if you buy a 100 rand of power, 50 rand will go to the arrears?” 
(Interview,Bayview resident 3).   
The general views among my informants show that most people in both Bayview and 
Westcliff believe the national government, since its coming to power has broken the promises 
it has given the people of South Africa. They are angry of the implementation of cost-
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recovery technology that will leave many poor and unemployed without adequate access to 
electricity or water, and cannot understand how the government offer promises it clearly has 
not been able to hold. Alongside the broken promises, a frame on the language of rights has 
developed. In the next section I will illustrate how people use a language of rights not only to 
protest against the government‟s „delayed‟ or „lack of‟ delivery, but also to provide access to 
services for themselves.  
 
Language of rights: justifying illegal actions  
The broken promises frame clearly shows who is to blame for people‟s miseries. Alongside 
this frame the progressive Constitution in South Africa has facilitated the development of 
what I would call a language of rights among the post-apartheid activists. The activists and 
people in Chatsworth are no exception as they talk about their constituted rights when framing 
their demands. Two of the W-FRA activists have even used Children‟s Rights in the 
courtroom when fighting for access to housing or water (Interview,W-FRA members 4 and 
6).  
 But people also emphasize their rights as human beings arguing that the government 
does not treat the poor well:  “the government must see us with a pair of eyes, as we are all 
human beings they should be treating us like human beings!” (Interview,W-FRA member 4), 
and that also the poor should have the right to live in proper conditions: “It is our right to live 
in a decent, habitable room” (W-FRA leader in W-FRA meeting 29.10.06).  
   
In both communities, illegal reconnections of both water and electricity are widespread, and 
the amount of people living in arrears due to non-payment (of rent and services) is huge. Non-
payment is a result of people‟s inability to pay. Their awareness of their rights and the 
organisations‟ use of a language of rights to demand proper housing and affordable services 
have led more people to stop paying rent and services, due to their belief that it is their right to 
have this access whether they can afford to or not. The W-FRA leader tells the story of when 
they declared a defiance campaign because the government was not listening to the plights of 
the poor. The Head of Housing received a memorandum stating that people were not willing 
to pay for rent or services anymore. The main argument was based on a language of rights, 
the W-FRA leader explains:  
We went on a defiance and we told people not to pay. We told people not to pay 
because we thought that is was their RIGHT not to pay. If you are living in a house 
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where the disrepair is so bad, your taps and your pipes are leaking and you‟d be 
overcharged for water, what would you do? You wouldn‟t pay, that is the reality. I 
think people have a right not to pay.  
       
People‟s awareness of their rights have also made way for legitimating illegal actions such as 
illegal reconnections of water and electricity. One BFRA member said firmly:  
They [Council/Municipality] took out our power boxes. So I‟m not afraid to say that 
we are using illegal, because they promised us, voting time they promised us: „vote for 
me‟ they‟ll be giving free education, lights and water and all these things. 
                                     (Interview,BFRA member 2) 
 
The language of rights is also used to justify their actions of protest:  
We write up placards and we march on the roads where we call a strike, and we 
barricade the road and we get involved with young childs (…) and they go on into the 
streets and they say: „we have the rights to education, we have no school fees and‟, you 
know, „we have the right to put boards on the roads‟ and everything. 
                                         (Interview,BFRA member 1) 
 
This language of rights that is so commonly used by activists and residents in the two 
communities has been developed since the CCG, and later CCF, became involved in the 
struggle in the two areas. The W-FRA leader explains: 
 
When Fatima Meer and them came in they played a very crucial role. The one thing 
they really did was that they educated us on our rights. Prior to that we weren‟t so 
strong and powerful because we didn‟t know how to really act, and what we could do 
because we didn‟t know our rights, we didn‟t know the Constitution, you know, how 
constitutionally we were protected and all that. (…) We thought that it was not even 
our right to question, but now we realised that it is our right, a democratic right, to 
know what is happening, with even the taxes that we pay! (…) And all this education 
came about through the Concerned Citizens Group, which later upon related itself into 
the CCF.  
 
Even in public gatherings, such as in a rally in Crossmoor, a well-known leader, activist and 
academic, Ashwin Desai, told people that one of their rights is to go against the system that 
breaks them down, explicitly saying who is wrong: “If the law is wrong, (…) it is our right to 
break it. (…). YOU are right, and the government is WRONG! YOU are right, and Mike 
Sutcliffe is wrong!” (Speech at a rally in Crossmoor, Chatsworth, 24.09.06).  
Although people in both Bayview and Westcliff have access to water and electricity 
through illegal means by using their rights to access such services, Desai (2002) asks whether 
activists really can acquire any gains from the practice and language of “human rights” based 
on the time, energy and mobilisation that was put into the Manqele case (a case to regain 
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access to water for a single-mother being the caretaker of many children) that lost in court. 
Despite suffering losses through the court-system although using a language of rights, it 
seemed during my stay in the community that people used their awareness about their rights 
to continue fighting for their rights, and to demand from the government to implement them. 
After all, people continue to struggle in their daily lives, the arrears accumulate and each day 
is harder to provide “a decent meal on the table” (phrase used by many informants), despite 
South Africa having one of the most progressive Constitutions in the World.   
Ballard (2005) is also sceptical of having an uncritical celebration of rights on behalf 
of activists, due to the lack of implementation of such rights. Despite Ballard and Desai‟s 
scepticism it is important to note the creative ways in which social movements have adopted 
the notion of rights, for example to regain access to services they have been disconnected 
from.  
 As seen here, when diagnosing the issues as unjust, a dichotomy between a „we‟ and a 
„them‟ is automatically made. How this is done explicitly is discussed in the following 
section. 
 
The creation of a collective identity (we), and putting the blame on 
a ‘them’ 
This part discusses how the W-FRA and the BFRA distinguish between a „we‟ and a „them‟. 
Constructing a common „we‟ identity is crucial to build up and to mobilize groups of people 
as it creates a boundary between activists (the people) and the ones they mobilize against 
(usually the state). This distinction says something about people‟s view on the state. This part 
shows how the W-FRA constructs an identity among its constituents generally termed as 
„poor‟ (although this collective identity does not resonate with all the constituents that live in 
the same community), and how the state is portrayed as the people‟s adversary.    
 
Towards a collective identity as „the poors‟ 
In the first instance the people‟s common experiences living in the same socioeconomic 
context has facilitated a common identity that, in this case, is class-based. Desai captures the 
essence of this collective identity in his book “We are the Poors” (2002) which title draws 
inspiration from an incident in Westcliff where one designer-bedecked African councillor in a 
mass meeting in Westcliff began castigating the crowd saying Indians were too privileged. 
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She was met with anger from the crowd and an Indian lady screamed: “We are not Indians, 
we are the poors!” Another lady in the crowd, an African lady, said with a good-humoured 
tone: “We are not African, we are the poors!” (Desai 2002:44). The struggle they all were, 
and still are, facing has been a source to rethink identities in the new South Africa. During my 
stay in the area this collective identity of being „poor‟ came up to the surface and was highly 
present in most of my informants‟ views on themselves. The word „poors‟ was used so often, 
and seemed as if it in a way had become a trademark for the people in the two communities. 
Promoting an identity as poor has resulted in an all-inclusive identity irrespective of other 
differences. This discursive strategy is advantageous in that it includes and targets a wide 
spectre of people within the two communities.  
This collective identity of being „poor‟ came out strongly in most of the interviews, 
informal conversations, meetings, and even public gatherings where leaders and activists used 
this term frequently. When I asked one informant in Westcliff how many poor people there 
are in the community, she said: “Lots, lots [of] people. For rich people I think two or three or 
four. People in this community [are] poor people, really poor people” (Interview,W-FRA 
member 6).  
Despite all the negative connotations attached to being „poor‟, people are filled with 
pride, self-esteem, and strength. People generally do not seem to be ashamed of being poor, 
and openly fight in solidarity with other „poors‟. Some see themselves as educated people 
(“We are strong people, we are educated people (…)”, Interview,BFRA member 1). Such 
views were evident among several of my informants in the two communities.  
 
Some argue that CSOs appeal to substantive like-mindedness between representative and 
those represented “by virtue of existential qualities that are usually impossible to renounce 
such as gender, race and ethnic origin” (Lavalle et al. 2007:14). This thesis, on the contrary, 
argues that those qualities are not the ones that are used as common characteristics for 
creating a common identity in these two communities. There are about 30% Africans living in 
the area, and the collective identity that has been drafted is not created on the sole reason of 
being Indian or African, but by being in the same deprived socioeconomic situation. The 
collective identity as „poor‟ is communicated over other identities such as being a Hindu, a 
Christian or a Muslim (religious identity), or an ANC or MF supporter (political affiliation). 
Although the CSOs target those that identify themselves with being „poor‟, not all in the 
community share this identity. 
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Non-poor 
Although the people active in the CSOs in most cases have a collective „we‟ identity as 
„poor‟, I discovered that some people in Westcliff distinguish between non-payers and rate-
payers as „the poor‟ versus „the rich‟, respectively. Some informants who pay their rent and 
services do not want to involve themselves in the W-FRA because they believe the W-FRA 
only represents the „poor‟ non-payers and treat the rate-payers badly. They do not want to 
identify themselves as being poor, and they also argue that people in the community are not as 
poor as they often want to give an impression of. These informants even call the people 
claiming to be poor for being drug-addicts and alcoholics: “There‟s not many poor people 
here, because most of them are alcoholics, drug addicts, so where poor coming in this place 
when you‟ve got money for all that?” (Interview,Westcliff residents 6 and 7).  
Although these „non-poor‟ people are concerned about issues that overlap with the W-
FRA‟s issues (such as upgrading of the flats), they choose not to fight for these issues with 
and through the W-FRA. This shows that the W-FRA is primarily focusing on framing „the 
poor‟ people in the community, and gives an impression, among other people in the 
community not identifying themselves as poor, that the W-FRA is biased explicitly towards 
fighting for „the poor‟s‟ grievances and concerns. This is what two informants said in a joint 
interview: 
Fatima Meer and all. They didn‟t come for people like us, paying rent. (…) They only 
[came] for the people not paying rent, that‟s why they call it poverty area. Poverty, 
they make US like poverty here too! But we are not poverty because we pay the rent. 
So people only come here to fight for people that don‟t pay the rent. 
                                       (Interview,Westcliff residents 6 and 7)  
 
This shows that the W-FRA seems to target people that identify as being poor, and not the 
people that do not share this identity. The lack of a proper „identity frame‟ - that is the 
convergence of people‟s personal identity with the identity framed by the [CSOs] which is 
necessary to motivate action (Gamson 1992) - seems to be the reason why all in the 
community do not identify themselves with the collective „we‟-identity the W-FRA tries to 
communicate to the people.  
 
My findings show that there are several types of „groups‟ in the two communities. 1) There 
are unemployed people dependent on social grants and/or low incomes from alternative 
sources of work that often maintain a whole family of several members with their grant-
money and low income, and others, who despite being unemployed, neither have access to 
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social grants. The two last groups are those struggling to maintain themselves and/or their 
families, and are generally unfit to pay for rent and services. These generally define and 
identify themselves with being in the group of the „poors‟. 2) Those that are from the working 
class and are paying rent and services (and who refuse to be called poor), and 3) those that 
gain income through dodgy channels and are seen as rich by other people in the community 
(so-called „interest-people‟), but that also in many instances „join the bandwagon‟ of the 
„poors‟ by refusing to pay rent and services despite affording to do so.  
 
The poors‟ image of the state as the „enemy‟ 
How the state is framed is ultimately decisive for the people‟s perception of it. Here I will 
discuss the CSOs‟ framing of the state, and as a result, people‟s views on the state. 
Understanding people‟s views on the state is fruitful in understanding why people are 
sceptical towards or happy with their CSOs‟ choice of political strategies and whether their 
sentiments about the relation strengthens or weakens the legitimacy of the CSOs. The CSOs‟ 
use of political strategies and their constituents‟ reactions towards is discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
Public gatherings and events are platforms where identities are shaped, issues voiced, and the 
creation of a common glue that holds people together is made. The speeches held often 
contain words and phrases people can identify themselves with. In these speeches, a „we‟ and 
„them‟ is constructed, and the explicit and simplistic ways of communicating this to the 
people easily creates an immediate understanding among the people of who „us‟ (we the 
people) and who „them‟ (usually the state) are.  
In a public celebration of Diwali
18
 in Westcliff community, Professor Fatima Meer held 
a powerful speech to the people. Utilising the symbolic value of the story behind this 
important Hindu festival and celebration, she made a clear division of a „we‟ and a „them‟. 
                                                 
18
 Diwali is the celebration of the return of the Hindu god Rama, who came back from a battle after defeating the 
demon Ravina. When Rama returned, people welcomed him with "thousands of lights" in their homes, a 
tradition that characterizes Diwali celebrations. At the metaphysical level, Diwali signifies the victory of good 
over evil (http://media.www.thepenn.org).  
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Based on two characters from the story that many people, especially the Hindus, are familiar 
with, she created a clear distinction of a „we‟ and a „them‟ saying:    
 
You, people of Chatsworth, are the living [spirit] of Rama, Rama discovered Ravina, and 
he fought him to death. And you have discovered your Ravina. And no matter how much 
your Ravina oppresses you, you are always fighting him. And I‟m now referring to the 
Town Council, that is your Ravina. Every now and again they come and they oppress 
you, (…) but you stand up to that Council, and you are never oppressed. Your fate in 
yourself, just like Rama had fate in himself, and there was unity between him and Sita 
and his brothers, and through that fate and that unity they conquered Ravina. And you are 
conquering your Ravina, through your fate in your self and in your neighbours.  
            (Speech at Diwali celebration, Westcliff 22.10.06) 
 
Professor Meer uses this well-known story as an analogue to the struggle of the flatdwellers in 
Chatsworth, and portrays the people as the good King Rama, and Town Council as the evil 
demon Ravina, who oppress the people. The story is not only explicitly and clearly making a 
„we‟ and „them‟ distinction, but is also giving values attached to these distinctions where „we‟ 
(the people) are good, whilst „them‟ (the Town Council) are portrayed as bad and as the 
people‟s oppressors. She is also emphasizing the people‟s need of having fate in themselves 
and unity with each other (their neighbours) in order to stand up against the oppression 
executed by Town Council.   
As already mentioned in the theoretical framework studies of cultural framing focus on 
how cultural processes create a basis for, and are a product of, collective action (Stokke 
1999). The celebration of Diwali represents exactly one such cultural process that has been 
shared across religious and cultural groups over time within the communities of Chatsworth, 
and has today become meaningful, in different ways, to all people living there. Even Desai 
argues that the people living in Chatsworth have been part of a cultural process where: “all 
religious groups and races living in the mosaic of Chatsworth [have] participated in the 
celebration of Diwali and raised the slogan „lights for all‟. In this way, Diwali in South Africa 
[has been] rethought, politicized, and made accessible to all the community” (2002:42). 
Diwali, then, has become an effective glue in creating a collective of united people in 
Chatsworth. It has been recognised as a good occasion to gather the people of Chatsworth, in 
line with other similar events of collective celebrations, and has contributed to strengthening 
the social atmosphere in the communities. The W-FRA leader recognises the role of these 
avenues of collective celebrations, and says in an interview: 
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After we started organising the Youth Day functions, the Woman‟s Day functions, 
Diwali functions, we found that people would socialise very well, and the whole (…) 
atmosphere in the community started to change. People started to realise more about 
(…) being social and sociable, even with your neighbours for that matter. And things 
did change drastically. 
                     
Negative descriptions of the government (Council) are not only made in public speeches by 
well-known and experienced activists such as Professor Meer, but are also reflected in the 
sentiments of the CSO activists in both communities. They see the government as someone 
who uses the people (“I feel there‟s no future for our people anymore because of the 
government. I‟m not against the government, but the government is using us”. 
Interview,BFRA member 1), as careless (“They don‟t care about the poor people”, interview, 
BFRA member 1), someone who oppresses the people (see Prof. Fatima Meer‟s speech), and 
who comes with false promises (see broken promises frame). Some ask why Council is so 
blind, naïve and foolish and see the Council as “uneducated, illiterate barbarians” 
(Interview,W-FRA member 4), and even racist. The Council is not working for the poor, it 
has, according to a WFRA member, accused her and her family for „unseemly behaviour‟ 
running a brothel and illegal business, although these are untrue accusations. And, although 
she was a paying tenant, Council came to evict her. She thinks councillors are bringing 
division instead of unity (Interview,W-FRA member 2). The general sentiment among 
residents in both communities is that Council has treated them like criminals, coming with 
false accusations as an excuse to execute violence on them during evictions especially. This 
sentiment among the people is also in line with how the government is portrayed in the 
literature in how they resolve issues of non-payment (see McDonald & Pape 2002). The 
people have had such an extent of confrontations with local government and local councillors 
that they have learnt not to trust them. 
 
Although being successfully able to diagnose the problems and frame the issues convincingly, 
the CSOs also need to present themselves as the solutions to the diagnosed problems in an 
equivalent convincing fashion. 
 
Continuation of apartheid struggles  
Although most of my informants had never participated in any struggle under apartheid, they 
framed the present struggle as similar to the anti-apartheid struggle, and even address each 
other with names used by anti-apartheid activists. In a context of ongoing bad living 
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conditions, growing unemployment and raising prices for food, rent and services people 
cannot but compare their living to the apartheid days, some even claiming life in post-
apartheid South Africa being worse. In an interview with the W-FRA leader it clearly came 
out that the residents in Chatsworth are fighting for the implementation of the rights the anti-
apartheid activists once fought for, and see their struggle as a prolongation of the apartheid 
fight. She believes the government judges poor people for living a too good life when they 
once in a while can eat a warm meal or purchase new clothes. The W-FRA leader says: “I 
think they have the right to wear something new. And they have a right to eat good food. 
That‟s what South Africa, that‟s what the fight, you know, the apartheid fight, was about: „a 
better life for all‟”.  
Both CSOs in this study fight for the implementation of the government‟s policies, but 
they resent the government‟s affirmative policies (such as the BEE strategy) and go as far as 
calling it racist. Most Indian informants feel discriminated and unfairly treated by the 
government and many claim the present government treats them worse than the apartheid-
government did. One W-FRA member confirmed this view in an interview when she angrily 
said: “Now the ANC, the way we look at it, has become racist! They are racist because they 
give five Blacks employment and one Indian employment which is not fair!” (Interview,W-
FRA member 4).   
Claiming that the government is like, or worse than, the white apartheid government, 
activists in Chatsworth use the same words that were used by the anti-apartheid activists in 
public gatherings, marches and rallies. Leaders and activists within the civil society 
environment address each other as „comrade‟, and they often use powerful anti-apartheid 
slogans in their speeches and in marches, like “Viva19 [name] viva” or “Amandla! Awetu!” 
(Power! Power to the people!). 
 
The historical struggle in Westcliff and Bayview has a special position in people‟s memories 
and stories. In both communities the residents, together as flats residents associations under 
the CCF banner, have resisted forced evictions by fighting the brutal use of rubber bullets, 
tear-gas, batons and fierce police-dogs by Council security forces. People (both residents and 
CSO members) in both communities spoke proudly of the time the community got together 
                                                 
19
 Meaning „long live‟ in various languages (Spanish, Portuguese) and is a type of cheering honoring and 
supporting persons or whatever issues one might be cheering for. An expression of gratitude or respect.  
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and fought the security personnel by making human walls to stop them from entering people‟s 
homes.  
In Westcliff, this struggle history is used to describe the W-FRA as defenders of the 
community and as martyrs sacrificing their lives for the people and fighting for the future of 
the children. In several of the interviews with W-FRA members the W-FRA leaders are 
spoken of as altruistic defenders of the community sacrificing both their lives and their 
children‟s‟ lives in the confrontations. One W-FRA member said:  
 
Westcliff Flats Residents Association (…) are able to die for us!  They [W-FRA 
leaders] fighting for the people, they never fighting for themselves. [W-FRA leader] 
never got problem, they got the money themselves, the children [of the W-FRA 
leaders] themselves they give everything, fighting for the poor people only. (…) They 
worry about the people, all the poor people. 
                                      (Interview,W-FRA member  6)  
 
The view that the W-FRA is fighting for people‟s human rights has validity outside its 
community boundaries, and is acknowledged by powerful persons, such as Professor Meer, 
which has an important symbolic significance for the people of Chatsworth through her 
involvement in their struggle as the leader of the CCF. People‟s admiration and respect for her 
is also connected to her history as an anti-apartheid freedom fighter. In a speech she held in 
Westcliff during the Diwali celebration she said: “everyone honours you [people of 
Chatsworth], admires you, and you are known nationally, as the fighters for human rights” 
(speech held on Diwali 22.10.06).  
 
The CSOs‟ use of motivational frames 
The last of the framing tasks is motivational framing. It is closely connected to participation 
and non-participation that will be discussed in the chapter on „Participation‟. The leaders of 
the two CSOs here try to motivate the people they represent to engage and participate, but 
they use different words in their motivation. The motivational frames used by both CSO 
leaders focus on the benefits/gains of participating in CSO activities, but the gains and 
benefits people will obtain if choosing to participate are different for the two CSOs. Whilst 
the W-FRA leader says people‟s involvement and commitment to the organization will result 
in a divine benefit, the BFRA leader motivates people only to participate in selected 
happenings (here the ward-elections) and uses duress rather than persuasion by telling his 
constituents they will not receive material benefits  if they choose not to participate. The W-
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FRA‟s „divine benefit‟ frame and the BFRA‟s „material benefit‟ frame will be discussed in 
turn.   
 
The W-FRA‟s „divine benefit‟ frame 
The W-FRA leader tries to entice participation in the weekly community meetings and 
feeding schemes, as well as in other activities and happenings by saying: “A service to 
humanity is a service to God”, thereby trying to convince people how important their work is 
for the community and the people in it. This phrase was in many instances also used by the 
W-FRA leader to justify her personal involvement in the community. One W-FRA committee 
member explained how this phrase also gave her inspiration to join the W-FRA saying: 
 
From looking at [the W-FRA leaders] heart FOR the poor people, I decided myself to 
join them, become a committee member and do the same work: help those in need. 
And as [the W-FRA leader] always tells us every single time at the meeting: “A service 
to humanity is a service to God” which I believe in my heart. If you can‟t serve men, 
how can you serve God? Because you see God is a person who‟s generally religious, 
we look at He is the one who is our provider, but in human life we‟ve got to provide 
for each and other, and how can we do it if we haven‟t got a heart? 
                          (Interview,W-FRA member 4) 
 
In addition to using a frame of „divine benefit‟, as discussed above, the W-FRA leader also re-
tells the history of the resistance in Chatsworth to constantly remind people of the W-FRA‟s 
past strength and significance in the community. As already mentioned, people in Chatsworth 
see their struggle as igniting the post-apartheid struggles in South Africa. In Westcliff, the W-
FRA leader tries explicitly to attach pride in people based on past accomplishments and 
resistance. I interpret it as a motivational strategy aiming at giving people hope that their 
continued struggle is necessary and important to be able to change their present situation. The 
CSO members and residents of both communities warmly tell of their participation in these 
happenings. The W-FRA leader once said in a meeting: “The story of the struggle in 
Chatsworth is studied, researched (…). Isn‟t that something we should be proud of?” 
(Meeting in Westcliff 22.11.06). In the same meeting she said: “People around the country 
started organising just AFTER we started organising!” Habib & Kotzé (2003) argues that 
continued participation by people in CBOs is often motivated by religion.  
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The BFRA‟s „material benefit‟ frame 
The BFRA leader, on the other hand, uses enticement in a more conditional way rather 
pressuring people to participate  by saying they will reap material benefits, such as reception 
of food-hampers, only if they come to important meetings and gatherings (such as ward-
elections). In one community meeting held in Bayview the BFRA leader said: “The people 
that don‟t meet up at the meeting will not get [food] hampers on Christmas!” (26.11.06). 
Duress is the main method used. But unlike the W-FRA, he does not urge people to 
participate in CSO or community activities in the same manner. Part of the reason may be the 
lack of meetings and other happenings in the community for the past year.  
The main difference between the two leaders‟ motivational framing is that the W-FRA 
leader uses people‟s belief in God to make her statements appealing for them to actually 
choose to participate on voluntary basis, whilst the BFRA leader uses people‟s weakness in 
being poor to attract participants.   
 
The past stories of united resistance in the communities have a strong presence in people‟s 
memories today and can be used in the CSOs‟ framing in showing people that joint resistance 
can give good results, but there is a need for the CSO leaders to constantly create motivational 
frames that are appealing to the people and that can motivate them to join in the ongoing 
struggles.   
However, when listening to people‟s stories and views, many said that would the 
community undergo dramatic happenings, such as forced evictions, they believe the people in 
the communities will converge and resists it jointly, just as they did in the past. The 
importance of using motivational framing, then, is to attract people to partake in the daily 
activities of the organisation and to keep it running. 
During my stay in Chatsworth, only the W-FRA was active in its community on a 
regular (almost daily) basis, and was concerned about attracting participants to contribute in 
the daily running of the organisation. The emphasis on promoting participation despite the 
absence of forced evictions seemed to be pertinent in being able to jointly fight the current 
issues at hand.  
The BFRA, on the other hand, was not active in the community on a daily basis, and 
did not even seem to be concerned about it. The BFRA‟s invisibility and lack of activity in the 
community was rather seen as problematic by its constituents.   
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The importance of converting discourses into actions  
Even if a CSO is successful in attracting participants through its use of discourse (framing), 
its ability to maintain people‟s participation in the CSO is dependent on whether its discourses 
are transferred into concrete actions. The thesis argues that whether the CSOs are able to 
transform what they say into specific actions, or not, is crucial for understanding how 
legitimate they are among their constituents. Although a CSO is able to get its constituents to 
identify and sympathize themselves with its demands and goals, and even is successfully able 
to motivate people to participate in collective ameliorative actions, this alone is not 
necessarily sufficient to be able to maintain the constituents in the CSO and discourage them 
from leaving the CSO.  
One important reason for arguing that the CSOs should convert their discourses into 
concrete actions in their communities to present themselves as the legitimate bodies in their 
constituencies is based on the fact that people in both Bayview and Westcliff have been met 
with many promises since the new government came to power. These promises of a „better 
life for all‟ have been proposed by local councillors and politicians affiliated to various 
political parties, over and over again, especially during elections, but as has been discussed 
above, despite all the promises that have been made by various political parties, once 
elections are over the people never see anything more of neither the politicians nor their 
promises. This has created a sense of disbelief among the people in Bayview and Westcliff 
towards people that come with nice promises (but are never able to fulfil them). The CSOs‟ 
relation to the formal political system through their choices of political strategies, then, has in 
the light of their constituents‟ perception of the state, and those associated with it, an 
important impact on how they are perceived among their constituents.  
 
Another way of converting discourses into actions is not only through the CSOs‟ choices of 
political strategies, but their specific activities in and with their constituencies. This thesis 
argues that the arrangement of frequent community meetings open for all the constituents is 
important for the CSOs to be perceived as legitimate, and is an important strategy for the 
CSOs to maintain a communication with its constituents. This, in turn, facilitates the 
constituents‟ continued participation in the CSOs.  The thesis argues that the W-FRA‟s choice 
of conducting weekly community meetings is an important source to maintain and discourage 
participants from leaving the organisation (and its struggle), and is an important strategy to 
maintain its legitimacy among its constituents. When the opposite is happening, meaning 
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when the organisation holds irregular and few community meetings, the organisation will as a 
result have little communication and interaction with its constituents, and may risk to loose its 
legitimacy and significance among its constituents. The latter is happening with the BFRA in 
Bayview. The importance of conducting community meetings will be discussed in the last 
analytical chapter on participation/mobilising structure.  
 
Summary 
This chapter has provided a discussion of the framing strategies used by the CSOs in 
diagnosing the problems, their solution and way forward to solve them, as well as their use of 
motivational frames to motivate people to join in their actions. Both the W-FRA and the 
BFRA face the same challenges, and target „the poor‟ in their constituencies. Portraying the 
political system as an enemy and an oppressor is done at all spheres were interaction between 
the CSOs and their constituents happen. Even much-respected CCF leaders and front figures 
of the Chatsworth struggles hold powerful speeches to audiences from the poor communities 
and portray the state as an enemy and an oppressor against the people who are poor and good. 
This framing gives people a certain view on state authorities that influences their view on 
their CSOs‟ choice of political strategies.   
The similarities between the W-FRA and the BFRA are many, but they do differ on 
the way they motivate their constituents to partake in the organisation‟s actions and 
happenings. Whilst the W-FRA employs a „divine benefit‟ frame where people‟s involvement 
is portrayed as an altruistic action which is both individually and collectively beneficial, the 
BFRA uses a „material benefit‟ frame which in a way forces people to choose between 
receiving or not receiving material goods.  
Although having similar framing, this thesis argues that in order for the CSOs to have 
a continued significance in their communities they have to maintain their interaction with 
their constituents, not only through discourses, but through frequent actions. What will be 
evident is that whether the CSOs transform their discourses into specific actions has an impact 
on people‟s perception of them as legitimate or not. The W-FRA‟s frequent activity in its 
constituency through weekly meetings, feeding schemes, and other activities, clearly gives it a 
far more legitimate status among its constituents than the BFRA which is close to absent and 
has fair little communication with its constituents. The issue of frequent community meetings 
and its role for legitimacy will be discussed in chapter 7.  
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The next chapter discusses the CSOs‟ relations with the state, and how their choice of 
political strategies influences their legitimacy. 
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5.    POLITICAL STRATEGIES 
 
In this chapter the theory on political opportunity structure (POS) will be used to look at what 
political opportunities and constraints are facing the W-FRA and the BFRA in a post-
apartheid context, and how they utilize the political spaces open for them. The focus is on 
what political strategies they make use of and how these choices impact on the legitimacy 
they attain in their constituencies. Although their choices of political strategies are 
overlapping, and in many ways identical, they have developed a different relation to the state. 
Whilst the BFRA leader employs a close relation to the formal political system to have better 
access to resources, the W-FRA leader thinks such a close relation will impair the 
community‟s struggle for improved living conditions and therefore chooses to have an 
autonomous relation to the political system. Their difference in strategies impacts the relation 
to their constituents, and as a result their legitimacy is weakened or strengthened.  
 
The CSOs‟ choice of political strategies can facilitate a better understanding of what kind of 
CSOs they are. The leaders play an important role in the running of the CSO, so the leaders‟ 
view on what types of strategies to use, and not least where in the political system they should 
work (outside/inside), have an immense impact on how the CSO as a whole is situated in 
relation to the formal political system, and what kind of relation is generated as a result.  
The first part provides a short presentation of the CSOs‟ common historical 
experiences with the political opportunity and constraints they have faced since their birth 
(around 1999). McAdam‟s (2004) synthesis of the formal and informal structures that create 
opportunities or constraints for collective mobilisation guides this historical background, as 
well as the previous political strategies used by both CSOs in the past. This forms an 
important backdrop to investigate the different political strategies employed by the CSOs 
today, and how the CSOs are perceived by their constituents in light of the choices they make 
in a changed environment with more opened spaces for participation by civil society in the 
institutionalised political system.   
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Political opportunities and constraints for movements 
The political opportunities and constraints facing the two CSOs and how they have been dealt 
with in the past forms an important background to understand the CSOs‟ current attitude 
towards the state and their choice of strategies in a changing political environment.  
 
Previous political strategies  
The political strategies used by social movements in post-apartheid South Africa today are 
diverse, and many of which was usual during the anti-apartheid struggles. The political 
strategies used by both CSOs have since their birth been identical. They have both utilised 
„in- and out of system‟ strategies such as; protest marches, rallies, petitions, picketing, court-
battles, as well as marching to local councillors‟ homes and cutting their electricity and water 
connection. Activists speak proudly of the Ten Rand Campaign where they marched to Rent 
Office in town and demanded affordable rate, and waved fake R10 notes. They have engaged 
local political leaders in conversations over their problems, been active in the local 
community policing forums (CPFs) around local problems such as drugs and crime, and have 
networked with other civil society groups and actors through national and international 
forums such as the Social Movements Indaba (SMI) and the World Social Forum (WSF), both 
forums made mostly of grassroots organisations. They have also engaged in more „violent‟ 
actions such as street-blockades with burning tyres, they have made human walls to stop 
Council security forces from entering flats during forced evictions (these incidents have often 
lead to violent clashes between the people and the security personnel). They have occupied 
the Rent Office, and one informant told me she had even slapped one of the local councillors 
in the face (informal conversation,W-FRA member 1).  
 
The openness or closure of the institutionalized political system 
As already mentioned in chapter 2, the post-apartheid era has led to a revival of South African 
civil society as a reaction against the ANC government‟s neoliberal socioeconomic policies. 
The new political climate emphasising a non-racial society and equal constituted rights for all 
South African citizens have opened up the political opportunities for civil society and 
represent a legitimate background in which to mobilise due to the government‟s unfulfilled 
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promises. In a climate of worsened living conditions, people have woken up from their doze 
of hope, and started mobilising against the state. 
 
 As said in the previous chapter, the state‟s unfulfilled promises have led people in general to 
perceive the state as illegitimate and untrustworthy. This lack of trust in the state still hangs in 
people‟s minds today, and represents an important reason for their reluctance towards any 
state authorities. These experiences are identical for the constituents in both Westcliff and 
Bayview.  
 
Informal structure of power-relations 
Both CSOs have developed an informal, but yet decisive, network with powerful individuals 
that in different ways have contributed tremendously in the CSOs‟ struggle. Networks consist 
of apartheid freedom fighters that took the role as leaders and mentors for the CSOs in the 
post-apartheid struggles, and people with specific skills and education that offered their 
expertise when needed (such as low-priced attorneys that helped the CSOs in court-battles). 
The CCF leadership were in many ways the drivers behind the proportionately success 
experienced by the people in Bayview and Westcliff. They helped make their struggle visible 
in the media, and as former activists with academic background/education, they have great 
knowledge of the South African formal political system, the rights of the people (as 
constituted in the Bill of rights), and are equipped with valuable knowledge about movement 
tactics and strategies. These alliances have strengthened the poor people in Westcliff and 
Bayview though their expanded knowledge about their rights, what strategies and actions they 
can make use of in their struggle, and how their situation is interlinked with happenings on a 
national and global level. This common background has given the organisations in Westcliff 
and Bayview a powerful consciousness about the situation they find themselves in, and how 
to utilise upcoming opportunities in their struggle.  
Having these kinds of personal alliances and networks have also provided the CSOs 
with access to key players within the government as many of their alliances have been part of 
the anti-apartheid movement. This access is crucial for the purposes of accessing information, 
attending important meetings and influencing policy (Ballard et al. 2005).  
 
78 
 
At the beginning, the people in the communities did not fight court-battles, it was when the 
CCF came in the communities and joined in the struggle there that the people in Bayview and 
Westcliff learnt more about their constitutional rights. According to the W-FRA leader:  
 
We didn‟t know the Constitution (…) how constitutionally we were protected and all 
that. The one thing they [CCF] did was that they taught us (…) our rights, they 
supported us financially. (…) When we went to the municipality to engage in 
discussions with them, we were accompanied by them because they were more (…) 
educated on the policies and procedures of the municipality. And therefore, that made 
us more powerful, because we were taught about all this (…) we could ask the 
municipality “why was we paying for this” and “what was it being used for”? We 
thought that it was not even our right to question, but now we realised that it is our 
right, a democratic right, to know what is happening, with even the taxes that we pay! 
(...) And all this education came about through the Concerned Citizens Group, which 
later upon related itself into the CCF.  
 
State‟s capacity and propensity for repression 
Both constituencies‟ past experiences with Council-violence (through forced evictions in both 
communities) have painted a picture in their minds of the government‟s repressive and 
authoritarian reactions towards what the people perceive as justified and legitimate grievances 
and protests. Till this day the memories of the council security forces‟ violent opposition 
against people‟s efforts to protect families from being evicted stay strong in their minds, and 
most people still perceive the state as an oppressor. This historical background, that is 
identical for the two CSOs, forms an important context and backdrop to understand the 
history and dynamics behind the present situation in the communities, and people‟s 
perception of their CSO as legitimate or not.  
 
The present situation: what differentiates the W-FRA and the 
BFRA? 
The relative opening up of the institutionalised political system in South Africa has changed 
the political landscape and has, although offering the same opportunities for both CSOs, been 
used differently by them. This part discusses the two CSOs‟ use of the political opportunities 
opened up for them and the various spaces in which they have chosen to act. Although they 
have used identical political strategies, and spaces to voice their concerns, they have since end 
of 2005 developed a different relationship and attitude towards the local political system.  
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Opened opportunities: the use of invited spaces  
The opening up of the institutionalized political system gives civil society actors the 
possibility to utilize these opened spaces for their own benefit. This entails a more 
collaborative relation to the state as these spaces are created for civil society actors by the 
state. Both the W-FRA and the BFRA have utilized spaces made available for their 
participation, such as election of a ward-committee. Whilst both CSOs were positive towards 
participating in the election of a ward-committee (that happened during my fieldwork in 
2006), the ward-elections had different outcomes for the two CSOs. While the BFRA leader, 
who already works within the political system, saw the ward elections as a victory for the 
BFRA and its constituency by winning four of the ten seats in the ward-committee, the W-
FRA leader ended up walking angrily out of the ward-election locale in protest against what 
she perceived as “a very, very corrupted, very badly rigged” election with “no sense of respect 
for the poor and the community” because “people were influenced in the wrong direction”. 
Even when the W-FRA leader raised objections “nobody objected, and it was still overruled” 
(Interview, W-FRA leader). Despite both having positive expectations of using this „invited 
space‟, their different experiences reinforced their attitude towards how to relate to the state. 
The BFRA had a relative positive experience, contrary to previous years (according to 
the BFRA leader the local ANC has a reputation of conducting ward-elections in an 
undemocratic manner). Winning four of the seats in the ward-committee has strengthened the 
BFRA‟s belief that working within and/or through state-structures can give positive 
outcomes. 
The W-FRA, on the other hand, had yet another bad experience with the conduction of 
the ward-elections that led to a reinforcement of their resentment towards working within the 
local political system. The W-FRA expressed that it will keep working outside state 
structures, and maintain an autonomous relation to the state. 
 
Participatory approaches  
One of the instruments available for a dual relationship between civil society and the state is, 
as mentioned earlier, the local governments‟ Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). An IDP is 
a development plan at city level aimed at leading to city-wide economic growth through 
ward-based consultation which aims at identifying and targeting the needs of the citizens in 
the various communities in the city. In Durban, the IDP was adopted in June 2003 to provide 
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a more detailed framework for the council‟s activities over a five-year period (Ballard et al. 
2007). A part of this is Community Based Planning (CBP) which is a methodology that 
provides municipalities with the means to strengthen the participatory aspects of their IDP
20
. 
The overall objective of CBP is to get communities to take ownership of the process of 
resolving their own problems. It entails a task team visiting each ward that plans intensive for 
two weekends to allocate R50.000 to facilitate a development process (Ballard et al. 2007). 
“The 50.000 rand is used to purchase equipment for them to start the community projects, 
and no cash is given” (Interview,BFRA leader). The BFRA leader applied for a job in the 
eThekwini Municipality, and is now working in the task team that visits the different wards as 
part of the CBP. The BFRA leader says his constituency has access to important resources, 
such as a loud hailer and a PH system that will benefit the facilitation of mobilisation in 
Bayview. He believes the change of strategy, by working within the political system, has 
given access to much-needed resources. The BFRA leader explains in an interview:   
 
I also would say to people that (...) all these things existed, but because we were the 
outside fighting the social movements against this, the system, we were not getting 
access to all these things, although they were available. We could actually be accessing 
moneys that can come back into the social movement for our activism, you know. 
Fighting against the very same system, but using their very own resources. Now, you 
know, past that, we have (...) existed for 7 to 8 years and don‟t have, community 
organisations don‟t have these things. 
                 
The argument is that by working within state structures one will have access to resources that 
would not be accessible otherwise. 
Ballard et al. (2007) are sceptical of how influential community-identified needs are in 
determining projects. One official they interviewed concede that none of the projects 
approved in the municipal budget 2002–2003 were developed in reference to priority lists 
generated by communities in the IDP process (Subban in Ballard et al. 2007:274). Thinking 
that the communities‟ concerns have not come through, although the intention to let the 
communities target their own needs has been central, makes one think whether the BFRA 
leader has made a good choice of taking an active part in this process or not. How the leader‟s 
choice has been received by his constituency will be discussed in the following excerpt.  
 
                                                 
20
 The html-version of the file (downloaded 20.11.08): 
http://www.durban.gov.za/durban/services/departments/abm/conference/ntsiki/. 
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Criticisms of the BFRA leader‟s job 
Among the constituents in Bayview and among residents and activists in Westcliff, the fact 
that the BFRA leader has a full-time job in eThekwini Municipality and at the same time 
being the community leader in Bayview is quite peculiar and, for many, contradictory. The 
job was not offered the BFRA leader by initiative of the municipality, but was a job the leader 
applied for on his own initiative thinking that the job would reap benefits for both Bayview 
and Westcliff.  
 
When speaking to informants in Bayview, many of them complained about the BFRA 
leader‟s engagement with the Municipality. They are discontent with the fact that the leader 
works for the Municipality and see the job as a disturbance that takes the leader‟s attention 
away from his community work. Some are quite confused about the BFRA leader‟s role in the 
community, and doubt his intentions with working there. They call him corrupt and a „sell-
out‟, and accuse him for not being considerate to the people in the community, but rather 
thinking of himself. According to informants, the leader is also reluctant to let someone else 
take the leadership position, despite not being able to take on all the responsibilities and duties 
supposed to be managed by him. In general, the legitimacy of the leader and his committee is 
questioned. Several informants questioned how the leader could be working in the political 
system when they were in opposition to it, saying: “We are fighting Council, how can our 
chairperson work for Council?!” (Interview,Bayview resident 1). Another informant felt a 
great discrepancy between the BFRA leader‟s job in the municipality and his leadership-role 
in the community and thought that the leader works as a camouflaged undercover agent for 
the municipality:  
How come this [person] be actively involved in the affairs of the people in the area 
itself? You can‟t do that. So, (…) you are taking information from the people itself and 
getting back to Council, you‟re feeding them. 
                    (Interview,Bayview resident 2) 
 
The leader was accused of being careless about the community and prioritizing his personal 
benefits over the people‟s common good: 
 
And now that [BFRA leader] is working for Council (…) he called up a mass meeting 
here, he told the people: “it doesn‟t mean I‟m working for Council I don‟t care for you 
all. I do care for you all, by doing this thing here. I also got to put food on my table, 
it‟s a paying job”. And he started convincing the people and telling them “please, now 
you must give me all these bills because I‟m gonna work with council to sort these 
82 
 
problems out”.  And he was just walking out. All these people [BFRA committee] 
were walking out. So from there we never heard from [BFRA leader] up to now! 
                                  (Interview,Bayview resident 1) 
 
Calling people that work for council for „sell-outs‟ were quite common among my informants. 
The BFRA leader was termed as a „sell-out‟ as people felt that he, by taking a job in the 
municipality, was deceiving the people supposed to be protected and guided by their leader: 
 
The worst thing [BFRA leader] did was to work for Council. It‟s like he was selling us 
to Council. We were calling him a „sell-out‟, so the other communities didn‟t like that. 
How can you work for Council when you say you‟re fighting for the poor of the 
poorest? You see? That‟s where the problem is”. 
                                      (Interview,Bayview resident 1) 
 
Besides being angry at the BFRA leader‟s job in the municipality, another important 
reason people are angry is the BFRA‟s reduced activity in the area. One Bayview 
resident explained:  
 
When he started working for the Council he wasn‟t much interested in the community, 
there was no meetings… not that I know of. Like he used to have big meetings here 
too, there was no meetings nothing, everything just sort of, died. 
                    (Interview,Bayview resident 4) 
Although the criticism comes mostly from Bayview residents, even the BFRA members are 
reluctant towards the leader‟s collaboration with the state.  
 In one interview with a BFRA member I was explained that people‟s reluctance 
against the BFRA leader‟s work in the municipality is mainly because they think he is a local 
councillor. Even the BFRA member herself thought so, but was convinced that it is not the 
case: “I have asked [BFRA leader] this question: „How could he work with councillor?‟ He 
said, you know, he‟s not councillor, he‟s one of the people that educate people, he runs a 
workshop” (Interview,BFRA member 1).  
 
Ashwin Desai thinks social movements should work outside party politics, and has been 
critical towards movements such as the TAC for too much involvement into party politics 
(Friedman and Mottiar 2004). Despite this critique, the CCF‟s inactivity since end of 2002 
and the questions this spurred, has made him suggest that the CCF and others need to consider 
more carefully how to engage with the government, work with others who are supportive of, 
but not committed to, the CCF, and how to build alliances without compromising principles 
(Dwyer 2004). Maybe this change in Desai‟s view on strategising in relation to the political 
83 
 
system has had an impact on the BFRA leader‟s choice of working in the Municipality? 
According to the BFRA leader himself, the decision of taking a job in the municipality was 
done after discussions with several people, one of them being Ashwin Desai. According to the 
BFRA leader, he also conferred with the constituency, the BFRA committee, and powerful 
individuals that have been actively involved in the Chatsworth struggles, before accepting the 
municipality job, and they were all positive. If this is true, why are people in the community 
so much against the BFRA leader‟s job in the Municipality?  
The job in the Municipality is clearly impacting on the BFRA‟s relationship with its 
constituents. Looking at the history of violent clashes between Council security and people in 
both Bayview and Westcliff it is not strange that they have a strained relationship with the 
state. As discussed in chapter 5, the continued framing of the state as an enemy and a violent 
oppressor does not exactly help in easing the people‟s view on the state.  
 
One observation made me think that having a foot within state structures does not necessarily 
mean that one will have the freedom, or the influence, to use the position to the benefit of the 
people in poor communities. The observation was done at a rally in Crossmoor, a community 
in Chatsworth, where a local councillor held a speech saying he had sympathy with the people 
that had been evicted from their homes (by private owners) and had just experienced their 
newly-built shacks being thorn down by Municipal authorities. He said that although he had 
sympathy with the people, his mere presence at the rally and his sympathy and involvement in 
their community struggles put him in a position were he, at the present moment, was facing 
disciplinary hearings. His job was on the line for being concerned and for expressing his 
views in public. Ballard et al. (2007) argue that one of the challenges facing decision-making 
at the local political level is attempts by individual councillors to secure development for their 
wards. This may be a reason the councillor showing up at the Crossmoor rally was threatened 
with loosing his job. 
Activists from both Bayview and Westcliff were present at the same rally, and heard 
the same speeches. The thesis, then, argues that in addition to having negative experiences 
with the state through violent clashes during forced evictions, and being fed with discourses 
that the state is an enemy and an oppressor, hearing a local councillor saying he faces 
disciplinary hearings for being the least involved in the local struggles adds more fuel to the 
already burning fire. It seems that, in this case, people‟s resentment towards the BFRA 
leader‟s too close affiliation with the local state has many reasons, and this resentment is in 
line with what new social movement theorists would argue; that too close ties to the political 
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system will reduce the integrity and legitimacy of the organizations and activists that choose 
such a close relation.  
 
What can be asked is whether the BFRA leader chooses such a close relation primarily to get 
access to important resources that can be canalized into the community, or for his own 
benefit. Is his distance to the community intentional due to the danger that he might 
jeopardize his job and at the same time loose access to resources beneficial for the 
community? It has to be mentioned that the BFRA leader could not attend the ward-elections 
himself due to his job in the municipality. Is his fear of loosing his job genuinely due to his 
own loss, or the community‟s loss of beneficial resources? 
 
W-FRA in Westcliff 
The situation in Westcliff is quite different from Bayview. Here, the W-FRA leader has 
refused several offers to work as a local councillor for various political parties. The W-FRA 
leader thinks working within the system, although receiving a high salary, is not the right way 
to help the community. The leader thinks the system rather restrains the people‟s 
opportunities saying:  
I‟ve been offered a place (…) within political parties many times. (…) The DA offered, 
the Minority Front offered, the IFP offered, but I don‟t think that‟s for me. I don‟t think 
I would want to be a councillor, I think I‟d rather like being, you know, an activist. 
Even if it‟s voluntary I think that‟s fine with me (…). I think it gives me more (…) not 
just freedom, it gives me more pleasure (…) to really serve the poor. To try to make 
changes so that people‟s lives can be better. There‟s no other purpose. 
     
One of the W-FRA members is of the opinion that anyone working for government will never 
help the poor. She says that Crossmoor, Bayview and Woodhurst (other „poor‟ areas in 
Chatsworth) are all facing the same problems as in Westcliff, but it is only Westcliff that is 
going forward. That is because of a strong leadership. She continues: 
 
[W-FRA leader], when starting this organisation, left her job, but [BFRA leader] is 
with the Council. That is like backbiting. Sometimes it‟s hard to get [BFRA leader]. 
[BFRA leader] doesn‟t stand for his people, but people complain to US. 
                          (Interview,W-FRA member 1) 
 
The W-FRA leader‟s reluctance to work within the formal political system is in line with 
most constituents‟ views both in Westcliff and in Bayview. The W-FRA leader is choosing 
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political strategies that are suitable with people‟s experiences, views and opinions of the state, 
and focuses therefore on having a good relation to her constituents. While past experiences 
stand strong in people‟s memories, continued happenings - such as badly conducted ward-
elections, cut-offs, and continued warnings of new evictions, as well as the aggressive 
implementation of cost-recovery measures - are reinforcing the strong sentiments people 
already have against the state and everything associated with it.   
 
From this discussion, it appears that the BFRA leader in Bayview considers the CSO‟s access 
to resources over its credibility among its constituents. This collaborative relationship 
between the BFRA and the state can resemble a political clientelistic relation where the 
BFRA leader‟s work is „traded‟ with goods from the state. 
 The W-FRA leader, on the other hand, chooses to be autonomous from the state, 
although having friendly relations with local councillors and other actors in the political 
system. The main focus is to be trustworthy and accountable to the constituents, and serve the 
poor in an altruistic fashion. The W-FRA leader‟s reason to be involved in the local struggle 
is connected to the motivational framing she uses to motivate people to participate in the W-
FRA‟s activities.  
The W-FRA has continued to have a distant relationship to the state, and is perceived 
to be far more legitimate among its constituents in Westcliff than is the case for the BFRA in 
Bayview.  
 
The two CSO leaders‟ different relationship to the political system is not received identical by 
their constituents. In the case of the close relationship the BFRA leader has developed to the 
state, the constituents do not show the same enthusiasm towards a close relation with the state 
and expressed openly in the interviews their personal sentiments and reluctance against such a 
relation. Informants in Westcliff also had negative sentiments about the leader in the 
neighbouring community having such close affiliation to the political system.  
 
Linking with other struggles: the use of invented spaces  
Until late 2005 (about a year before my fieldwork) the two CSOs have shared similar 
strategies, and used the same spaces to voice their concerns and to link with other struggles. 
Both BFRA and the W-FRA have participated in the Social Movements Indaba (SMI) since 
its beginning. The SMI is a platform for social movements and grassroots groups from all 
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over South Africa to share experiences of struggles against social and environmental 
injustices, and have even had participants from other African countries. SMI was launched at 
the height of the struggle against the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
2002 (SMI 2005), and was part of the organization of a huge march of 20.000 activists from 
Alexandra township to Sandton. It is arranged once a year, and has been held in Johannesburg 
all the years since its beginning, but due to the recent growth in activism around Durban and 
in KwaZulu-Natal and the questions that spurred around its representativeness if always being 
held in Johannesburg, the SMI was for the first time since its start held in Durban in 2006 
(Harris 2006).  
 The W-FRA took an active part in the planning committee of the upcoming SMI and 
participated in weekly meetings, workshops, and all the logistical planning required to 
organize and carry through the SMI. The BFRA, on the other hand, had no active members 
participating in any part of the SMI planning process, nor at the SMI conference itself. There 
were some activists from Bayview, but none of these were officially part of the BFRA 
committee, although speaking on behalf of the community. When the BFRA leader was asked 
of his lack of involvement he replied: 
 
Every year‟s SMI I was the organising person, sort of the coordinator that actually got 
the people (...) went to Johannesburg and all that. And every year I was one of the 
people that went to all of the meetings, the national meetings ...committee meetings. 
 
Q: But the latest meetings for this year’s SMI, you did have representatives from 
this community? 
 
Yes, but I was not there personally and that‟s something that all the committees from 
the other provinces were questioning me about (...) and I think it all surfaced after the 
SMI in the exchange of emails that they realised what the true reason for my lack of 
involvement was and they were truly acceptable. 
        (Interview,BFRA leader) 
 
The SMI in Durban witnessed a division in the ranks of activists in the country. While the W-
FRA played an important role and active part of it, the BFRA leader and committee did not 
take any part of it, neither in the planning process, nor in the conference itself. Harris (2006) 
did interview many of the different activists involved in the SMI, both those critical of it, and 
those optimistic. Her findings show that there were mainly three criticisms against the SMI: 
organizational structure, the role of academics, and maintenance of grassroots character. 
While the W-FRA leader and the members that did participate in the SMI were positive of its 
value in uniting, defining and benefiting all the struggles going on in South Africa, the BFRA 
leader, when asked about his personal opinion on the SMI said:  
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It‟s the greatest thing that ever happened to this country, but I just feel that all 
provinces should be in support. And the reason why the SMI, I wouldn‟t say it‟s not 
working because it is proven to be working, but in Durban why certain movements 
[divide] is because of politics. I‟ve been part of the [SMI] from the day that it started. I 
was in Johannesburg when we went to the big march from Alex to Sandton…we 
walked that distance with people from the Bayview Flats Residents Association. We 
know what it WAS to be part of that struggle, and then after that we gave birth to the 
SMI and the very first [SMI]. Up until the last one, that I just came in the first and 
wouldn‟t pitch up after that, I‟ve been part of every single year [SMI]. And all that, it 
was just academics in Bayview ...in Durban, that caused this sort of division in Durban, 
in the community. 
 
The BFRA leader seems to blame the division among the activists in relation to the SMI on 
academics. Harris finds that the activists‟ problem with the role of academics goes from 
arguments saying academics are not committed to the grassroots‟ struggles, to saying that 
academics are interested in “the movements‟ work to the extent that it could further their own 
research” (2006:47). The BFRA leader did not, however, clearly state what he specifically 
meant by arguing that academics create division among activists in Durban.   
 
While people in Westcliff got feedback from what had happened in the SMI through a W-
FRA member‟s active communication with her neighbours, and through the W-FRA 
meetings, the BFRA itself would not have much to say to the people about the SMI due to 
their absence.  
The BFRA‟s absence from participating in the SMI is just one incident along a line of 
other happenings, and seems to be a process where the BFRA has distanced itself more from 
the grassroots, and gotten closer to the formal political system.  
 
Breaking the „Unity‟?  
In Westcliff, people are expressing frustration with the situation in Bayview. The reason 
being that they fight the same struggles and have done so up through the years of their 
existence, but now see division between them and the „brother‟ community. According to the 
BFRA leader: 
 
Westcliff and Bayview were always the very brother-sister-kind-of-thing. Where 
whatever happens in Bayview happens in Westcliff and whatever happens in Westcliff 
happens in Bayview. And because we are so close to each other and we started the 
struggle together we would always partake for each other. 
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Today, they are divided along lines of tensions and discrepancies between their view on what 
strategies to use, and what relation to have with the political system. According to the BFRA 
leader the disunity between the two organisations is not based on community-level because 
“people from Bayview meet people from Westcliff, and people from Westcliff meet people 
from Bayview, we still have that”, but the differences are on a leadership-level. The BFRA 
leader claims the tensions between the W-FRA leaders and the BFRA started when he took 
the job in the Municipality and W-FRA members went around “claiming that I sold people 
out, claiming that I would take up this job and not representing people” (interview,BFRA 
leader).  
 The W-FRA leader concurs with the BFRA leader‟s view saying that frictions and 
disunity only exist between individuals on leadership level, but not the community as a 
whole: 
I think in Chatsworth our unity is still there. If you look at Bayview, and it‟s like I am 
saying individuals always think that the struggle is about them when it is not. I think 
the struggle is actually with communities and not with individuals. 
 
The importance of Chatsworth and Durban communities and groups to stay united was voiced 
by CCF leaders at public gatherings where activists from both Westcliff and Bayview were 
present. The issue seems to be, then, that the resentment against the BFRA by its constituents 
revolves mainly around its choice of political strategies. It is clear that the constituents are 
willing to fight the challenges they are continuously facing, but the question seems to be who 
is going to lead them forward. 
 
Political competition for legitimate representation  
In the midst of the internal challenges facing the people of Bayview due to the change in the 
BFRA‟s activity there, yet another issue ignites more confusion among the people of 
Bayview: there exists a puzzle of individuals claiming they want to help the people there. 
There are around three individuals in Bayview in a political competition over attracting as 
many constituents as possible to „their‟ organisation, trying to demand legitimacy among the 
people there. Despite these internal contestations for the monopoly of a legitimate right to 
„rule‟ and represent the community, the constituents themselves argue that these individuals 
are all promoting their own interests and do not care much about the people they try to attract 
to their organisations. 
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 What is common for both Bayview and Westcliff is that the so-called „opposition‟ in 
the respective communities is ANC-aligned and often fight primarily for the rent-payers. The 
BFRA leader was laughing when I asked about the different „leaders‟ in the area that seemed 
to be fighting over getting supporters from the community. According to him the other 
individuals trying to get a good reputation in the community had failed to do so, and when 
talking of one of them he said the „opposition‟ “hasn‟t become democratically elected by the 
community” (Interview,BFRA leader). Although the BFRA seemed to have no worries of 
being „out conquered‟ by other individuals in the community trying to present themselves as 
the people‟s representatives, the fact is that the BFRA‟s lessened role in Bayview has created 
both anger, frustration and confusion among the people that have been actively involved in 
the BFRA and that identify themselves with the struggle it represents.  One Bayview resident 
illustrated the general frustration among the constituents there when she said: “You don‟t 
know who is who in this who! You don‟t know who to trust, who‟s misleading us or who‟s 
leading us” (Interview,Bayview resident 4). People‟s frustration has escalated due to the 
recent happenings in the community (the municipality has started implementing prepaid 
electricity meters). 
 In Westcliff, the political landscape is quite similar to Bayview were two of the 
„oppositions‟ in the area are ANC-aligned. They also generally fight for the rent-payers. 
According to the W-FRA leader, the W-FRA is the only organization really fighting for the 
people that cannot afford paying their rent and services. When asked what the W-FRA‟s 
challenges are, she said:  
Ooh! The major challenge for us is the ANC itself! And its corruptedness. And 
opportunists. I think the challenge for us is, you know, it‟s not a big challenge I don‟t 
see it as a big challenge, because over the years it has been the same one and two 
individuals, not groups of people and we have managed very well to overcome that 
because we have the support of the community. It‟s political parties, individuals were 
involved, first they came as IFP, now they‟re coming as the ANC. You never know 
what people‟s real agenda is, and that‟s the real purpose of, you know, starting all this 
opposition. 
 
Although there are other individuals in both communities that try to form their own parties 
and try to „overthrow‟ the BFRA and the W-FRA respectively, both the BFRA and the W-
FRA use the same arguments: they are both formally constituted, and they have a struggle 
history in the area to refer to. Through their role in previous happenings in their respective 
communities they have built up an important significance in their constituencies. One W-FRA 
member said: 
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All these years [W-FRA leaders] were running this committee. Everything was a 
success and nobody had a problem. So why now, another committee coming in 
poisoning your mind, and taking you away that side and forgetting about the first 
committee you was in? Used to come when your water was cut, the lights [W-FRA 
member] used to come and put for you.  So why forget those, the past, and go to 
another committee which you don‟t know what want?  
                              (Interview,W-FRA member 5) 
 
Summary 
The two CSOs have employed different strategies towards the state. Although having utilized 
identical invited spaces (such as the election of a ward-committee) their different experiences 
with it have rendered them with different attitudes towards state-facilitated spaces for civil 
society participation. While the BFRA won four of the seats in the ward-committee, the W-
FRA leader walked out from the election-locale in protest against the corrupted manner it was 
organised. Although having had identical experiences with, and attitudes against the political 
system, the BFRA and the W-FRA have developed different relations to the political system 
The BFRA‟s „success‟ in winning four of the seats in the ward-committee, and the BFRA 
leader‟s job in the municipality has resulted in the BFRA developing a closer and friendlier 
relation with the state. Despite the BFRA leader‟s positive views on such a close relation with 
the state, his committee is sceptical about it, and the constituents are generally outrageous. 
These reactions from his committee and constituency have rendered the organisation 
illegitimate, both within its constituency and among activists in the neighbouring community. 
The BFRA‟s withdrawal from the SMI process also shows that the BFRA has distanced itself 
from fighting within civil society and have bigger aspirations of making changes through the 
formal political system.  
Unlike the BFRA, the W-FRA has maintained a close relation to its constituency, and 
kept a distant relation to the state. The distant relationship to the state concurs with its 
negative framing of the state and the constituents‟ negative experiences and views of the state. 
This has been to the benefit of the W-FRA as its framing of the state is concurring with its 
political actions, and has strengthened its legitimacy among its constituents.  
 
Acknowledging the interconnection between use of framing and choice of political strategies 
is important when trying to understand why CSOs are seen as legitimate or not. Where 
discourses (framing) and use of political strategies correspond, people will most likely 
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perceive the CSO as legitimate. Where they do not correspond the CSO will most likely be 
seen as being illegitimate.  
 
The next chapter will discuss various types and domains of participation and how people are 
included in or excluded from the various activities of the CSOs and their resources.   
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6.    PARTICIPATION 
 
The community in large should be in every meeting, the community in large should be 
everywhere. Whether it‟s small or whether it‟s big. That is how we will get things done 
from the government. A person going by himself he won‟t get nothing. 
                                      (Interview,Bayview resident 9) 
 
This chapter will discuss three forms of participation, and mainly three domains in which 
these forms of participation take place. Discussing the issue of participation will reveal 
interesting organisational differences employed by the W-FRA and the BFRA. What type of 
participation is encouraged by the CSOs through their organisational structure is an important 
source from which to assess the legitimacy they attain in their constituencies. The CSOs‟ 
organisational structures differ, the BFRA employing a more NGO-like structure than the W-
FRA that maintains a grassroots character similar to a CBO. What kind of participation is 
encouraged will elucidate important findings of whether the CSOs are working in line with 
their constituents‟ interests, thus strengthening or weakening their role as legitimate 
representatives of the people. This will also shed light on the internal dynamics and power-
structures that exist within civil society groups such as these organisations.  
 
First, the various types of participation that characterise the constituents‟ involvement in CSO 
activities will be defined, and the various domains in which these forms of participation take 
place (or not) are presented. The presentation serves as a foundation for the subsequent 
discussion which is divided in three parts discussing the three forms of participation.  
 
Three types of participation 
There will be a distinction between participation, non-participation and non-
inclusion/exclusion. The three forms of participation are defined as follows: a) Participation: 
People‟s active or passive presence (and participation) in community meetings and/or other 
arrangements organised by the CSO, b) non-participation: People‟s lack of participation due 
to personal choice, and, c) non-inclusion/exclusion: People‟s lack of participation due to 
factors outside their personal control such as the CSO‟s way of including or excluding them 
in various ways.  
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Three domains of participation 
There are mainly three domains in which the level of participation by constituents in Bayview 
and Westcliff will be discussed. These are the participation of constituents in decision-making 
processes, in community activities, and in activities outside the community. 
The first domain, decision-making processes, is here operationalised as elections such 
as the Annual General Meeting (AGM) where chairperson and committee members are 
elected/re-elected (usually once a year). An assessment of participation in this sphere is 
interesting to see whether important decisions of the CSOs are taken in line with the interests 
of the wider community.   
 The second sphere, community activities, is operationalised as community meetings, 
and other activities such as feeding schemes, religious celebrations like Diwali and Christmas, 
women‟s groups, youth groups, home-based care, and so on, and that are confine to the 
community. Community meetings are important because they serve as forums where 
information flows, grievances are voiced, and issues are discussed and acted upon as a 
collective. When being open for participation they can create a feeling of ownership among 
the constituents, and in many ways one can argue that they are important vehicles for ensuring 
that decisions are taken in line with the interests of the constituents. Frequent conduction of 
open community meetings (i.e. open for anyone to participate in) ensure and maintain a fair 
degree of internal democracy, and a relative continuous communication between the CSO and 
its constituents which is important when changes in the political opportunities (and 
constraints) happen and need to be acted upon. The thesis argues that a good communication 
between the CSOs and their constituents facilitates mobilisation and increases the people‟s 
perception of their CSO as legitimate.  
Participation in other activities is in many ways important for building a sense of 
ownership and feeling of being included in collective matters, and includes the fair or unfair 
distribution of resources from the CSOs to its constituents. How resources are distributed is 
an important measure of whether people are adequately included in the CSO activities. 
Whether the CSOs‟ constituents think they have equal access to the resources possessed by 
the CSOs, or not, is an important measure for their perception of their CSO as legitimate or 
illegitimate. As will be seen in the following discussion, the CSOs differ in their distribution 
of resources and their inclusion of their constituents in collective celebrations such as Diwali 
and/or Christmas.  
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The third domain, activities outside the community, consists of political and 
educational activities that are necessarily attached to the work of the CSOs, such as 
mobilisation in protest marches, defiance campaigns, and rallies for and/or with other civil 
society groups, or participation in forums such as the SMI, as well as participation in 
educational workshops, lectures
21
 and conferences. Attending these kinds of activities can in 
many ways be fruitful for the participants‟ understanding of their situation and can equip them 
with powerful tools in linking with other people in similar struggles and in thinking of new 
strategies to change their status quo. Not least, having knowledge of the external structures 
shaped mainly by politics and economy on a national and global level, and how these power 
structures impact the communities on a local and individual level, gives a certain feeling of 
empowerment among the individuals exposed to this „wisdom‟ through participating in the 
spaces utilised by the CSOs.   
 
In the following part, the three types of participation that are identified in this thesis will be 
discussed in light of the three domains of participation. The two CSOs differ substantially on 
how they include their constituents in the various domains of participation and what type of 
„participation‟ is promoted as a result of these choices. 
 
Participation  
The thesis argues that it is important for CSOs to take into account their constituents‟ consent 
on any decisions made by allowing for the constituents‟ contributions in form of personal 
opinions and suggestions on how things should be done, or simply allowing their mere 
presence in the decision-making processes. Likewise, it is important to include the 
constituents in all activities both in and outside of the community and to let them know they 
are part and parcel of a collective where both tangible and non-tangible resources are shared. 
This is important for the constituents to feel their CSO is representing them in a way they can 
identify with, as well as giving them a feeling that the CSO is representing their interests and 
fights their struggles. Where the organizational structure of the CSOs facilitates tight 
communication with their constituents they will strengthen their legitimacy.  
                                                 
21
 The Centre for Civil Society (CCS) at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) arranges educational 
workshops and lectures, and often invites activists from the Durban area to participate. Funding for transport is 
usually given.  The CCS aims at building organisations working for socioeconomic equality. According to the 
W-FRA leader, the CCS also helps people getting computer-skills, and helps them applying for jobs (W-FRA 
meeting 22.11.06).  
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The W-FRA has maintained an organizational structure that encourages frequent 
communication with its constituents. It conducts weekly meetings at one of the local schools, 
and at times organises public meetings where activists and residents from neighboring areas 
are invited. The weekly meetings are arranged at the same day, place, and time, and the W-
FRA leaders and committee members always urge people to participate in these meetings 
which are always open for anyone to participate in.  
 People are also encouraged to attend arrangements - meetings, marches, workshops, 
discussion forums like the SMI and CPF - both inside and outside of the community. At one 
meeting where the W-FRA leader received a price for her arrangement of the Diwali-
celebration she said “the biggest appreciation is when people attend all kinds of functions” 
(speaking at community meeting in Westcliff, 27.10.06). During my stay in the community 
the weekly meetings went unabated, and in addition to the political activities, the W-FRA 
arranged a weekly feeding-scheme (every Thursday) with resources from its own constituents. 
The activity of the W-FRA and its members were very visible in the community, and 
facilitated a communication between the constituents and the organisation.  
 This thesis argues that frequent communication between the CSOs and their 
constituents is crucial for strengthening their legitimacy in the long run. Krishna argues that 
“it takes long time and repeated and continuous interactions for CBOs to acquire legitimacy 
with their constituents” (2004:9). In a political climate such as that in Westcliff and Bayview 
where several individuals are trying to portray themselves as the people‟s representatives, but 
rather promote their own interests, people do not easily trust people that come with nice 
words and promises. Based on this reality, the thesis argues that it is important for the CSOs 
to go through with repeated actions over a long period to show people that the CSOs are 
accountable to them. 
 
The majority of the people I spoke with in Westcliff were very grateful for the W-FRA 
leaders‟ efforts and personal contributions in the community. One informant in Westcliff 
emphasised the imperative role the W-FRA leader had played in the ongoing work of the 
organisation throughout her time as the leader, saying: 
There will be no organization after [W-FRA leader] steps down because nobody can 
stand up and speak for the people. Nobody will take a slap or the words that [W-FRA 
leader] took, even the teargas - she was tear-gassed, she was bitten by the dog - 
security dogs. She takes our problems, she goes to High Court. She stands up with 
everyone‟s issues. If she falls down, the organization falls down. There‟ll be no 
organization, the community will fall down.” 
                                       (Interview,W-FRA member 1) 
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These sentiments were apparent among several of my informants in Westcliff, and some in 
Bayview. When I asked what would happen if the W-FRA leader would resign, she brutally 
said: “I will commit suicide. You can‟t do anything alone, you need to be well-organised, you 
need the crowd” (Interview,W-FRA member 1).  
 
In addition to having frequent actions, the conduction of transparent and open elections is also 
important. Every year in Westcliff, the W-FRA holds an annual general meeting (AGM) 
where leader and committee members are elected/re-elected. As mentioned earlier, the W-
FRA has had almost the same committee for many years. When asking the W-FRA leader 
why she had been the leader since the birth of the organisation, she said: 
Well, for many, many years we are challenging the system, having elections, and all 
the time people are electing the same person. There were times when I gave in a letter 
of resignation and …maybe I‟m tired now, and people wouldn‟t accept. You know, 
then you just think you have to go on.  
 
None of my informants in Westcliff had any negative comments on the conduction of 
elections in the community, or on the membership-composition of the W-FRA.   
 
The W-FRA is a CBO in its structure and organisation, and has chosen to keep a close 
communication with its constituents through its choice of organisational structure. Its distance 
to the political system discussed in the previous chapter, is also contributing to the 
maintenance of its close and open relation to its constituents. The adoption of an 
organisational structure promoting and facilitating participation by the constituents and 
transparency has strengthened the W-FRA‟s legitimacy. 
 
Although participation is important, how participation is encouraged has an impact on the 
CSOs‟ legitimacy. Chapter 5 discussed the differences in motivational framing and found that 
whilst the W-FRA encourages people to participate in all its activities by appealing to 
people‟s belief in God, the BFRA uses duress to motivate people to participate in meetings. 
What is striking is that the BFRA did not arrange regular community meetings and had only 
four meetings the last year (2006). Why did the BFRA leader use duress in forcing people to 
come in an upcoming meeting when only four meetings had been held the last year? His use 
of duress was done in the community meeting I attended (that was the only meeting held 
during the four months I was in the field) and he wanted people to attend a meeting the 
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following day. According to informants the meeting the leader spoke about was never held. 
Why did then the BFRA leader seem to be so desperate to attract participants to the meeting 
the following day when it was not even held? Can my presence in the meeting he said so be 
the reason? Was it to give me a good impression of the BFRA, being a white researcher from 
overseas? Or was it to portray the BFRA as an active organisation that needed to entice 
people with groceries to attract participation? Did the BFRA-leader try to give me an 
impression that the limited activity in the community was to blame on non-participation by 
the constituents? 
 
Non-Participation 
Non-participation is the lack of incentive by people to participate in their CSO‟s activities. In 
this sense, non-participation is voluntary and cannot be blamed directly on the CSOs, unless 
the CSOs are organised in a way that renders them illegitimate among their constituents 
resulting in the lack of interest or belief by the constituents in the CSO.  
 Some of my informants in both communities, independent of how they perceived the 
W-FRA or the BFRA, feel that the lack of agency among the people to engage in community-
issues could not solely be blamed on the CSOs, but that part of the blame should be put on the 
constituents. The lack of incentive among constituents is, amongst other things, blamed on 
their greediness. One Bayview resident said: “People want handouts, they don‟t utilise all 
opportunities given to them - like the Women Empowerment Centre (WEC) where they could 
learn how to sow clothes so they could earn a living - People don‟t want to work!”  She 
continued to say that people‟s lack of interest is to blame on the BFRA leader for not being 
actively involved in telling the people that WEC is a good opportunity for them 
(Interview,Bayview resident 1). Here non-participation is interlinked with the BFRA-leader‟s 
lack of motivational incentive to inform the people about opportunities they can make use of. 
Another „collective weakness‟ in the community was blamed on a lack of leadership 
and fortitude among the people to oppose the current BFRA committee‟s way of leading the 
community despite being unsatisfied with it. One Bayview resident said: “Strong leaders 
stand their ground”, and compared strong leaders with being like the W-FRA leaders in the 
neighbouring community Westcliff (Interview,Bayview resident 1). Another resident said the 
problems in Bayview are based on the community‟s lack of unity: “The challenge in the 
community is to stand and unite. (…) People complain about drugs, but if I would have a 
march against drugs, nobody would join me. No unity at all”, and that people will join the 
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organisation and fight only if they get something in return: “you must have something to 
suffice people here, honestly”. He continued to say: “People in Bayview love different people 
at different times. (…) I think so many Gods have come down here and changed the hearts of 
our people, it‟s hard” (Interview,Bayview resident 3). This also illustrates the complex nature 
of politics going on in the community as was discussed briefly in chapter 6 where there is a 
political competition between individuals over being the legitimate representatives of the 
people in the two communities.  
When having lived in Westcliff for quite some time I got the impression that people 
wanted to be freed from their arrears so they could start afresh, but that they could not free 
their arrears solely based on their personal efforts due to a structure of unemployment and 
limited opportunities to get an income. One resident in Bayview put me in two minds about 
this issue when he said: “They will keep the arrears as long as they get food. The only thing 
that people in this area think about is food” (Interview,Bayview resident 3). I know there are 
many people in Westcliff and Bayview that are in huge arrears due to non-payment. Many of 
these do have access to food on a daily basis, but I also heard of people that are too poor to 
buy food everyday. This utterance may have several meanings, but in the context it was said it 
pointed to people‟s lack of agency, of engaging in collective actions, to fight for scrapping 
their arrears. The informant said people did not bother about getting rid of their arrears as 
long as someone (organisations or individuals) give them food-hampers on a regular basis. 
His sentiment concurs with Bayview resident 1 saying that people only want handouts, and do 
not want to engage in activities that can enhance their situation.  
 
If taking these characteristics of the constituents into account, can one say that people want 
changes, but unless someone will make those changes for them, people are not going to 
engage in these struggles on their own initiative? If it is so, maybe the BFRA leader‟s use of 
duress, trying to entice people with access to groceries, is a good strategy to encourage 
participation? 
 
In Westcliff, one W-FRA member said similar things as some of the informants in Bayview, 
complaining on people‟s lack of incentive to engage in the W-FRA‟s activities and 
mobilisation:  
We have to still go on, never leave it [the struggle]. We must never sit back reluctant in 
our homes, we must fight our battle (…). We don‟t need fun and entertainment and all 
of this. We‟ll have that AFTER our struggle is over. People are getting bored. You see, 
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most of the people here they are running to entertainment world, but you are forgetting 
to see what is behind you! 
                 (Interview,W-FRA member 1) 
 
She continued to say that one has to make sacrifices to be actively involved in the struggle: 
“When you talk about meetings people don‟t show up, but if there‟s a show people come to 
me and ask „why you didn‟t tell me?‟”. She argues people are not willing to sacrifice their 
time and efforts in doing community work, and says that she leaves her child at home, 
although she does not like it, in order to do the duties appointed to her by the W-FRA. She 
believes all should make an effort to win the struggle (she wishes for a good home, a job and 
education for her children) before enjoying entertainment and be relaxed in ones home. 
 
Non-participation and free-riders 
Based on the utterances above, are the people in Bayview and Westcliff, which are not 
actively involved in organisational activities, so-called „free-riders‟22?  
Free-riding is a question of why rational, self-interested individuals would act to 
achieve a collective good when they can withhold contributions and still enjoy the fruits of 
others‟ collective efforts (Olson 1965 in Benford 1993:197). Rational choice explanations of 
collective political action focus on explaining why individuals do not participate rather than 
explaining why they do (Finkel et al. 1989).  
Judging from the utterances presented above it seems that there are people in the two 
communities that are benefiting from other‟s collective efforts, but even so, are they free-
riders? To assess whether it is a matter of free-riding or not one has to take into account the 
activity of the CSOs, and the current happenings in the two communities regarding issues 
they mobilise against. Can one argue that in communities where there are no urgent 
happenings, such as forced evictions and implementation of prepaid meters, that non-
participation is a matter of free-riding? And what does non-participation have to do with 
legitimacy? 
 
                                                 
22
 Informants used the expression „jumping on the bandwagon‟ of people who withheld their own contribution to 
the struggle in the area, and benefited from the CSO‟s work although doing nothing. One example is people I 
knew about in Westcliff who could afford to pay their rates and additional living expenses, but that withheld 
their payments and had illegal access to electricity and water like others who simply could not afford it. These 
people would not necessarily participate in the CSO activities.     
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Westcliff 
In Westcliff, the W-FRA is very active arranging weekly meetings, feeding schemes, huge 
celebrations (Diwali), as well as encouraging its members and constituents to participate in 
forums at local, national and international levels. The W-FRA chooses to be active and tries 
to mobilise people into these activities despite not being faced with forced evictions or threats 
of violent clashes. In the absence of violent evictions, is non-participation in the W-FRA 
activities a matter of free-riding? 
The W-FRA‟s choice of being continuous active is a strategy to be better equipped to 
handle future happenings that necessitates collective mobilisation. It is argued that repeated 
and continuous interactions between CBOs and their constituents are important for CBOs to 
gain legitimacy, but also to avoid free-riding. Krishna argues: ”free riding is likely to be less 
common when people know they are likely to interact with each other and derive benefits 
over multiple occasions stretching out into the future” (2004:32). In line with this the W-
FRA‟s choice of being active in its community can be an important source to avoid free-
riding when it needs its constituents to participate in future mobilisation. Additionally, the W-
FRA‟s continuous active role in its constituency, in addition to the framing it utilises, is 
crucial to prove to people that the organisation is there for them. This thesis argues that 
despite a lack of involvement by some constituents, informants in Westcliff perceive the W-
FRA as legitimate based on the actions it has been part of, as well as the continued actions it 
arranges in the community. Non-involvement among the constituents in Westcliff can, thus, 
not be primarily blamed on the motivational framing or efforts by the W-FRA leadership, but 
on people‟s belief there is no need to attend meetings and other activities. Non-participation 
due to an individual‟s non-identification with the organisation‟s goals is exemplified earlier 
with the rate-payers that do not feel represented in the same way as the non-payers in the 
community. This seems to be an issue of inadequate inclusion of all in the framing work of 
the W-FRA, and that these constituent‟s feel safe in their homes because they are up-to-date 
with their payments. 
In Westcliff, the leaders‟ and committee‟s continued effort in keeping the W-FRA 
active and ongoing showed that mobilization was more frequent in Westcliff than in Bayview. 
 
Bayview 
The views among the informants above focus on people‟s voluntary non-participation. Non-
participation in Bayview is not to blame on free-riding when taking into account people‟s 
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non-participation in BFRA‟s activities. The reason for this assumption is that the BFRA has 
experienced a lull in its activity since late 2005 and generally the whole of 2006. The BFRA, 
judging from its limited activity in the community, seems to give low priority to frequent 
interactions with its constituents due to the lull in physical actions exerted by the authorities. 
Despite the organisational lull of the BFRA and the lull in forced evictions and similar actions 
exercised by the authorities, one BFRA member believes that there is no problem to gather a 
crowd to oppose forced evictions and engage in violent clashes should it be needed. In an 
interview with the BFRA leader he said that the organisation‟s activity is dependent on 
happenings in the community and upcoming issues. In periods with no specific happenings 
the organization sees no need of calling people in to meetings. Non-participation is here due 
exclusively to the BFRA‟s inactivity and limited communication with its constituents. 
 One BFRA member expressed indirectly that the BFRA was going to arrange a 
Christmas party to weigh up for its inactivity for a long period of time. She said: “Like how 
we had a Christmas [in December 2006], we used to bring the community back together, you 
see? They mustn‟t think we are lacking, [that] we go down, we are still there for our people” 
(Interview,BFRA member 1). It seems that this informant do see the lack of activity as a 
problem in that people will not know whether the BFRA is their representatives or not. In 
chapter 5 the importance of framing, and not least using framing, to facilitate collective action 
is crucial to attract participants. Simultaneously the thesis argued that being continuously 
active with one‟s constituents is important to maintain their support. This is also argued by 
Krishna (2004) that links the practice of frequent interaction between CBOs and their 
constituencies with the CBOs‟ attained legitimacy among their constituents, as well as to the 
prevention of free-riding.   
 
In Bayview, then, the lull in BFRA‟s activity is the main reason for non-participation in the 
community. With this in mind, the next part discusses legitimacy proportionately to non-
inclusion or exclusion of the constituents by their CSOs.   
 
Non-inclusion and exclusion  
Only in Bayview did people complain about the BFRA‟s way of conducting the annual 
general meeting (AGM). When asked how it works when the BFRA elects/re-elects a new 
committee one Bayview resident angrily said: “I think they [BFRA] never ever had like an 
election where they called people to voice their opinion and the people to choose the ones that 
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they want. There‟s never ever happened!” Later on in the interview she told me that the 
BFRA had recently carried through with the election of a new committee without the presence 
of the majority of the people: 
 
There was supposed to be an election. We set a date. [But] on [that] date they didn‟t 
have elections. So when they had elections, they had it with, like a few people. They 
didn‟t have a majority, you understand me? By the time we said „Jack Robertson‟ the 
election was done. Imagine we got a committee, we have people here, a thousand - can 
we have election with about 50 people? 
                                               (Interview,Bayview resident 1) 
 
Not only was the election carried through on a date unknown for most of the people in the 
community, but according to the same informant the BFRA leader and committee often use 
other methods to gain votes. She explained: “this is what they say „you have to elect me, 
otherwise when the groceries come I won‟t give you groceries‟. This is how they work, this is 
how they work” (Interview,Bayview resident 1). The BFRA‟s use of duress towards its 
constituents to keep its position in the community resembles a patron-client relation where the 
clients, who are the poor people in Bayview, become reliant on their patron, the BFRA, to 
have access to much-needed resources like groceries. The clients can often be coerced to do 
certain things, in this case re-elect the current leader and committee, in return for personal 
goods (Edigheji 2003).  
When speaking with the leader himself, the elections are fair and done openly with the 
whole community. He told me the AGM was initially done every year, but at one of the 
elections “the community then decided that we needed to amend the Constitution and make it 
a bi-AGM, so it would be every two year[s]” because they were seeing the same people were 
coming in the committee “they felt that it would be pointless re-electing after a year”.  The 
current committee has not been drastically changed over the years. According to the BFRA 
leader “in the last five years I can say that almost 90% of the people that are still in the current 
committee have been there, of the last four to five years” (Interview,BFRA leader).  
 
While the W-FRA holds frequent community meetings in its constituency, the BFRA 
in Bayview was close to inactive. The BFRA‟s lack of frequent meetings with its constituents 
is a problem, and many informants questioned it claiming they did not know what was going 
on in the area and that the BFRA was „invisible‟ in the sense that there were no community 
meetings, no action. One informant said with a resignation in her voice: “I can‟t even see a 
meeting, I can‟t see anything happen. Everything is like dead” (Interview,Bayview resident 
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8). Another informant felt excluded from the meetings angrily arguing that the BFRA had no 
communication with the people in its constituency whatsoever. His quote summarizes the 
general sentiment among most of my informants in Bayview when he said: 
You have to unite. And for the community to unite you have to have meeting, not by 
your house, but we have a community hall. Get the people out there, hire buses, let the 
people know „this is what we going through, this is what we going to do‟ so people 
will know „we are doing it because we live here‟. (…) Even the parties that was here at 
the bottom. No children from here were taken to the parties. How do we communicate 
with the chairperson who says he‟s running this place, what communication does he 
got with the people? 
                                              (Interview,Bayview resident 9) 
 
According to the leader in Bayview the BFRA has on average four to five community 
meetings in a year. But if there are certain issues that need to be resolved they have meetings 
almost every single week. “For example if they start disconnecting electricity tomorrow, then 
there will be meetings happening regularly until the issues are resolved” (Interview,BFRA 
leader). According to one BFRA committee member the turnout at community meetings is 
immense:  
When we call up [a meeting] we call up the whole area which is about 2000 or 
something. We have a good response. (…) we ask the people:‟what do you all say? 
Give us your voices so we can help you all. It‟s not for us to make decisions all the 
time, it‟s for you all to lead these decisions on‟.  
                            (Interview,BFRA member 1) 
 
I was surprised by this great number, especially when the crowd present at the one and only 
community meeting that was held in the area during my fieldwork period had approximately 
50 attendants. When asked why the BFRA had such few community meetings in a year the 
BFRA leader explained: 
For example in a year where there was not much activity there was no need to call a 
meeting, (…) apart from having a meeting (…) once every quarter. (…) But, as I said 
is difficult to say that it is just four meetings because sometimes we have a meeting 
almost every single week. (…) It all depends on the issues. For example if they start 
disconnecting electricity tomorrow, then there will be meetings happening regularly 
until the issues are resolved.  
 
Despite the BFRA‟s arguments that there is no need to conduct frequent community meetings 
in quiet periods its constituents do not share the same view. The discrepancy between the 
BFRA and its constituents‟ view on how things should be done and how the BFRA should 
work in its community, is weakening the BFRA‟s attained legitimacy among its constituents.  
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The BFRA‟s characteristics are on several aspects similar to the characteristics of NGOs as 
presented in chapter 3. NGOs are not necessarily driven by internal democracy and might 
exclude its constituents from participating in decision-making processes (Mercer 2002). The 
BFRA is accused by several informants of excluding its constituents from participating in 
election of a new committee that, according to the BFRA leader, is held every other year. 
Although the BFRA is organisationally separate from the government, the leader works in the 
eThekwini Municipality and is regarded with scepticism by his constituents. His job has 
already impacted on his activity in Bayview, and he cannot participate in all the spaces 
available for the people in Bayview, like the ward-elections. The current organisational 
structure of the BFRA renders it unaccountable among its constituents. Compared to the W-
FRA‟s organisational structure that facilitates and encourages a close communication with its 
constituents, the BFRA seems to be the W-FRA‟s total opposite.  
 
Whilst people in Bayview are concerned about the BFRA‟s invisibility and absence in the 
community as a whole, and complain that the BFRA committee, as a whole, excludes those 
not closely related to them by kin or friendship, the problem in Westcliff has another 
character. Whilst the W-FRA has an active presence and role in the community, and includes 
all that are interested in joining the organisation, some committee members complain on the 
behaviour of other members of the committee. One W-FRA member was worried that people 
in the community would not take the W-FRA seriously due to the inappropriate actions of a 
fellow committee member saying: “You never see new people sitting in the taxi going for 
shows (...) [the W-FRA member] take the same people and people question ME!” 
(Interview,W-FRA member 1). Based on several stories I heard about this particular 
committee member I had to ask the W-FRA leader why the W-FRA choose to keep a 
committee member that many perceived as a corrupt person. The leader explained that many 
people that are formally elected into the committee are not doing the community work 
demanded from them. Due to this, the daily workings of the W-FRA, and its continued 
existence in the community, is very dependent on the voluntary labour done by the committee 
members. Because of this, the W-FRA‟s dependency of the voluntary labour done by this 
member will be far more fruitful for the organisation as a whole than if expelling the person 
from the organisation. This has made me aware that despite seeing corruption as something 
that is unwanted, one has to accept it when the total gain of the organisation exceeds the total 
loss. In this case, loosing one person‟s free labour was far more costly than the partial loss of 
credibility in the committee as a result of that person‟s behaviour.  
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The interconnection of resources and participation  
When you look at community-based organisations, funders don‟t come and just 
fund you, they always rather fund a non-governmental organisation, an NGO, 
but NGOs don‟t actually do anything.  
                                      (Interview,W-FRA leader) 
 
Delivery is an important aspect of participation. This part will mainly look at how the CSOs‟ 
incoming resources are distributed to their constituents. An overview of the resource-flows in 
the two CSOs is presented in figure 2 and 3. The discussion will focus on two aspects: 1) the 
differences between where the CSOs‟ resources come from, and 2) the distribution of 
resources to their constituents.  Their different sources of resources are not directly impacting 
their attained legitimacy as much as their distribution of resources. They can rather be argued 
to strengthen the sentiments the constituents have of their CSOs.  
As seen in the figures, the CSOs have similar resource-flows, but differ mainly on two 
aspects: The first is that the BFRA receives resources from the local state, and the W-FRA 
does not. The second is that the W-FRA receives resources from its constituents. This did not 
seem to be the case in the BFRA. These differences impact on their attained legitimacy. 
While BFRA‟s access to resources from the state weakens its legitimacy among its 
constituents, for reasons that will be discussed later, the W-FRA‟s access to resources by its 
own constituents is a source to strengthen its legitimacy. 
Resources are defined as tangible and non-tangible resources. The tangible resources 
are commodities such as sewing machines, computers, clothes, and food distributed by the 
CSO to its constituents within the boundaries of the community. The non-tangible resources 
can be anything from entertainment, the provision of free transport, to activities leading to 
building up people‟s personal resources and social networks through educational workshops, 
seminars, lectures and forums at local, national, and even international level (such as the 
WSF).  
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Bayview
Figure 2:  Flows of resources into and from the BFRA 
 
According to BFRA leader and some committee members many activities are currently 
benefiting the community. They have a youth organization that is part of the eThekwini 
Development Forum, monthly distribution of food hampers and occasionally clothing, 
distribution of stationary and school uniforms at school start, they offer home-based 
HIV/AIDS care, access to equipment (loud hailer and PH system) to show films and 
communicate with the community given by the CBP ward development program in which the 
BFRA leader is currently working, a computer centre at a primary school in Bayview with 
sponsored computers given by the Nelson Mandela Children‟s Fund, and they arranged a big 
Christmas party in December 2006.   
 
The BFRA leader argues for the positive aspects of having access to resources from the state, 
however, the BFRA has weakened its legitimacy in its constituency, not due to the resources 
coming from the state, but because they do not reach the people. His job in the municipality, 
as discussed in chapter 6, is a source of great concern among the constituents that rather 
strengthens the view on the BFRA as illegitimate. 
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According to informants many the resources are not reaching the people. People claim the 
BFRA has access to resources it keeps secret for the rest of the community. Some people 
accuse committee members of dividing huge sums of money among themselves:  
People have been misusing funding! That is why the Bayview Flats Residents 
Association is not resisting! It‟s a family-thing, it‟s a friendship-thing, it‟s not because 
you are focusing on the poor of the poorest! 
           (Interview,Bayview resident 1) 
 
People that are not part of this close-knit system of friendship and family ties do not have 
access to the resources managed by the BFRA. People‟s opinions on how resources are used 
in Bayview are also interlinked with the low level of activity by the BFRA in the community 
making it even more difficult for people to see how the resources are used. These claims of 
corruption weaken the legitimacy of the BFRA among its constituents. 
 Resources already known by the constituents to be in possession of the BFRA are not 
used on the constituents, although the BFRA leader claiming that they are. One informant 
said:  
I didn‟t even know the organization sponsored computers, but they [other residents] 
said there was, and I don‟t even know where the computers are. You see, Bayview 
don‟t even have a youth [organisation]. (…) So I don‟t have any idea where are these 
computers gone to! 
              (Interview,Bayview resident 7) 
 
Another youth concurringly lamented: “We don‟t have a youth organization, nothing!  
Everything was sponsored” (Interview,Bayview resident 6). Another Bayview resident said 
that the BFRA has access to sowing machines that are not in use.  
It is also claimed that resources are used by the BFRA to contain complaints by the 
constituency against the BFRA. One young resident lamented: “They have this way of 
shutting people by giving them groceries and full of stuff” (Interview,Bayview resident 7). 
Another resident concurred saying that the BFRA are “…Giving them groceries, giving out 
clothes to them, but if you don‟t speak against them you can get, but if you don‟t get, 
especially me, because I confront them and say „what is going on‟” (Interview,Bayview 
resident 8). When asking a Bayview resident if he sees any bright future for the community, 
he said: 
To be honest, if there is no change within the structure of chair and vice-chair and the 
organization itself, I don‟t see it moving very far. It‟s always going to be the way it is. 
The people that are on the top are going to be gaining, and the poor, that are always 
poor, are going to remain like this until it‟s finished  and it‟s going the be the same 
thing over and over again. 
                        (Interview,Bayview resident 7) 
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According to Professor Fatima Meer, small grassroots organizations like the two CSOs in 
Bayview and Westcliff do not have corruption:   
 
Not when organisations like us have funding. We are scrupulous; it‟s never ever any 
corruption. We don‟t ask for more money than we need. I mean I‟m very, very strict on 
this. You budget for the event, and then you go out and find the money that you need 
to see that the event succeeds”  
 
 
Despite the fact that these organisations are small-scale, do not receive any regular funding, 
and do not have a bank account or a treasurer, the informants in Bayview have refuted the 
assumption that there cannot be any corruption in such small organisations as the BFRA. 
Whether resources are divided among only the leadership, or simply not in use despite being 
accessible, are two forms of corruption. 
 
In Westcliff, however, the W-FRA‟s way of managing incoming resources is done in the way 
described by Professor Meer. They canvass for funding and support to carry through specific 
projects, events and happenings in their constituency (see Appendix 5).  
 
Westcliff
Figure 3:  Flows of resources into and from the W-FRA 
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The W-FRA is highly active and visible in its constituency through regular meetings and 
activities. Incoming resources are usually accounted for in plenum at the regular Wednesday 
meetings.  Most of my informants were happy with the effort and personal financial 
contributions made by the W-FRA leader and her family to carry through different events 
(like Diwali and feeding scheme). Except for some complaining on a devious committee 
member (as discussed earlier) no one had anything negative to say about the W-FRA‟s way of 
distributing resources. 
 
The collection of resources by the constituents to the W-FRA was done to be able to carry 
through the weekly feeding schemes. This thesis argues that by letting the constituency 
contribute with their own resources, as well as their own labour to carry through activities 
such as the feeding scheme, people will feel ownership and pride of having contributed to the 
successful carrying-out of such activities. Sitting together with the activists and volunteers 
cutting vegetables and preparing the food was a nice experience and it seemed as if these 
collective activities strengthened friendship ties among the constituents. In one occasion, 
however, one resident was excluded from participating to the carrying-out of the feeding-
scheme as the money she donated was rejected by the W-FRA leaders. The rejection was 
based on personal conflicts between them, and the W-FRA leader‟s belief that the donation 
was made based on devious intentions.   
 
In Westcliff it seems that the way resources are distributed is not so closely connected to who 
participates in the activities. People are informed about upcoming activities, events, and 
distribution of groceries through the Wednesday meetings. By participating in the community 
meetings, or by speaking with those that participated, one will get access to the resources 
coming in. When it comes to grocery hampers these are distributed in turn due to limited 
parcels. Those 20 families that receive a grocery hamper today will not receive next time as it 
will be given to other families that did not receive any hampers the first time. This system of 
rotation is supposed to divide the resources as fairly as possible. Although the W-FRA in 
general is seen as distributing their resources fairly, one W-FRA committee member 
complained that another committee member on occasions took several grocery hampers. 
Despite complaints within the committee on one of their members, the general views of the 
W-FRA were positive.  
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Summary 
Three forms of participation have been discussed in this chapter, as well as the 
interconnection between participation and access to resources. The discussion here has shown 
that the BFRA has excluded most of its constituents from important processes such as 
decision-making, and has very limited communication with its constituents due to few and 
irregular community meetings. The BFRA is also accused of hiding information from its 
constituents regarding incoming resources. The issue of distribution of resources was very 
contentious when speaking with informants in Bayview. When asked what they think about 
their CSO many spoke explicitly of the BFRA‟s misuse of resources. Limited activities by the 
BFRA in its constituency, together with claims of corruption and misuse of resources have 
severely weakened the BFRA‟s position in its constituency as well as its legitimacy. The 
conclusion is clearly that the BFRA‟s way of excluding the people, having limited interaction 
with its constituents, and rather speaking on behalf of them than with them makes it look 
similar to an NGO which is distanced from the people. It seems people‟s participation in the 
BFRA activities is secondary to the BFRA‟s functions and existence. As a result people think 
the BFRA is illegitimate because it does not work in line with their interests, and therefore 
does not really represent them although claiming to do so.   
 The W-FRA, on the other hand, seems to be the BFRA‟s opposite. By conducting 
weekly community meetings and feeding schemes the W-FRA has a good and frequent 
communication with its constituents. Its way of working and interacting with its constituency 
has shown the people that it is transparent and all-inclusive. Generally people had good 
sentiments and opinions about the W-FRA. These findings show that the W-FRA has an 
important and central role in this constituency that has contributed to strengthening its 
legitimacy among its constituents. Its way of working, focusing on being close to the people, 
renders it looking very similar to a typical community-based organisation (CBO).  
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7.    CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has done a comparative study of two superficially identical CSOs, namely the 
Westcliff Flats Residents Association (W-FRA), and the Bayview Flats Residents Association 
(BFRA). They both developed as a response against the worsened socioeconomic conditions 
after apartheid, and have been mobilising together in an effort to demand affordable rent and 
services from the government. Despite sharing the same aims and having used identical 
strategies throughout their existence, they have since around 2005 gone in different directions. 
My aim has been to assess their differences, and how their current mode of working has been 
able to give them legitimacy among their constituents. The thesis has focused on the strategies 
they have used to present themselves as the legitimate representatives of the people, and how 
these strategies have strengthened or weakened their legitimacy. Legitimacy has been 
assessed through four concepts that have guided the discussion, namely; framing, political 
strategies, participation, and delivery. The concepts have been developed and inspired both by 
three themes in social movement theories (cultural framing, political opportunity structure, 
and mobilising structure), and by the empirical material gathered from the field. The main 
research question to be answered was:  
 
What strategies are utilized by CSOs to present themselves as the legitimate 
representatives of the people, and how are these strategies able to give them 
legitimacy within their constituencies? 
 
In order to answer this question I have identified three sets of „strategies‟ or ways of working 
employed by the CSOs, and assessed legitimacy through looking at each of these „issues‟. 
Each issue was formed as questions aiming at shedding light on the four aspects of 
legitimacy. It is important to note that the four aspects illuminated through the three following 
questions are interconnected. 
 
The first issue is cultural framing and looks at the interaction between the CSOs and their 
constituents. The question posed was:  
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How do the CSOs frame their demands, how do they present themselves as the solution 
to the problems, and how does their choice of motivational framing impact on their 
legitimacy? 
 
This issue was assessed through scrutinising the CSOs‟ use of framing strategies to identify 
problems, attribute blame, create a collective, all-inclusive „we‟ identity, propose solutions to 
their problems, and motivate people to take part in collective actions. Finding that the two 
CSOs generally share the same strategies in framing their demands and proposing solutions, 
the main difference was the leaders‟ motivational framing. The BFRA leader used a „material 
benefit‟ frame mainly based on duress and enticement that contributed partly to the 
weakening of its legitimacy among its constituents. The W-FRA leader‟s use of a „divine 
benefit‟ frame based on persuasion and sweet talk, however, seemed appealing to the people 
and did not have any negative effects on the W-FRA‟s legitimacy.  
 
The second issue looks at the relation between the CSOs and the formal political system by 
assessing their political strategies:  
 
What relation do the CSOs have to the formal political system, and how does this 
relation impact on the legitimacy of the CSOs? 
The two CSOs differ mainly on their relation to the state. The BFRA leader currently has a 
full-time job in the municipality and is not very active in its constituency. Although the leader 
argues that his position will provide the community with much-needed resources, his 
constituents are generally discontent about his job. They perceive the state and anyone 
associated with it negatively. This perception of the state has been fed to them through the 
CSOs‟ framing of the state as the enemy. The discrepancy between what the BFRA leader 
says and what he does has fostered sentiments of anger, frustration, resignation, and confusion 
amongst his constituents. The BFRA leader‟s close ties with the political system represents a 
double-moral that the constituents are not willing to accept, and has generally weakened the 
legitimacy of the BFRA.  
 The W-FRA leader is reluctant to work within state structures believing that it will 
only impair their struggle. Her sentiments and her actions are in harmony with how the W-
FRA frames the state. The choice of working outside state structures and focusing on being 
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close to the people has strengthened the reputation and the legitimacy of the W-FRA in its 
constituency and outside.   
 
The last issue looks at the interconnection between the constituents‟ participation in CSO 
activities and their access to resources (delivery) and asks: 
 
How do the CSOs organise community participation (and distribute resources) and how does 
this impact on the legitimacy of the CSOs?  
 
As seen in the last chapter the CSOs differ much on how they include and exclude their 
constituents in CSO activities. The BFRA‟s way of excluding its constituents from various 
spheres of participation or simply choosing not to engage its constituents in its workings by 
having few and irregular meetings and closed decision-making processes, have rendered it 
illegitimate amongst its constituents. The W-FRA‟s conduction of weekly meetings and 
regular activities that are open for all constituents to participate in, have facilitated and 
encouraged participation and transparency through regular interaction between the W-FRA 
and the constituency. As such, it has strengthened its legitimacy in its constituency. 
 
The findings are summarised in table 1. 
 
Table 1: Overview of the BFRA and the W-FRA’s strategies for legitimacy  
 Bayview Flats Residents 
Association (BFRA) 
Westcliff Flats Residents Association  
(W-FRA)    
 
Framing 
„Material benefit‟ frame based on 
duress 
„Divine benefit‟ frame based on 
persuasion and sweet-talk 
Political 
strategies 
 
Engagement 
Define terms of engagement 
(autonomy-way-of-thinking) 
 
Organisation 
 
Assumed adherence  
(indirect representation) 
System for internal 
democracy/adherence  
(in relation to community meetings: 
report and feedback = dialogue) 
Source: Fieldwork.  
 
Although the W-FRA and the BFRA initially were community-based organisations (CBOs) 
when they started organising in the late 1990s, they have on the basis of their choices of 
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strategies developed in different directions. While the W-FRA has maintained its CBO 
character and its closeness to the people on the ground, the BFRA has distanced itself from 
the people it is supposed to represent and have lost much of its credibility. Its characteristics 
are more similar to NGOs that do not necessarily have a close relation to the people on the 
ground. In a climate of political contestation between individuals and groups over being the 
people‟s representatives in both Bayview and Westcliff, it is hard for the CSOs to maintain 
their position. The people in Bayview, especially, expressed a sense of confusion and 
frustration over the invisibility of the BFRA and anger over not knowing what was 
happening. This thesis argues that CSOs that have continuous interactions with its 
constituents and activities that require their involvement will strengthen their role and position 
in their constituencies as the people‟s representatives. Where the opposite happens, where 
CSOs have limited communication with their constituents, other individuals/groups can more 
easily disturb the CSO‟s position in the community and attract its supporters towards their 
alternative organisations. The W-FRA and the BFRA‟s historical role and significance in the 
two communities stand strong in people‟s memories today. They have a history of being the 
people‟s guardians by being in the forefront protecting people against forced evictions and 
police violence, re-connecting their water and electricity, fighting court-battles, going in 
marches, and networking with other struggles, as well as engaging the municipality in 
discussions. Having a strong history to refer to, the people in both constituencies still regard 
both the W-FRA and the BFRA as the only organisations that can fight the poor people‟s 
battles. However, the BFRA‟s diminished role over a long period of time has distanced itself 
from the people to an extent that people are starting to turn their back on it.  
 
What can these findings say about the role legitimacy have in political struggles over 
socioeconomic improvements?  
 
The first issue to be learnt is that CSOs should „practice what they preach‟ and avoid 
discrepancies between what they say and what they do. Many poor people have experienced 
local state officials coming into their communities during elections making promises of 
socioeconomic improvements that are never implemented. Seeing the same tendencies within 
their supposedly representative organisations will weaken the organisations‟ support-base and 
distance them from the people they are supposed to represent. Looking at the fragmented 
struggles in South Africa and the ebb and flow of social struggles in general, it is important to 
117 
 
take into account the importance of legitimacy in keeping up the activity and the struggle of 
community-based organisations.  
 
Another issue is the importance of keeping up the activity of the CSOs in their constituencies, 
no matter if these activities are apolitical and concerned around local issues within the 
constituency. The W-FRA has shown, through its perseverance and continuous activity in and 
outside its constituency that it matters to have a continuous interaction with its constituents. 
Not only to maintain the support-base, but to foster good relations in the community and a 
sense of security that the CSO is there to help in people‟s everyday struggles. Having a good 
interaction between the constituents and the CSO will facilitate future mobilisation. 
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APPENDIX 1: List of Interviews 
The following list is an overview of all the interviews conducted for the purpose of this thesis. 
Those not referred to explicitly in the text are also included. All informants, except three, 
have been made anonymous and are referred to with codes such as “Bayview resident 1”. The 
interviews that were conducted with more than one informant are separated as individual 
interviews in the list to protect the anonymity of the informants.  
 
W-FRA members           Date of interview 
W-FRA leader        09.01.07 
W-FRA member 1        17.12.06 
W-FRA member 2        17.12.06 
W-FRA member 3        20.12.06 
W-FRA member 4        21.12.06  
W-FRA-member 5        21.12.06 
W-FRA member 6        04.01.07 
W-FRA member 7        06.01.07 
  
Westcliff residents 
Westcliff resident 1        20.12.06 
Westcliff resident 2        20.12.06 
Westcliff resident 3        21.12.06 
Westcliff resident 4        04.01.07 
Westcliff resident 5        05.01.07 
Westcliff resident 6        05.01.07 
Westcliff resident 7        05.01.07 
Westcliff resident 8        21.12.06 
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Westcliff resident 9        21.12.06 
    
BFRA members 
BFRA leader           08.01.07 
BFRA member 1        29.12.06 
BFRA member 2        08.01.07 
 
Bayview residents 
Bayview resident 1        29.12.06 
Bayview resident 2        29.12.06 
Bayview resident 3        31.12.06 
Bayview resident 4        07.01.07 
Bayview resident 5        08.01.07 
Bayview resident 6        08.01.07 
Bayview resident 7        08.01.07 
Bayview resident 8        08.01.07 
Bayview resident 9        08.01.07 
 
Other informants 
Richard Pithouse, academic/activist       15.11.06 
Professor Fatima Meer, academic/activist/CCF-leader   09.01.07 
Rocky Naidoo, PR Councilor (Democratic Alliance)   01.11.06 
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APPENDIX 2: List of Events 
 
EVENT ORGANISATIONS/PEOPLE 
PRESENT 
PLACE DATE 
Rally CCDT activists, BFRA,  
W-FRA, ABM, SDCEA, WDF 
Crossmoor 
(Chatsworth) 
24.09.2006 
Urgency meeting W-FRA and CCDT Westcliff   25.09.2006 
Court case for Crossmoor 
‟landinvadors‟ 
CCDT, W-FRA, (BFRA), 
ABM, SDCEA, (WDF), 
Ashwin Desai, Heinrich 
Bhömke, lawyers and attorneys 
Durban High Court 26.09.2006 
Engen meeting. Protest 
against the upgrade of 
Engen‟s HF Alkylation 
Unit 
SDCEA, WDF, ABM,  
W-FRA, BFRA 
Austerville Civic 
Centre (Wentworth)  
27.09.2006 
Community meeting W-FRA, CCDT Westcliff 28.09.2006 
SMI meeting W-FRA, Bayview residents CCS/UKZN 30.09.2006 
Feeding scheme W-FRA and others Westcliff 05.10.2006 
SMI meeting W-FRA, Bayview residents CCS/UKZN 07.10.2006 
Diwali celebration W-FRA and  Chatsworth 
communities  
Westcliff 22.10.2006 
SMI meeting W-FRA, Bayview residents CCS/UKZN 24.10.2006 
Moved into Westcliff  Westcliff 25.10.2006 
Feeding scheme WFRA+Westcliff residents Westcliff 26.10.2006 
Community meeting  WFRA+Westcliff residents Westcliff 27.10.2006 
SMI workshop ABM, WFRA, SDCEA, CCDT, 
PSM, CCS, Ashwin Desai 
 
CCS/UKZN 28.10.2006 
Public community 
meeting 
150 families from Westcliff, 
some from Silver Heights, 
Bayview residents 
Westcliff 29.10.2006 
Workshop on 
Reconciliation and 
Development 
SIT students + activists 
(WFRA, Bayview activists, 
SDCEA, WDF), writer: Faith 
Ka‟Manzi 
CCS/UKZN 1-3 + 6-7 Nov. 2006 
Feeding scheme WFRA+Westcliff residents Westcliff 02.11.2006 
SMI meeting  CCS/UKZN 04.11.2006 
Extraordinary community 
meeting 
WFRA + constituents, Bayview 
residents, CCDT, Silver 
Heights, SIT students 
Prof.Meer, Prof.Bond, Des 
D‟Sa (SDCEA)  
 
Westcliff 05.11.2006 
Pain of Africa: SDCEA 
call out South Durban and 
Durban residents to speak 
out on the abuse of 
Multinational 
Corporations 
BFRA, WFRA, SDCEA, CCS, 
WDF, eThekwini Municipality  
 
Austerville Civic 
Centre (Wentworth) 
08.11.2006 
Feeding scheme W-FRA+constituents Westcliff 09.11.2006 
*(Legal) protest  
 
Calling South Durban and 
Durban residents to a  
public protest at the Shell  
and BP (SAPREF)  
Around 500 people: 
Residents/activists from 
Westcliff, Bayview, 
Wentworth, Umlazi, SIT 
students, PSM, 
activists/academics: Patrick 
Outside SAPREF main 
gate (Isipingo)  
10.11.2006 
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Refinery Bond, Dennis Brutus, Harald 
Witt and more 
Corpse Awards Speakers: Patrick Bond (CCS), 
Dennis Brutus (CCS,?), Bobby 
Peek (Groundwork), Trevor 
Ngwane (APF?, SECC), 
residents/activists from 
Westcliff and Bayview (and 
more people) 
Claremont Race-
Course (Durban) 
10.11.2006 
Crossmoor 
rally/Christmas party 
W-FRA leader, local 
D.A.councillor Devan Naicker, 
CCDT and Crossmoor residents 
Crossmoor 
(Chatsworth)  
12.11.2006 
Folk dance and music 
from North-Eastern India 
Westcliff and Bayview 
residents/activists, Professor 
Fatima Meer (IBR), and the 
Consulate General of India in 
Durban, eThekwini 
Municipality, Aryan 
Benevolent Home 
Pattunden Theatre, 80 
Arena Park Drive, Unit 
6 (Chatsworth) 
13.11.2006 
Community meeting W-FRA+Westcliff residents Westcliff 15.11.2006 
Feeding scheme W-FRA+Westcliff residents Westcliff 16.11.2006 
Community meeting BFRA+Bayview residents Bayview 16.11.2006 
Ward elections (for ward 
69 Bayview, and 70 
Westcliff) 
BFRA+W-FRA 
activists/residents 
Bayview and unit 5 
(Chatsworth) 
18.11.2006 
Community meeting  WFRA+Westcliff residents Westcliff 22.11.2006 
CPF meeting WFRA Unit 5 (Chatsworth) 22.11.2006 
GRAIN workshop WFRA, Bayview residents, SIT 
students, SDCEA, WDF, 
Groundwork, and more 
(activists from different parts of 
the world) 
Botanical Gardens 
(Durban) 
23.11.2006 
Feeding scheme WFRA+Westcliff residents Westcliff 23.11.2006 
SMI meeting  CCS/UKZN 25.11.2006 
FXI workshop WFRA, Bayview residents, 
SDCEA, Harrissmith (Free 
state) and others 
CCS/UKZN 25.11.2006 
Community meeting WFRA+Westcliff residents Westcliff 29.11.2006 
Wolpe Lecture: 
Archbishop Ndungane on 
“Africans and 
Development” 
WFRA, BFRA, and others UKZN 30.11.2006 
SMI conference WFRA,TAC,Bayview activists, 
AEC,LPM,APF, CCDT, 
Fishermen,Abasha Youth, 
SDCEA,WDF, Jubilee South 
Africa, Dennis Brutus, Fatima 
Meer and others  
UKZN 2 - 6.12.2006  
Wolpe Lecture: George 
Galloway “Muslim 
views” 
WFRA,BFRA?,CCDT,SDCEA, 
WDF, Dennis Brutus, 
Prof.Bond, Heinrich Bhömke 
and others 
UKZN 13.12.2006 
Christmas party (I was not present) Bayview 18.12.2006 
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APPENDIX 3: Eviction Letter 
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APPENDIX 4: Transferring of ownership letter 
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APPENDIX 5: Sponsor letter  
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APPENDIX 6: Interview Questions and topics 
All the interviews done with the BFRA/W-FRA leaders, committee members, and 
constituents had an informal character where several issues were discussed. Due to the myriad 
of questions asked in different ways, and various probing (follow-up) questions used, I have 
chosen to present the core questions and topics that were spoken about in the interviews, and 
that are most relevant for this thesis. 
 
Common questions for BFRA/W-FRA leaders: 
 When and why involved in the current struggle, ever been part of anti-apartheid 
struggle? 
 Have you experienced violent clashes with police/security personnel during 
mobilizations? 
 About BFRA/W-FRA:  
o Information on organizational structure (structure of committee: how has it 
changed since its beginning? internal division of labour, decision-making 
processes and conduction of community meetings, does the organization have 
an office), available resources, aims, current activities/campaigns, challenges 
(internal/external). 
 What forums are you involved in concerning the community? 
 What is the BFRA/W-FRA doing to fight social problems in the community (drugs, 
domestic violence, police corruption)? 
 Does the organization have „struggle-plumbers/-electricians‟? 
 Do most people that support the organisation not pay rent? How many do not pay rent 
in this community? Do you promote people not to pay rent? 
 Opinion on working within the state:  
o will working within state-structures benefit the community/struggle in any 
way? If being a local councilor, can one do much to help the 
community/struggle or will one be restrained? Can resources from working 
within the formal political system benefit the communities?  
 What do you think about ward-elections? 
 What do you think about social movements working for the people on the ground, 
trying to become a political party with an idea of having a positive impact on the 
ground? 
 Did you ever vote ANC? 
 Do you cooperate with other individuals in the community that represent other 
organisations or affiliations? What about the local school-principal, religious leaders 
etc.? 
 How is the unity between the „flatted‟ communities (Westcliff, Bayview, Crossmoor 
and Woodhurst) in Chatsworth today, and how has it changed since the CCF? 
 What do you think about the Social Movements Indaba (SMI)? 
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 Opinions on future of the community and the struggle 
 
BFRA leader: 
 Does your job in the municipality benefit the community and other communities, 
how? 
 The area has social problems like drugs, domestic violence and crime, you said that 
your organization has an HIV/AIDS unit; do you work with drugs in the area and the 
youth? 
 What do you define as poverty, and how many poor people are there in this area? 
 Do you have arrears? 
 Have you been threatened with eviction and been cut-off from water/electricity, are 
you illegally connected to water/electricity? 
 
W-FRA leader: 
 How did the struggle in Chatsworth start? 
 How many people were you together trying to organise? 
 How did it develop until Fatima Meer and Ashwin Desai (CCF)came? 
 Who taught you about what strategies to use? That time, how did you get 
funding/resources to do those actions? 
 What was the difference between the CCG and the CCF? 
 Of all the strategies used (in- and out-of-system), which of these do you think were the 
most powerful ones? 
 Which years were the most active, were most things happened? 
 How did the CCF help? 
 Do you think police repression and this brutality against people can scare people away 
from resisting?  
 How would you describe an ordinary member of the organisation? 
 How do you create a community-feeling or a unity in the community (e.g. through 
arrangement of Diwali)? 
 Have you been offered a good job in any political party? 
 Can you tell me about the previous upgrading of the flats? 
 What makes you continue being a leader despite all the challenges you have met? 
 What will happen if you resign, will your constituents be able to continue the fight? 
 
BFRA/W-FRA members: 
 When/why involved in the current struggle, ever been part of anti-apartheid struggle? 
 Current struggles and challenges, how to deal with them 
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 The organisation‟s activities, aims, accomplishments, and strategies (knowledge about 
the organization, personal involvement/relation to it, and personal opinion on its role) 
 Opinions about the state, its ‟s role and whether current government will make 
socioeconomic improvements (relation to/perception of the state) 
 Opinions about the constituents‟ involvement in the CSO activities and how to/why 
involve them 
 How define themselves, (poor?) and others (in the community, the state) 
 Opinions about the future 
 
Bayview/Westcliff constituents: 
 When and why moved to Westcliff? 
 Ever been part of previous (anti-apartheid) or current struggles, why, why not? 
 Current living conditions and what challenges faced with? Any idea how to combat 
the problems? 
 Opinions about BFRA/W-FRA (is BFRA/W-FRA a good avenue to create changes in 
the community?) 
 Opinions about the government and socioeconomic living conditions in the 
community 
 Future predictions about their life and the struggle in the community  
 How they define themselves (poor?) and is CSO representing them. 
 The organizational landscape in the community: what forces are at play, and who do 
they „support‟? 
 
Professor Fatima Meer:  
 When did you get involved in the Chatsworth struggles and why? 
 What role did the CCF have with working with the communities in Chatsworth? 
 Do you see any differences or similarities from the strategies that people used during 
the apartheid period and now 
 Do you think there is a need to revive an umbrella body like the CCF again and is it 
possible to unite all the struggles? 
 Do you think the WSF is a good forum to voice the people‟s voices on the ground 
worldwide? 
 Do you think ANC or any other political party will make changes to the betterment of 
the poor people? 
 Are social movements necessary? 
 What strategies have been effective and what strategies should be employed by social 
movements? 
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Richard Pithouse: 
 Why are social movements necessary? 
 What role can academics play in social movements‟ struggles? 
 Do today‟s struggles differ much from the anti-apartheid struggles?  
 What do you think about the Social Movements Indaba in trying to unite the struggles 
or at least trying to make a platform for people to voice their experiences and 
grievances and their struggles on the ground?  What do you see as the main challenges 
for movements uniting? 
 What do you think about the future of social movements/local struggles in South 
Africa? 
 What do you think is the strength of the CBOs being very local and very small? Do 
you think uniting with other communities and social movements, like ABM, would be 
a good idea? 
 Do you thing social movements should keep away from politics, and not involve 
themselves as political parties, to actually have an impact on the ground? 
 Do you think it‟s fruitful for activists to attend workshops and seminars?  
 
Local councilor Rocky Naidoo (D.A): 
 What is your role as a local councillor? 
 In what degree have you been involved in the local struggles in Chatsworth? 
 How free is your mandate to actually be involved in the struggles of the people in 
these areas? 
 Do you support the struggle?  
 What challenges do you meet by being in an ANC dominated council? 
 Do you see any way forward for local councillors and community activists to work 
together on issues of housing, basic services, and service delivery? 
 
 
